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1.  Summary findings
1. The history of the UK’s smaller company stock markets shows an 
ongoing, though cyclical, demand for growth funding and share trading 
mechanisms (on the part of companies) and investment opportunities 
(on the part of retail investors and institutions). Skilled, entrepreneurial 
intermediaries have exploited the opportunities presented by this 
two-way flow of supply and demand. These intermediaries comprise a 
financial ecology essential to the effective functioning of the markets; 
equally, an effective financial ecology must be anchored to the 
institution of a viable and trusted stock market.
2. Markets are historically and materially embedded entities. They take a 
particular form as a result of historical forces and material constraints: 
organisational path dependencies, regulatory changes, advances (or 
otherwise) in technological systems and market infrastructure, reactions 
to external stimuli and competitive pressures, and the personal projects 
and interests of individuals. The distinctive regulatory shape of AIM 
is an example of one such path dependency, and the launch of OFEX 
another. The social and cultural contexts in which the exchanges were 
launched and operate have also been influential in shaping the markets. 
Recognising path dependencies as the source of institutional form can 
facilitate discussion over appropriate organisational changes as and 
when necessary. 
3. Market architectures, cultures and trading mechanisms give rise to 
distinctive kinds of ‘ethics of office’ among participants. Examples are 
the code of practice among those apprenticed as blue buttons on the 
floor of the old London Stock Exchange, or the project-based frame 
of reference of classroom-educated MBAs. These value systems have 
shaped the developing markets and clashes between them underlie 
some of the most bitter disputes in my history. 
4. AIM has achieved a critically important position in the financial 
infrastructure of UK plc, raising over £100 billion of investment in 
the primary and secondary markets. Nonetheless, there are growing 
strains within the system, notably in terms of regulatory pressures 
on nominated advisers and a regulatory ambivalence towards retail 
investors. An over-cautious regulatory stance does not necessarily 
reflect the realities of growth funding mechanisms, especially in the face 
of ongoing demand for investment opportunities among the general 
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public. Should regulatory activity make retail investment in small 
company stocks unrealistic, those demands are likely to be satisfied in 
other, less reputable fora.
5. Academic research has highlighted the importance of high-growth 
firms (gazelles) with certain characteristics, notably maturity and 
heterogeneity of industrial sector. AIM, in its more mature form, has 
a constituency manifesting these characteristics. Research has also 
drawn attention to the importance of physically located entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. It should be noted that the AIM community comprises 
one such ecosystem in itself, and supports many others through the 
provision of legitimacy, publicity and financial support.
6. Launching AIM constituted a radical change for the conservative and 
risk averse London Stock Exchange. It is now clear that the reputation, 
institutional solidity, and infrastructure of the Exchange have been 
crucial factors in the success of AIM. My study suggests that there is 
only room for one full scale growth market in the British economy, and 
that more benefits accrue from the concentration of trading activity 
than from the fragmentation required by competition. The Exchange 
therefore has a heavy responsibility in terms of stewardship of this 
national resource for the future. 
7. The ongoing enthusiasm of financial intermediaries and their clients 
for earlier-stage sources of funding indicates that AIM should be 
supplemented by a variety of transparent and clearly supervised 
funding mechanisms appropriate for growing businesses that are 
not yet ready for a full market listing. Structural factors suggest that 
‘dual-capacity’ arrangements, where market-making revenues subsidize 
market infrastructure, may be viable here. These would need to be well 
regulated, but the example of JP Jenkins and OFEX shows that such 
‘markets’ can be beneficial for growing firms. Technological innovations 
linked to more localised economic activity (for example algorithmic 
micro-exchanges for locally crowd funded start-ups) also offer 
promising solutions. The London Stock Exchange has been historically 
supportive of noncompeting funding mechanisms, which it views as 
feeders for its own business. 
8. Technological and regulatory developments, notably the Internet, have 
concentrated financial ecologies in bridgehead cities such as London. 
This is neither necessarily desirable nor in keeping with the political 
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aspirations and responsibilities of a national small company market. The 
perspective of British enterprise – an important political and rhetorical 
motif in this story – demands mechanisms to reinvigorate issuer activity 
in Scotland, Wales and the English regions. Growing infrastructure costs 
and associated economies of scale suggest that ‘white label’ serviced 
offered by large providers may be a more effective solution than de 
novo start-ups. 
9. It should be stressed that AIM is a stock exchange of a distinctive kind: 
it is a mechanism for fundraising and stock trading growth companies. 
Trading mechanisms have evolved to reflect the natural irregularity 
in supply and demand of stock. Supervisory mechanisms delegate 
oversight to corporate advisors with close knowledge of the companies 
in question. Maintaining effective supervision through mechanisms 
based on reputation and social networks poses a key challenge to the 
exchange going forward. 
10. Finally, my study also shows that stock markets are simply talked into 
being. Infrastructure, an appropriate regulatory environment and 
underlying demand are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
the successful formation of a market. Markets reflect the collective 
commitment of participants acted out through multiple, ongoing 
conversations, and successful market innovations stem from a collective 
recognition that change is due. We may soon be at another such 
moment, with Brexit and the aftermath of austerity necessitating a 
refocusing of our national economic intellect. Smaller company stock 
markets – and trading mechanisms for even earlier-stage equity finance 
– should form an increasingly important part of that conversation.
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2.  Introductory remarks
The following pages offer a ‘historical sociology’ of two markets established 
in London in 1995 in response to a series of rule changes at the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). The first, the Alternative Investment Market, or AIM, was 
set up by the LSE. It was established as part of LSE chief executive Michael 
Lawrence’s ‘seven-point plan’ for the repositioning of the Exchange as an 
engine for economic growth focused on the UK regions. AIM was also, in part, 
a reactive move allowing the Exchange to deal with competitive threats in 
Europe and at home, particularly growing activity under its own Rule 535. 
It has acted as a proving ground for many smaller companies and plays 
an important role in the political positioning of the LSE. The second, OFEX 
(renamed PLUS in 2004) was privately operated and driven by commercial 
demand. Originally operated as a trading facility, it achieved legal recognition 
as a ‘designated market’ in 2001, and then as a Recognized Investment 
Exchange (RIE) in 2007. As OFEX it coexisted with the LSE and rode the 
dotcom wave; as PLUS it served as a vehicle for a market rebellion against 
the LSE. It struggled to maintain a commitment to its original small company 
constituency and to compete as a trading venue of choice against the 
Exchange. While AIM has flourished, PLUS faltered after the financial crisis of 
2008, and my narrative finishes in 2012 with the sale of the PLUS RIE licence 
to ICAP, now NEX. 
I suggest that the sociology of these exchanges is rooted in the interactions 
on the old floor of the LSE prior to the 1986 ‘Big Bang’ and my narrative 
begins there. The first section, ‘Dog tracks and matched bargains,’ discusses 
the period up to the stock market crash at the end of the 1980s. I then 
discuss the regulatory and technological path dependencies that led to the 
inception of OFEX in 1995 (‘Regulation, technology, and the birth of OFEX’), 
and the elite political lobbying in response to these changes that led to the 
foundation of AIM (‘Elite lobbying and the AIM?’). The next sections, ‘1995 
to 2000 on OFEX: Dotcom bubble and IPO boom’ and ‘Bear market travails 
and the end of OFEX’, follow the development of OFEX from trading facility 
to prescribed market, culminating in the refinancing that saw the Jenkins 
family lose control of the firm. Against a backdrop of AIM’s flourishing 
internationalisation I explore the repositioning of OFEX, now PLUS, as a 
competitor to the LSE (‘From 2004 to 2010: Markets at war’) and the eventual 
failure of PLUS (‘Decline and fall: the final days of Plus). I conclude with some 
brief reflections upon the challenges and opportunities facing stock markets 
serving the smaller company sector, as illuminated by this history.
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The narrative is based on interviews and documentary sources. I have 
conducted 54 interviews totalling 73 hours.1 I have spoken with almost all of 
the major market participants of the time. Many interviews were conducted 
on a named basis, although some interviewees expressed a wish to remain 
anonymous. My documentary sources currently stand at over 1000 pages 
and comprise newspaper articles, company documents (prospectuses and 
annual reports), regulatory disclosures, press releases, newsletters and 
marketing materials. Many of these materials were provided by interviewees 
from their personal records. I have made use of data gleaned from personal 
communications and informal conversations. Finally, I have benefitted from 
the work of other scholars, notably Ranald Michie’s London Stock Exchange: 
a History, Elliot Posner’s Origin of Europe’s New Stock Markets, and Bernard 
Attard’s oral histories of the jobbers of the LSE. The project has been funded 
by a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship (RF-2016-078).
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of those who have supported 
this research. The project would have been impossible without the generosity 
of interviewees, who offered time, materials and the willingness to review 
and discuss my preliminary findings. I hope that all involved find the account 
below of value. Errors and omissions remain my responsibility alone. 
Dr Philip Roscoe
St Andrews
pjr10@st-andrews.ac.uk
August 2017
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3.  Dog tracks and matched-bargains
AIM and OFEX, London’s two smaller company stock markets, were both 
founded in 1995. Markets are not conjured out of thin air, however, and the 
genesis of both is tied to a broader historical context within the UK in the 
second half of the 20th century. Both markets inherited their distinctive 
shapes as a result of historical path dependencies in terms of regulation, 
material infrastructure, and business practices. It is therefore necessary to 
understand some of this background to appreciate, not only how they were 
founded, but also why they took their particular forms. I will argue that 
the distinctive supervisory regime of AIM has its roots in the dense social 
networks created in the London Stock Exchange’s ‘Gorgonzola Hall’ even 
before the Big Bang of 1986. The business practices and market networks that 
sustained OFEX in its first decade were formed in the same period, and the 
regulatory infrastructure that led to both markets has its roots in the City of 
the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter returns to the time of ambulatory, spoken 
trading on the floor of the London Stock Exchange. It examines the social and 
material architectures and trading practices of the market during that period, 
before considering the formation of S Jenkins & Son, the forebear of OFEX. 
It then briefly considers the reforms of 1986 and the crash of 1987 to the 
extent that these shaped the destiny of key actors within the small-company 
world and the existing arrangements for financing smaller companies in the 
LSE. The LSE’s smaller company offerings during the 1980s – the USM, Third 
Market, and Rule 535 will be covered in chapter two. 
3.1. Gorgonzola Hall
Until the Big Bang reforms of 27 October 1986 the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) remained a closed organisation with multiple, monopolistic functions. 
Owned by and representing its members, who also had the right to trade 
on the floor, it was the sole authority for the listing of UK securities and 
held the ability to set the level of fees and commissions. It was the UK’s 
only regulated investment exchange.1 Despite these privileges the 1960s 
and 1970s were difficult times for members of the Stock Exchange. The LSE 
was being used as a de facto regulatory arm of the government, often with 
consequences deleterious to its membership. Small-scale flotations had 
been made impossible by regulatory changes, while high levels of state 
borrowing provided an attractive, risk-free return for investors that made 
equity investing look distinctly unappealing. As a consequence there was 
1  Elliot Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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little business, and members had little flexibility to pursue new opportunities. 
Member firms saw capital and skills lost through retirement, while high 
levels of personal taxation made it difficult for individuals to recapitalise their 
partnerships. Member firms responded with a decade of consolidation. In 
1960, 405 firms held memberships of the LSE; by 1970 only 223 remained, 
although the number of partners remained almost constant.2 Ranald Michie, 
author of the preeminent history of the LSE, concludes that ‘the problem 
for the LSE in the 1960s was that it took its quasi-public role more seriously 
than that of creating and maintaining an orderly but dynamic securities 
market’, for example rejecting FIAT’s application for a quotation in 1962.3 The 
membership structure of the Exchange, with many small firms located in the 
provinces, made modernisation difficult; in 1966 the Exchange held and lost 
two votes on the admission of women to the membership, and women were 
only allowed on the trading floor in 1973. 
Until 1966, the LSE occupied a large building on the corner of Throgmorton 
Street and Old Broad Street, ‘crowned with a dome 100 feet high and 70 feet 
in diameter, earning for the entire edifice the nickname ‘Gorgonzola Hall’ 
because of the marble used to face its walls and supporting pillars’.4 Members 
said the dome was surpassed only by the cathedrals of St Peter in Rome and 
St Paul in London. In this hall, the London markets employed a unique system 
of ‘single capacity’ where the occupation of ‘jobber’ (market-makers dealing 
on their own account) was separated from that of broker (dealing as agent 
for external customers).5 The occupation of jobber had evolved organically 
with the development of the exchange in the 18th and 19th century as a class 
of professional speculator able to accommodate the buy and sell orders of 
brokers. Having developed into a robust and successful mode of operation 
by the end of the 19th century the characteristics of jobbing remained 
remarkably constant, and the jobbers were seen as essential contributors 
to the depth and liquidity of the market.6 Each jobbing firm occupied a 
particular spot on the Exchange floor, a ‘pitch’, often passed from father to 
son, while the brokers spent market hours in their ‘boxes’ at the edge of the 
floor.7 Larger jobbers might carve out an established pitch by a wall or a pillar, 
Dog tracks and matched-bargains
2 Ranald C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3 Ibid., 477.
4 Bernard Attard, “Making a Market. The Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange, 1800–1986,” Financial History 
Review 7, no. 1: 9.
5 Pardo-Guerra contrasts economic labour (of dealing with clients) with epistemic labour (of making prices): Juan 
Pablo Pardo-Guerra, “Creating Flows of Interpersonal Bits: The Automation of the London Stock Exchange, C. 
1955–90,” Economy and Society 39, no. 1 (2010).
6 Bernard Attard, “The Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange an Oral History,” Oral History 22, no. 1 (1994);            , 
“Making a Market. The Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange, 1800–1986.”
7 Ibid.
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furnishing it with seating and makeshift shelves; smaller firms simply had to 
stand among the crowds on the open floor. Jobbers traded with their own 
capital, buying a nomination to become a member of the Exchange. Business 
was conducted by physically walking around the pitches buying and selling 
according to a complicated verbal etiquette set out at length in the Stock 
Exchange’s Code of Dealing.8 Brokers circulated around the floor while the 
jobbers manned the pitches; the location of the pitch within the Exchange 
floor would make a material contribution to the success of a firm. During 
trading hours as many as 3000 men stood under the dome, manning pitches 
or circulating around the Exchange floor. When business was slow on a slow 
Friday afternoon, songs would burst out. The jobbers 
‘would sing the Marsellaise to [one fellow] because he was 
supposedly a Frenchman…In the old market we had these high 
desks with the flaps on – the sort you would experience in a school 
classroom – and when it came to the cannons parts in the “la-la 
la la, la-la la la”, all these desks would crash down all round the 
Stock Exchange and you’d probably have a good thousand people 
singing.’ 9
Jobbers served a lengthy apprenticeship, first as messengers, then ‘red 
buttons’ and ‘blue buttons’, each colour of badge denoting an increased 
level of seniority and certain powers and responsibilities. Dealers wore no 
buttons and junior employees would have to remember who was who, lest 
they disgraced themselves by speaking out of turn to a senior member. 
Blue buttons communicated between jobbers and brokers, as well as 
marking up prices on the boards. When not so employed they were free to 
ask questions and learn from their employers who doubled as tutors and 
mentors, sponsoring the careers of juniors and thereby preserving the future 
of firms that were, typically, very small. The oral histories recorded in 1990 by 
Dr Bernard Attard testify to the positive benefits of such relationships: the 
working class, East End blue button Tommy attached to a generous mentor 
(Pat Durlacher, senior partner of one of the larger firms) who he described as 
‘a jobber out of this world’.10 In my interview, Brian Winterflood, another East 
8 Pardo-Guerra, “Creating Flows of Interpersonal Bits: The Automation of the London Stock Exchange, C. 
1955–90.”
9 In 1990 Dr Bernard Attard of Leicester University conducted a series of oral history interviews with former 
jobbers, capturing the details of what was by then a vanished world. By lucky chance he interviewed two 
central figures in the small company world: Brian Winterflood, one of my own interviewees, and Anthony 
Jenkins, older brother of John Jenkins and partner in SJ Jenkins. The Jenkins interview, from which this 
quotation is taken, can be found online at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/id/eprint/2598 [accessed 17 march 2017]
10 Attard, “The Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange an Oral History,” 45;                   , “Making a Market. The 
Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange, 1800–1986.”
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End boy, recalls an almost accidental arrival in the City thanks to a generous 
school teacher:
‘I said I don’t want to drive a bus because my father was a tram 
driver…what I would like to do is to make some money, and he 
said, “Well if you want to make money you should go to where 
money is made”. I thought that was a sensible thing to say. He 
said, “I have got a friend who is a partner in a stockbroking firm 
and I wonder if you would want to go up the City.” I did not think 
anything about it and I said, “Yes, I would,” and I went up and 
became a messenger with a firm that is long since dead. And so 
I started right at the bottom…well thank God I did start there, 
running round the City, getting to know the city, getting to know 
the people and it was magical, absolutely magical.’ 11 
Tommy recalls his transition to ‘authorised clerk’ (or ‘dealer’) with awe:
‘I was called into the partner’s room and they said, “How would 
you like to become a dealer?” I said, “I don’t know”. I was absolutely 
dumbfounded. Where I come from I couldn’t have anticipated 
anything like this. So “I said I’d love to, I’d love to have a try.” So I 
was authorised, and I’ll never forget the first morning…’ 12
The account continues in similarly glowing terms, as Tommy is supported by 
the ever generous Durlacher. But it would be a mistake to assume that life on 
the floor was always a bed of roses. Winterflood’s first day was less charmed:
‘To go up the ladder and become a dealer…to do that was really 
like the Oscars, it was fantastic to be authorised. Go upstairs [to the 
Exchange floor] and get your badge and so on. I had a particularly 
nasty senior partner and I remember the day that I got authorised, 
and he was a moody so-and-so and he used to gamble everyday 
on the horses, his life was terrible, he ran off with another woman. 
Anyhow the day that I got authorised, you go on to the floor of 
the Exchange, he puts his hand in his pocket…and he says, “All 
right Winterflood, now you are authorised”, and he took his hand 
out like that and he gave it to me, it was my badge, my authorised 
badge. And he said, “Mind your fucking eye.”’ 13 
Dog tracks and matched-bargains
11 Winterflood interview
12 Attard, “The Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange an Oral History,” 45.
13 ‘Mind your eye’, a common phrase on the floor meaning ‘watch out’
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Winterflood goes on to reflect on the sudden responsibility of holding a 
trading book as an authorised dealer in a partnership, trading with the 
partners’ own money and unlimited liability. The supervision extended by the 
partners to their own property was markedly different from the target driven 
gambling familiar from more recent, incorporated trading vehicles.14
‘It was good looking over everybody’s shoulder when they were 
doing this [i.e. trading], but when the senior partner says “Mind 
your fucking eye”, I mean you are terrified…I remember when 
he came back from a bad day at the races, which was the bookie 
outside the Exchange, he would sit in the pitch and say, “What 
have you done?” I would say, “Well not a lot Sir but there are one 
or two things that you might like,” and he goes across and looks at 
the page, of course this was in a book and he was going through 
like that and that, and there was one particular page and he 
looked at, I said “Have you noticed sir, so and so,” and he said, “It 
only pays for the bad ones.”’ 15 
This lengthy apprenticeship would lead eventually to membership of 
the Exchange. Younger jobbers had to pass the Stock Exchange exams, 
introduced in 1971 as an attempt to control risk in the market. More 
importantly, for this account, it gave rise to a tightknit social community, with 
trust built up by many hours of trading face to face, making and honouring 
spoken bargains.16 Dictum meum pactum – my word is my bond – was, and 
still is, the LSE’s motto. A stock exchange, like any effective organization, 
depends upon trust and reliable sanctions, and both of these operated in 
the LSE’s club-like system.17 There was a kind of schoolboy justice, too. One 
of Attard’s interviews recalls an insider dealing ring profiteering on Sunday 
Express recommendations. The jobbers and the newspaper editor struck 
back with a fake news story, a bogus article on left on the editor’s desk; the 
culprit was not apprehended but the firm made its money back and the 
trading ceased. Social conventions remained hidebound, the revolution of 
the swinging sixties restricted to sartorial innovations like soft collars, Cuban 
heels, sideburns and mohair suits: ‘we were the leaders of change… when 
I look back on it I looked a total prat but I thought that it looked good’.18 (A 
14 See, for example, the transformation of Salomon Brothers in the 1980s. M Lewis, Liar’s Poker (London: Coronet, 
1989).
15 Winterflood interview
16 Pardo-Guerra, “Creating Flows of Interpersonal Bits: The Automation of the London Stock Exchange, C. 1955–90.”
17 Göran Ahrne, Patrik Aspers, and Nils Brunsson, “The Organization of Markets,” Organization Studies 36, no. 1 
(2015).
18 John Jenkins interview. 
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decade earlier, such garb would have been unacceptable: as a messenger boy 
in 1953, Winterflood inadvertently stepped on to the exchange floor without 
the regulation black shoes and was driven away by cries of ‘Brown boots! 
Brown boots!’)19 
Despite the LSE’s monopoly position and member privileges, times were hard 
during the 1960s and the depression of the early 1970s.20 The market crash 
in 1974 saw the total of staff employed by LSE members shrink by roughly a 
third in a single year.21 All partners of the broking and jobbing firms had to be 
members of the LSE and had to accept unlimited liability. Jobbers scrabbled 
for extra income. During the downturn of 1969 to1974 Winterflood and his 
wife ran a small bric-a-brac shop named Fludds in Valance Road, at the end of 
Petticoat Lane. He recalls meeting a colleague hawking carpet squares – ‘not 
even whole carpets, carpet squares!’ 22 Increased capital requirements made 
life harder for members but provided little protection; the crisis of 1974 saw 
the failure even of large firms such as Mitton, Butler and Priest, with £200,000 
in capital.23 
3.2.  S Jenkins & Son
It was in this milieu that S Jenkins & Son Ltd, a small jobbing firm formed 
on the 1 April 1960, began to build a reputation for trading leisure stocks, 
described as the ‘spivvier end’ of the market. S Jenkin & Son, despite being 
one of the smallest firms of jobbers on the Exchange, represents the 
very beginnings of the OFEX market.24 My account traces its genealogy 
accordingly. Anthony Jenkins recalls how the firm began:
‘I went back to father[’s firm] in 1956 when he became established 
with a firm called E.S. Godden and they more or less financed 
my father’s book and he was really trading in the same leisure 
compan[ies]. …In 1960, father took the business over, I became a 
member in 1960 and the firm became S. Jenkins & Son and that 
was the partnership. We took the staff over from the old firm and 
I think we had three on the staff. And eventually we grew, as the 
years went on my brother [John] was introduced into the business 
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and two other partners. There were five partners and we actually 
had five on the staff, so we were ten overall… It was a family firm 
and everybody knew one another. We knew when people had 
families and passed their driving tests and they were good days.’ 25 
At one edge of the Exchange’s vast dome, father Sid, with his sons Tony and 
young John (who joined the firm in 1962, aged 15), traded shares in dog 
tracks, betting shops, casinos, and holiday camps:
‘Clacton Stadium, White City…Northumbrian and Crayford, Brent 
Cross was a dog track, when whatshisname, George Walker, I don’t 
know whether you have heard of George Walker, but George and 
his brother, Billy Walker, was a boxer, George was his manager and 
they ended up taking over Hackney and Hendon Greyhounds 
[which they built into the Brent Cross retail development]…Butlin’s 
and Pontin’s Holiday Camps.’ 26
The firm was conservatively run. Sid Jenkins had a horror of overtrading and 
the dreaded ‘hammerings’, when firms unable to meet their obligations were 
shut down by the sound of a gavel, and the partners’ personal assets fell into 
the hands of the administrators. 
‘We never borrowed money and we never borrowed stock, which 
were two facilities that most other firms did [use]. And father’s 
attitude was “I like to sleep at night.” And we earned a good living 
out of the business and the staff all did well and father’s attitude 
was, “Why should I over-trade?” That was something that he was 
always frightened of. You’ve got to remember also father saw a lot 
of hammerings, a lot firms went broke in his time and I suppose he 
always had it in the back of his mind, “Well, I won’t overtrade, I’m 
going to survive.”’ 27
Sid Jenkins died in 1981, and Anthony briefly became senior partner. A year 
later, in 1982, John became senior partner. While financially conservative, 
John was forward-looking and could see the great changes ahead. He 
travelled to the USA, visiting a broking firm named Herzog Heine Geduld, and 
watching the novel computer-based trading. 
25 Attard Jenkins interview
26 John Jenkins interview
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‘It was coming, scary, but people did not believe it, people 
honestly did not believe. I’d come back and I would say, “I have sat 
with a trader in the room with NASDAQ, there is no market floor, I 
have sat with these guys in a room, sitting there with a computer 
terminal and they are doing their trades and this, that and the 
other.” You could see even my own lot think, “That is not going to 
happen here is it, you know, it is just not going to happen.”’ 28 
After Sid Jenkins died, John recruited Paul Brown to the firm as a junior. 
Even in the early 1980s, the apprenticeship model persisted, evidence of the 
remarkable stability and durability of the jobbing role:
‘John really looked after me there as regards to he promised me 
that he would make me a member of the London Stock Exchange 
if I was to do my exams, which I did. I became the youngest 
member of the London Stock Exchange at just under 21. You 
should be 21 but I managed to get just under the umbrella. So 
that’s where John and I really went back.’ 29
The bond between apprentice and master remained a durable one, and 
important for this account, as the relationship between John Jenkins and Paul 
Brown became the trigger for the formation of OFEX. 
A small firm specialising in a single sector, S Jenkins & Son developed a 
distinctive set of business practices which persisted into future firms. It 
boasted strong networks with broking clients and firms in the leisure sector 
and had a good reputation on the floor: 
‘We had a super rep in leisure I think. My dad was a close friend of 
Fred Pontin plus a friend of Billy Butlin…we were straight, we did 
not rip people off and we did what it said on the can…We just had 
a good market reputation, which we were very proud of.’ 30
Led by the conservative Sid Jenkins, it developed risk averse trading routines. 
Anthony Jenkins remembers late afternoon work in the office, settling and 
closing down trading positions: 
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‘You’d finish putting all your bargains on the checking sheets then 
the most important thing was to agree your positions so you take 
your bull and bear book which is your overnight position and 
then you would take the difference on the day’s trade and work 
that out from the overnight position and it had to agree with the 
position in the jobbing book. Most bargains that we did you would 
finish up with a position at the end and that was altered on every 
bargain and you never went home at night until you had agreed 
your position…Some firms, I know father used to say there was 
one firm – Frisby Brothers used to agree their positions every three 
months but it horrified me. We not only used to take the positions 
out, we used to take our profit and loss out every night as well, so 
by five o’clock we knew exactly our positions in the book were true 
and correct and we also knew that we had made a profit or a loss 
that day by five o’clock and tomorrow was another day.’ 31
Many of the stocks traded were so illiquid that it would be difficult, as well 
as risky, to quote two-way prices in these. As Buckland and Davis noted of 
the USM in 1989, ‘such modest volumes of stock are available as to render 
the concept of liquidity, if not meaningless, a very unlikely attribute of 
most OTC securities’. 32 Trading in illiquid stocks meant storing up orders 
and negotiating between buyers and sellers: jobbers would indicate ‘basis 
prices’ and record indications of interest. When two sides of a bargain could 
be matched, the order would be ‘put through’, with the jobber taking 1.25% 
on each side. There was some work involved in matching the two sides of a 
trade together, patiently negotiating between buyer and seller. Much of this 
trading was done under the LSE’s unquoted securities exemptions (discussed 
in the next section) which necessitated matched bargain trading as firms 
were not allowed to hold positions overnight. This work was naturally suited 
to the obscure stocks of the leisure sector as well as the cautious business 
habits ingrained by Sid Jenkins, and became John Jenkins’ main source of 
revenue: 
‘In those days you were not allowed to have a position in [a stock] 
at all, so you would have a list of buyers and a list of sellers and you 
would have to try to knit them all together. And at the end of the 
day whatever you bought you had to sell, you could not go short 
or long, so you had to be completely flat and I used to love doing 
that… I reckon this is back in the early 80s… I could make a grand 
31 Attard Jenkins interview
32 Roger Buckland and Edward W Davis, The Unlisted Securities Market (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 130.
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a day out of those, which was matching, matching and matching. 
Nobody else wanted to do it, nobody else wanted to fill the forms 
out, run round and you would fiddle about in those days, would 
the client take 1,049, well I know he wants to buy 1,000 but will he 
take 963 and then you would have to piece it all together and do 
it…But for a grand a day, in those days!’ 33
Settlement was also awkward, with paper share certificates coming in 
different sizes (‘shapes’) and often needing to be broken up into smaller units.
‘There were different shapes as well, I just remember that, shares came 
in different shapes. So you might have a certificate for five shares and a 
certificate for 10 shares and a certificate for one share.’ 34
Along with the family reputation and networks, these trading practices 
persisted until the end of the millennium: ‘You’ve got to get the shapes right 
John!’ was a frequent cry in the firm’s offices right until the late 1990s.
3.3.  Big Bang
By the late 1970s, the LSE was under pressure from a number of directions. 
Single capacity trading (the separation of jobbers from brokers) and the 
fixed commission regime seemed anachronistic; while computers were not 
regarded as serious alternatives to floor-based trading, rival systems were 
starting to appear, prompting the LSE to introduce the TOPIC price display 
system in 1978; most importantly, the new Conservative government began 
to take exception to the restrictive practices in which the LSE had engaged 
during the last two decades.35
The ‘Big Bang’ saw fixed commissions and single capacity abolished on the 27 
October 1986, but in many ways this represented the end of a process begun 
with the abolition of exchange controls in 1979. It was recognized at the time 
as the end of an era: the last day of the single-capacity trading, 24 October 
1986, saw a ‘rowdy Irish wake’, involving a pantomime horse and the Spitting 
Image puppet of Chancellor Nigel Lawson.36 
After the Big Bang it was possible for foreign firms to be members of the 
LSE, but international firms had been taking stakes in jobbers and brokers 
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throughout the 1980s, since it became clear that reforms were in train and 
that a deregulated exchange would offer opportunities for larger integrated 
banking and securities firms. Michie catalogues some of these deals: US bank 
Security Pacific paid £8.1 million for a 29.9% stake in Hoare, Govett, then:
‘a number of the leading London merchant banks acquired 
stakes in 11 brokers and three jobbers. Warburgs teamed up 
with the jobbers Akroyd & Smithers and two brokers, Rowe & 
Pitman and Mullens. A similar course was followed by some of 
the major commercial banks, such as Barclays, who linked up with 
the jobbers Wedd, Durlacher and the brokers de Zoete & Bevan. 
There was also a rush of foreign banks cementing relationships 
with London brokers such as Phillips & Drew and Union Bank of 
Switzerland. The giant New York bank, Citicorp, teamed up with 
three brokers, Vickers da Costa, Scrimgeour Kemp Gee, and J. 
& E. Davy while its US rival, Chase Manhattan, contented itself 
with two, namely Laurie Milbank and Simon & Coates. Even the 
chairman’s own firm, Quilter Goodison, sold a 100 per cent stake to 
the French bank, Paribas, in 1986.’ 37
In the early 1980s foreign bidders circled. At the same time, by a happy 
confluence of policy, the jobbers’ profits (and therefore sale values) had been 
enhanced by the public offers of national industries. One such was British 
Telecom, offered for sale in November 1984 and June 1985.38 Even the niche 
leisure player S Jenkins & Son saw plenty of the action: 
‘The boys heard about this BT issue coming up and they went up 
and saw the shop broker and said “We want to have a go at this”. 
We had no track record at all in British Telecom, nothing, or any 
electronic business, nothing at all. They went and saw the shop 
broker and all of the market makers were issued with the same 
amount of stock…900,000 shares in British Telecom, which we 
sold first thing on the morning of the float and we took nearly one 
million profit.’ 39
Anthony Jenkins recalls that the issue also presented a small firm with 
considerable risk:
37 Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, 555.
38 http://www.btplc.com/Sharesandperformance/Financialandotherinformation/Listinginformation/
Listinginformation.htm#ee
39 John Jenkins interview
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‘It was a most complicated issue and we actually finished up with 
something like 950,000 shares and when you think that Akroyd 
and Wedd all the large people I think got 1.4 million; for a little tiny 
firm of our size to get 950,000 was absolutely amazing because we 
got all these profits, but at the same time I wasn’t entirely happy 
with this because whatever bargain you’ve got you are still at 
risk. My thoughts would have been, well, if anything happens to 
Maggie Thatcher or if another war breaks out then its pay and be 
paid with this sort of stock – it’s all new issue, bearer stock which 
you need to pay the next day as it were, once it’s been checked. 
But anyway we accepted this underwriting and we did extremely 
well that year.’
Three crucial figures in the history of the new stock markets emerged from 
this milieu. Brian Winterflood, John Jenkins (both of whom we have already 
met) and Andrew Beeson (latterly chairman of Schroders, having spent a 
career in the small company broking sector) learned their trade on the stock 
exchange floor in the 1960s and before, all with a focus on smaller company 
stocks. Winterflood, Jenkins and Beeson were among those who sold their 
firms to foreign banks and Thatcher’s programme of deregulation made 
all three wealthy men, despite prior misgivings that removal of the single 
capacity, fixed commission ‘cartel’ – a very comfortable way of existing’ – 
would be difficult.40 All three described the subsequent years as among the 
unhappiest of their careers, as they suffered a change in culture from staid 
partnership to brash, hierarchical, target driven regimes. The newly merged 
firms rode out a year of boom but were found lacking by the bear market that 
followed the crash of Black Monday, 19 October 1987. Strategic mistakes, of 
the lack of strategy altogether, became apparent:
‘Suddenly…someone was going to pay us [the partners] £11 
million… for this business. We thought that Christmas had come, 
but nevertheless we were tied in. The mistake we made when ANZ 
bought [us] was that they did not know what they were going 
to do with it, and we assumed that an owner would have a plan. 
Come the crash of 1987 it was quite clear by then that they did not 
know what they were going to do with it.’ 41
Former partners, now bought out, remained burdened by the responsibilities 
they had accumulated under their firms’ previous structure. Beeson 
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continues, explaining how he sought to discharge his responsibility.
‘I formed up to the management of ANZ Bank and said, “Either you 
shrink this business to what it is really good at” – because despite 
the fact that we had these specialisations it was still all things to all 
men – “or we might buy the business back, or I’m leaving with five 
of my former partners and we are going to start again.” The reason 
I did that rather than just walking out of the door [was] that clearly 
having been a partner for fifteen plus years you know you had a 
responsibility to quite a lot of people. Where of course Australians 
are wonderful people but they don’t like to be bowled out, if you 
know what I mean, and so they fired me.’ 42
There was, it seems, a fundamental clash in corporate culture between the 
new arrivals and the incumbents of the Stock Exchange, with often tragic 
consequences for the former jobbing firms:
‘In this firm, the senior partner was saying to the other partners, 
they had just received a bid of £12 million, “Gentlemen, we have 
been kissed by the Holy Ghost,” and they are all rejoicing. And 
within twelve weeks it did not exist, it did not exist. They really had 
been kissed by the Holy Ghost! That was the Americans, they came 
in like the Fifth Cavalry and they thought they knew everything 
and they didn’t, they certainly did not understand our culture and 
it cost them a fortune.’ 43
By the end of the decade all three men had separated from their new 
employers and over the course of the next two or three years went on to set 
up their own firms specialising in smaller company stocks. The dense social 
networks that they had built up and the conventions of trading that they had 
learned were to sustain their businesses and give shape to the new markets 
of the 1990s. 
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page 23
4.  Regulation, technology, and the birth of OFEX
The financing of Britain’s entrepreneurs had, meanwhile, become a policy 
preoccupation. A succession of government-sponsored reports, beginning 
with the MacMillan committee report in 1931 and followed by the Bolton 
and Wilson committees in the 1970s, emphasised the funding difficulties 
facing growing businesses in the UK.1 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
the vast expansion of government debt had made it difficult for all but the 
largest companies to find equity funding on attractive terms. The growth 
of professional asset management in the late 1970s exacerbated this 
difficulty as managed funds tended to be restricted in the amount they 
could invest in smaller companies and higher risk securities. Overall, the 
LSE had struggled throughout the post-war period with the expectation 
that it should act as provider of risk capital for growing firms, a role that 
sat uncomfortably with its regulatory responsibilities yet received a 
disproportionate amount of political attention. Nevertheless, mechanisms 
for financing smaller companies did begin to appear by the late 1970s, and 
this chapter follows that process. It covers the growth of the OTC market 
under the ‘licensed dealer’ regulation, the subsequent formation of the 
USM, and the Exchange’s Rule 535. The chapter then focuses on the latter. 
It examines how John Jenkins developed Rule 535 into a small-scale capital 
market, eventually provoking the LSE into a defensive action, which then 
triggered the formation of OFEX. The LSE’s reaction, meanwhile, gave 
further impetus to the formation of AIM, discussed in the next chapter. 
4.1.  OTC, USM and Third Market
The LSE had been discussing a designated smaller company market 
throughout the 1970s but had made little progress. It had already come 
under pressure for failing to provide finance to North Sea oil exploration 
companies.2 A fix came in the shape of LSE rule 163(2), (later 535(2), and 
finally 4.2a), which permitted trading in unlisted securities and sought to 
meet political demands while preserving the existing shape and primacy 
of the Exchange. The London Stock Exchange promoted Rule 163 in a 
1977 brochure and drew attention to the facility in submissions to the 
Wilson committee in 1978 and 1979.3 Meanwhile, an over-the-counter 
(OTC) market sprang up entirely independently of the LSE. Stockbroking 
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firms could apply to the DTI for a licence to deal in securities and become 
a ‘licenced dealer’ able to act in ‘dual capacity’ as broker and market maker. 
MJH Nightingale Ltd, later known as Granville & Co, was an early innovator 
trading stocks in high-quality private companies on a matched bargain 
basis. It was highly reputable: the government backed venture capital 
house ICFC had a small department investing in privately held firms and 
bought heavily from Nightingale. While the sums involved were small, the 
demand for the OTC trading mechanism further demonstrated the need for 
a lower tier market.4 
Rule 163(2) and the OTC markets presented the LSE with a problem. On the 
one hand the rule offered a defence against accusations that the Exchange 
preferred to use its monopoly position to trade liquid, large stocks at the 
expense of Great Britain’s entrepreneurs and growing companies. On the 
other, the Exchange was extending its regulatory oversight and therefore 
its reputation to companies over which it had no control. Moreover, 
the public and regulators alike did not necessarily distinguish between 
exchange members and licensed dealers. Here, a more prominent but far 
less reputable operator came in the shape of Harvard Securities, run by Tom 
Wilmot, an outspoken stockbroker temporarily popular with the public. 
Wilmot published an investor’s guide to the market in 1985, describing the 
OTC as ‘a seed-bed of innovation, wealth and employment’, and making 
direct comparisons with the NASDAQ market in the United States, another 
over-the-counter arrangement.5 Insiders had a different view of Wilmot: 
‘Tom was the biggest rogue of the lot and whilst Tom was 
dealing [his] instructions to his dealers were, “Don’t buy 
anything, you are only a seller”. So just to convince people it was 
right, he would put in his list of stocks [in the financial press], not 
many of them, 20 or 30 and he would move them up 1p a day, 
down 1p a day and then he would move them down 2p a day 
and he got this thing going and people thought that it was all 
right but in fact they had bought a load of rubbish and of course 
he was a crook.’ 6
Harvard Securities collapsed in 1988 having failed to become a member 
of the London Stock Exchange and Wilmot was investigated by the DTI. It 
transpired that many investors had been pressure-sold investments and 
4 e.g. Buckland and Davis, The Unlisted Securities Market. Corporate advisor 6 interview.
5 Tom Wilmot, Inside the over-the-Counter Market in the Uk (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1985), xiii.
6 Winterflood interview
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now found themselves holding stock that had been overvalued by Harvard 
Securities in its role as sole ‘market-maker’ and was now worthless.7 
The recommendations of the Wilson Committee of 1979, together with a 
desire to ‘ingratiate itself with the new Conservative government’, led the 
Exchange to set up the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in November 1981.8 
This market offered much lighter admission rules including a three, rather 
than five-year trading record, no minimum capitalisation or pre-vetting of 
listing particulars, and a smaller public float.9 The USM was an immediate 
success, with 600 companies admitted before the end of 1987; as Arcot et 
al. note, its success was driven by a general revival of the stock market, an 
entrepreneurial boom and policy focus in the 1980s, as well as the extension 
of certain tax advantages and the suitability of the market and exit route 
for investments made by the growing British venture capital community. 
Buckland and Davis’ analysis of the USM contains a foreword from Sir Nicholas 
Goodison, businessman and chairman of the Stock Exchange from 1976 to 
1986, describing the introduction of the market as ‘a very important event in 
Britain’s commercial history…[the USM] greatly helped the progress of the 
British economy in terms of products, services, and jobs… this new market 
did a lot to alter attitudes to risk among investors who, during the 1960s and 
1970s, had become averse to risk’.10 The USM was also a response to the threat 
posed by OTC market: a 1981 circular to members of the Stock Exchange 
urged companies to move from the OTC to the USM, and rule 163(2) was 
changed to 535(2) on what was expected to be a temporary basis. Some 
participants claimed credit for putting the likes of Wilmot out of business: 
‘I said to the Stock Exchange, look we have got to stop this, we 
have got to get this under the umbrella of the Stock Exchange, 
some regulatory body… And that is how it started, and of course 
that effectively put Tom out of business because well people could 
deal and feel that they were dealing in something that meant 
something.’ 11
Regulation, technology, and the birth of OFEX
7 In August 2011 Wilmot was sent to prison for his involvement in a ‘boiler room’ share selling scam, along with 
his two sons. Telegraph, 24 August 2011, ‘Fraudster Tomas Wilmot failed to learn from Harvard collapse and DTI 
investigation’, Jonathan Russell. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/8718862/Fraudster-Tomas-
Wilmot-failed-to-learn-from-Harvard-collapse-and-DTI-investigation.html
8 Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets, 66.
9 Sridhar Arcot, Julia Black, and Geoffrey Owen, “From Local to Global: The Rise of Aim as a Stock Market for 
Growing Companies: A Comprehensive Report Analysing the Growth of Aim,” (London: London School of 
Economics, 2007).
10 Buckland and Davis, The Unlisted Securities Market. 
11 Winterflood interview
page 26
Philip Roscoe
Unfortunately the USM could not match the tax advantages available to OTC 
shares and by the late 1980s 22 dealers traded the stock of 210 companies.12 
Only the creation of a ‘Third Market’ in January 1987 with even lighter 
regulation, and the 1986 and 1988 Financial Services Acts’ requirement that 
OTC dealers hold a certain amount of capital, managed to slow down the 
OTC market. But the launch of the USM certainly offered investors a reputable 
venue for trading in higher risk shares, and entrepreneurial jobbers found a 
new tranche of trading opportunities. 
Brian Winterflood, now a partner at Bisgood Bishop, was one such jobber. 
He had become synonymous with the success of the USM, his firm’s pitch a 
‘wall of stocks’ and his nickname ‘Mr USM’.13 Jobbers undertook to provide 
a certain amount of liquidity in these stocks, using their own capital, and 
therefore constituted the market in a very real sense. By undertaking to 
trade in any USM stock, Bisgood Bishop literally made the market and 
stood to lose heavily in the event of a swing in sentiment. We should not 
underestimate the moral force of such an undertaking and the significance 
of the role of market-maker for the broader concerns of UK plc. Nonetheless, 
market-making on the USM could be a profitable business with the lack of 
competition among market-makers allowing spreads to widen substantially. 
As one interviewee noted, the obligation to make prices in a whole market 
could lead to wide spreads, noting acerbically that ‘Winterflood made a 
fortune because his bid-offer spreads were embarrassing…you could drive 
an 18-wheel truck through them’.14 Moreover, market-makers still enjoyed 
considerable flexibility in their trading and could avoid some of the riskier 
positions:
‘there was no regulation for them to make a price… They won’t 
make you a price, they’ll indicate. So if they’re 43 to 45, that’s 
an indication. And it’s certainly not definitely a price. When the 
business got difficult, then it could be in 500 shares one end and 
10,000 shares the other end.’ 15
Spreads widened still further due to a collapse in trade after the 1987 crash 
as retail investors lost interest in the markets; turnover on the USM fell from 
£200m a day in October 1987 to £40m a day in 1991, while average spreads 
12 Arcot, Black, and Owen, “From Local to Global: The Rise of Aim as a Stock Market for Growing Companies: A 
Comprehensive Report Analysing the Growth of Aim.” Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets, 69. 
13 Nathan interview
14 Winterflood replied (in my interview) by drawing attention to the important job that his firm was doing in 
making prices.
15 Nathan interview
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grew from 3pc to 11pc.16 Lack of trading was also driven by changes in the 
structure of market interactions that the boom years of 1986/7 obscured, as:
‘a by-product of the cessation of the stock jobbers’ monopoly will 
be correspondingly greater selectivity in the shares in which they 
deal with the result of the less liquid, even stagnant, market in 
trading in smaller, lesser-known companies…’.17 
The LSE responded with a modified version of the NASDAQ ‘specialist’ system 
where trade was mandated through a market maker, though this met much 
protest, especially as it was paired with an electronic bulletin-board that 
precluded any possibility of a profitable ‘turn’ by making bargains widely 
visible.18 In 1992 the LSE replaced the bulletin board with SEATS (Stock 
Exchange Alternative Trading Service), a screen that showed indicative 
prices and orders and required only one market maker, usually Winterflood 
Securities. David Macnamara, Winterflood’s head of dealing, acidly 
commented that SEATS ‘can’t work any worse than the old idea.’ 19
During the early 1990s the USM saw its distinctive selling points, such as 
lighter listing requirements, had been eroded by European legislation that 
shortened the trading record needed by the Official List to three years. The 
LSE had launched the ‘Third Market’, a higher-risk trading venue, in January 
1987 and closed it again in 1990. Crippled by the crash of 1987, the Third 
Market had acquired the reputation of ‘a complete shambles… a cowboy 
charter’. It was merged with the struggling USM in an attempt to revive the 
latter, which proved only to damage the USM further.20 The boom years that 
had made the USM an easy venue to raise money had ended: in 1992 only 
two companies had joined the market, from a peak of 103 new arrivals in 
1988.21 Eventually, just 30 companies remained listed on the USM.22 Cyclical 
change in the UK economy had lessened its appeal, and the appeal of ‘equity 
risk’ more generally.23 The market had become harder for investors to access, 
with one market-maker Bikuben-Whitefriars (owned by the Danish bank 
Sparekassen Bikuben) pulling out of market-making in December 1992, 
denying that it had been nudged to do so by regulators. More generally, the 
market’s reputation had been harmed by the exuberance and collapse of 
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the late 1980s; a Stock Exchange consultation, published in December 1992, 
conceded that ‘the quality and attractiveness of the USM has deteriorated in 
the eyes of companies and investors.’24 The sentiment was shared by many in 
the City. The USM had a ‘spotty reputation’ and it served as an unfortunate
‘back door into the old traditional markets, because …it [the LSE] 
suddenly had a route, for a small company that would have never 
made the cut, to try and…to come in. I don’t know whether they 
had…with hindsight whether they analysed the accounts for long 
enough or maybe let some in too soon…or maybe they hadn’t 
vetted some of the people that were running the companies.’ 25
The LSE’s consultation recommended the closure of the USM by 1995, with 
existing stocks fast-tracked to the Official List. It promised a formal decision 
by late 1993, but the decision had effectively already been taken. Posner 
quotes from a speech given by an anonymous official of the LSE to the annual 
Guildhall Dinner, on 15 June 1993: 
‘Now, in response to European directives entry to the Official List 
is available on essentially identical terms to those of the USM. It is 
often said that you cannot have too much of a good thing, but to 
have two, almost identical, markets in one exchange is going too 
far.’ 26
The USM is widely held, therefore, to have suffered from the bear market 
of the early 1990s and from its diminishing competitive position eroding 
both the volume of trading and the flow of new entries: ‘Given the greater 
prestige and visibility of the Official List, most companies that might have 
contemplated going to the USM preferred to wait another year so that they 
could qualify for the main market’.27 It seems that there was an organisational 
dimension to the decision as well. The Stock Exchange, and particularly 
its listing department, was burdened by the administration required in 
running two parallel markets from the same office and on the basis of the 
same handbook: the USM was – in reality – a small set of rules heavily cross-
referenced to the Official List rulebook, making administration difficult for 
those involved:
24 Daily Mail, December 22, 1992, ‘USM the latest victim of stock market forces’, Cliff Feltham, p.34
25 Hazell-Smith interview, Nathan interview
26 Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets.
27 Arcot, Black, and Owen, “From Local to Global: The Rise of Aim as a Stock Market for Growing Companies: A 
Comprehensive Report Analysing the Growth of Aim,” 7.
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‘you had your main listing rules and then you’d have a section at the back 
which would say... clauses 1.3 apply of the main rules, clauses this, that and 
the other don’t apply...You had the same people in the listing department 
who were reviewing prospectuses both for USM and for listed companies.’ 28
The listings department existed as an almost entirely separate entity from the 
rest of the Exchange. Its office contained much market sensitive information 
so it was separated by coded door locks. It had a reputation for bureaucratic 
stolidity and for being focused on what it saw as correct process and quality 
of new issues; it had unparalleled expertise in the regulatory aspects of 
market administration, but was disconnected from the commercial side of 
what was by then a business in its own right. Its members, often lawyers, 
were ‘rather pompous characters…who saw themselves as the guardians 
of this ephemeral thing called the Official List’.29 A new generation of LSE 
executives had started to pay attention to commercial concerns such as 
marketing and business development and regarded the listing department 
as ill-equipped to deal with such matters. 
‘They weren’t commercial…I remember the…management 
meeting, and the Head of Listing came into the room and said, 
“We’ve been looking at the USM, and we’ve done a contrast and 
compare of the rules of the USM with the main markets. And 
there’s so little difference…there’s really no point in maintaining a 
separate section. What we’ll do is bang the whole thing together. 
Yeah, and we’re going to write to the companies and say they’ve 
got a year to either comply with the main market rules or basically 
they can piss off”…It was all about laziness…And they saw this 
entirely in terms of the box ticking rule thing, they didn’t see 
anything beyond that. They’d almost made the decision and sent 
out the letters. And, of course, there was an absolute maelstrom.’ 30
4.2. Formalizing 535.2: J P Jenkins Ltd
The closure of the USM in 1995 triggered the formation of both AIM and 
OFEX but the stories of the markets are very different: the former a large-
scale institutional project and the latter a private, almost accidental start-up. 
Despite the difference in scale both are interesting to the student of markets, 
and I will consider each in turn. For chronological reasons I will begin with 
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OFEX, returning to the early 1990s. After two fallow years recovering from 
the stress of his exit from the Japanese bank that had purchased his firm (via 
a purchase of Guinness Mahon) in the 1980s, John Jenkins wrote a plan for a 
market-making business. He made two unsuccessful applications to the LSE 
and had almost given up the idea of returning to the market but was spurred 
on by a desire to help Paul Brown, his former blue-button from S Jenkins & 
Son, who had just been made redundant:
‘I was fiddling about thinking I would actually quite like to go back, 
I liked the boys, I liked the company, and honestly it sounds corny 
and clichéd but I did love chatting to the lads. I tried a couple of 
times and put my business plan in and got turned down. Made 
my mind up, it was no good, I was going to buy a smallholding 
in Norfolk and just enjoy life and I was not going to bother trying 
again. Then a lad who worked with me, Paul…people were hiring 
people and they were firing people just as quick as they hired and 
Paul got caught up in that.’ 31
Brown concurs: 
‘I rang John up and I said to him, “Look, John, just to let you know, 
before you hear it, I have been made redundant.” And he went, 
“Okay”. I’ll never forget it. He said to me, “Okay, Brownie, I’ll come 
back to you”. And that was it. And he rung me back the next 
day and he said, “Look, I went for a walk along the river, and I’ve 
thought about it. I’ve had this idea, trading what was 535(2) stocks 
then. How about you and I give it a go?” He said, “I can’t pay you a 
lot of money but it’s a start-up, we’ll get an office, just you and me, 
and we’ll give it a go.” So I said, “Yeah, fine.”’ 32
On the third submission, Jenkins managed to get it accepted by the London 
Stock Exchange. On 11 February 1991, Jenkins and Brown set up JP Jenkins 
Ltd with a mandate to trade unquoted stocks ‘over the counter’ under the 
Stock Exchange rules.
There followed a period John remembers as one of the happiest in his 
working life. JP Jenkins occupied a small office above the ‘Our Price’ music 
store in Finsbury Square. There was a friendly Dutchman on the floor above 
who would descend on their office mid-afternoon bearing a bottle of gin. 
31 John Jenkins interview
32 Brown interview
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It was just ‘two guys and a sofa’ trading with pen, paper and phone.33 Early 
attempts at computerisation were superficial, to say the least:
‘John had this old computer, so he brought it in, so it sat on the 
desk, but we never used it. We just had it there for show… it was a 
sofa and a computer that didn’t work. It did absolutely nothing. I 
mean it did nothing. It just sat there.’ 34
Business built up through existing networks and hard work on the part of the 
two men, if not the computer:
‘I knew a lot of the boys in the market, so it’s word of mouth. 
I hadn’t been out that long, John hadn’t been out that long 
relatively really, it was only a year and a bit. And so then we did 
quite a big PR splurge on it. I took a lot of the younger blokes out 
obviously, because they were the traders of their day. John knew 
all the bosses of the firms, I knew all the dealers of the firms, so it 
worked quite well. So we just did a PR blitz.’ 35
The timing appeared to be right, perhaps because of the closure of the OTC 
licensed dealers in the late 1980s. One can speculate also that the growing 
prominence of stock investing among retail shareholders led to a demand for 
trading in the dispersed shareholdings of certain private companies. In any 
case, Jenkins’ instincts were correct and there was a profitable opportunity to 
be exploited:
‘We found that a lot of brokers had pent up business in these 
stocks and they’d had nowhere to go. And then when we came 
along, as I say, we did a publication and we sent it out to all the 
brokers, and that’s it. And they started coming back to us. We’d 
build up a list of indicated orders from brokers, things they wanted 
to trade. And if we didn’t do it we’d go away and find out about 
that company, and if we could do it we’d put it on our system. So it 
was a great time really, because it just grew and grew, because as I 
say, a lot of the brokers needed this at the time. We never said no. 
We said “We’ll take a note”.’ 36
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As noted above, trading under Rule 535 needed to be on a matched bargain 
basis, with the market-maker (the title jobber having been abolished in 1986) 
taking a turn on each side. This kind of trading was natural continuation of 
John Jenkins’ prior trading experience and extensive networks. ‘I’ll take a note’ 
came to be the catchphrase of the business:
‘They just sort of grew this list of stuff and if anybody rang up and 
said…I have shares that I want to get rid of, [John would say] “Okay 
I will take a note”, and that was probably the thing that I remember 
saying the most, “I will take a note”… especially at the start, there 
was not a lot of natural two-way business, it was “I will take a note 
and go and find the other side.”’ 37
JP Jenkins’ innovation was to centralize this trade under a well-recognized 
market name. Market makers and brokers are exposed to a considerable 
counterparty risk in terms of non-payment or non-delivery of stock. In a 
formal exchange setting market-makers protect themselves through informal 
measures, such as blackballing delinquent traders, and through formal 
disciplinary mechanisms.38 The Jenkins family reputation signalled reliability 
to clients and solid networks allowed John to judge the quality of his trading 
counterparties and to take care over whom he offered a price. Matched 
bargain trade also had the happy side-benefit of lowering the firm’s exposure 
as traders did not have to hold stock themselves; overall, the firm began 
trading in the careful, risk averse manner that had characterised S Jenkins & 
Son. 
In 1992 the firm moved to Moor House in Moorgate, and in December John’s 
daughter Emma joined the firm. There was a separate room for the back 
office. Shares traded did not fall under the London Stock Exchange’s Talisman 
regime, so trades were settled in house, by the ‘manual XSP’ method.39 A 
typewritten and copied booklet from that period (see figure 1) catalogues the 
stocks traded by JP Jenkins. The list includes some well-established entities 
such as Rangers and Liverpool football clubs, National Parking Corporation 
(NCP), breweries such as Daniel Thwaites and Shepherd Neame, Yates’ Wine 
Lodges, and even Weetabix. In some cases, such as the brewing firms, unusual 
share structures and family interests precluded a full listing on the LSE; in 
others, such as Weetabix, the share register of a private company had grown 
37 Jonathan Jenkins interview
38 Wayne E Baker, “The Social Structure of a National Securities Market,” American Journal of Sociology 89, no. 4 
(1984).
39 J P Jenkins 535(2) list, n.d.
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through gifts and payments-in-kind to a point where a trading mechanism 
was necessary. Alongside these were the stocks of smaller, high-risk, or less 
frequently-traded entities: Pan Andean Resources, Dart Valley Light Railway 
and the Ecclesiastical Insurance Office, to name three at random. These firms 
could also make use of the Jenkins trading facility to raise risk capital in a 
limited manner. 
Life was not taken too seriously, even as the business began to grow. When 
the traders faxed end of day prices to brokers’ offices they would include joke 
stocks to test their readers’ attention; Underground Airways plc and Sahara 
Sand and Ballast plc were popular non-firms, a testament to the sophisticated 
humour of the trading room.40 In all, the firm was successful in its chosen 
niche, matching bargains under the Rule 535(2). It had formed an easy truce 
with the LSE by staying firmly away from the Exchange’s core business of 
larger firms. The style of trading had not changed much over the preceding 
decades, and the success of the business was rooted in a reputation and 
networks built up over years on the trading floor. Trading business grew 
steadily and the firm was profitable; John Jenkins’ horizons were not much 
bigger – no ‘delusions of grandeur’ as he put it. 
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Figure 1.  Extract from JP Jenkins Ltd 535(2) listing booklet. The left hand 
column is a separate sheet, stapled into the booklet. 
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4.3. The market’s ‘place’
Big Bang had ended open-outcry trading in London, and in doing so had 
forced the market to find other ‘places’. These new marketplaces took the 
form of electronic screens, telephone networks and messaging services. 
The LSE’s development of digital trading systems during the 1980s had 
resulted in the new SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automated Quotation) electronic 
notice board, launched in 1986. Built into the existing TOPIC screens, SEAQ 
rapidly became the physical site of the market: a central venue for bids and 
offers to be advertised and trades reported. SEAQ provided a technological 
architecture to support the new dual capacity arrangements, as market 
makers were now required to maintain quotes for the securities they traded.41 
Although the 1987 crash showed the shortcomings of electronic trading, 
it had by this time become normalized and there was no possibility of a 
backwards step.42 Market participants had found other means of taking the 
temperature of trading: the innovative FTSE100 ‘trigger page’ became the 
most visited on TOPIC and the ‘keystone of a self-referring representational 
system that made the floor redundant as an informational device’. 43
Smaller-company trading had also found an electronic home in the ‘non-
SEAQ’ board, developed by the London Stock Exchange for Rule 535 stocks. 
Also running through TOPIC, it was a primitive bulletin board where brokers 
could post bid and offer prices, alongside basis prices for stocks that traded 
infrequently.44 It also published historic trades, and thus the market markers’ 
margins:
‘[It] didn’t show price, didn’t show any live prices, didn’t show 
mid-price. It showed the previous day’s close and it would show 
you the price at which trades had happened. It used to piss people 
off because you’d get someone saying, “I bought them off you at 
nine and it prints on there you bought them at six.” So it showed 
everybody exactly what we were doing. And in really illiquid stuff, 
you could see that we’d had some quite wide prices.’ 45
At some point in the early 1990s, JP Jenkins took over the operation of the 
LSE’s non-SEAQ notice board, which the LSE had threatened to discontinue. 
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There is uncertainty over the precise date, but closure of the non-SEAQ board 
was announced in parallel with the announcement of AIM, so it is probable 
that JP Jenkins’ involvement began in mid to late 1994:
 ‘When the LSE decided to go ahead with creating AIM, they 
decided to withdraw Rule 535.2 and not continue to support the 
provision of the Non SEAQ Noticeboard. For continuity, JP Jenkins 
offered to take over the running of this board. [Until] 2 October 
1995, we ran this for free for brokers so that indicated business was 
still visible…We made the Non SEAQ Noticeboard available via 
ICV (previously TOPIC), Reuters and Bloomberg on their electronic 
screen-based services.’ 46
According to John Jenkins, his firm took on the running of the non-SEAQ 
board because ‘we could not imagine life without some form of publicity’. 
Following Pardo-Guerra’s analysis, more than publicity was at stake, for the 
SEAQ board had become central to the organization of trading practices; 
Jenkins’ comment recognizes that to be excluded from what sociologist 
Karin Knorr Cetina calls the ‘appresentation’ of the market – the electronic 
production of a virtual form – is to be excluded from the market itself.47 
In this move it is also possible to see the first germs of friction with the LSE, 
as JP Jenkins sought to disseminate the prices of Rule 535 stocks through 
commercial providers as well as the Exchange’s Official List. Alongside the 
non-SEAQ board the firm created ‘Newstrack’, a rudimentary news service 
for the small companies that it traded, displaying prices and a limited 
amount of company information over the Reuters network. Newstrack 
was the brainchild of Barry Hocken, a former market-maker who joined 
the firm in June 1993 and Emma Jenkins, who quickly became responsible 
for managing the information service and the compliance issues that it 
involved. There was a family business logic to the decision: John Jenkins 
had by this time realised that Emma’s talents were of a more organisational 
variety, and when Hocken mooted a news service he could see that his 
daughter would be better occupied with this than as a trader.48 Hocken had 
initially proposed a printed newsletter, but Jenkins was an early adopter 
of technology and argued that electronic distribution would be a more 
appropriate channel. It happened that Reuters was looking to expand 
46 Emma Jenkins personal communication
47 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger, “Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets,” 
American Journal of Sociology 107, no. 4 (2002).
48 Hocken and John Jenkins interviews
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the range of content on offer through its screens, and JP Jenkins struck a 
chance deal. 
‘It coincided with [John] deciding that the dealers needed Reuters 
on their desk…so the Reuters people came in and talked about 
kit for our dealers, started talking about information, company 
information, and this chap said to us, “We are starting to provide 
this service where people can have bespoke pages on their 
terminals, would you be interested in those?” We said, “Oh yes we 
would be really interested in that”. “How many pages would you 
like?” And I said, “Well, about 100”, and the bloke went a bit white, 
he said, “Yes, okay”. [We] basically beta tested the software because 
it was a way of being able to put this information on spreadsheets, 
press a magic button and it would arrive on our pages on Reuters 
and that was how simplistic it was in those days. Reuters was our 
first news vendor, they took it on first and then Bloomberg after 
that.’ 49
The service provided market capitalisation and some volume information. A 
rudimentary connectivity between the market makers and Newstrack meant 
that that if the price moved the market capitalisation would also move. 
Dividends were also published: although many companies were too small 
for this to be relevant, some of the larger firms were good dividend payers. 
Firms released final and interim results through the pages, were encouraged 
to make trading announcements though Newstrack was careful that these 
shouldn’t be ‘advertorial’. In other words, Newstrack consciously mimicked the 
London Stock Exchange’s Regulatory News Service (RNS).50 A Reuters circular 
dated October 1993 states: 
‘Reuters has been experiencing repeated demands for more 
prices and information in and on niche markets such as SEATS 
(Stock Exchange Alternative Trading System) and rule 535 (2) on 
the London Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange has recently 
addressed the problem of accessibility to SEATS by providing a 
live feed to Reuters and other information vendors, but has not 
been able to offer the facility on rule 535 (2) stocks. Consequently, 
to overcome this problem, Reuters has joined forces with London 
market-makers JP Jenkins Ltd to offer mid-market prices in over 
75 Rule 535 (2) listed stocks… SJ and S Holdings Ltd, has created 
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a further subsidiary, Newstrack who will, in turn offer a company 
news and data service for smaller Rule 535(2), USM and listed 
companies. “For every call we get from someone in the market 
wanting a price of a 535(2) stock, we get another two from people 
wanting information on the companies,” says John Jenkins, 
chairman of JP Jenkins.’ 51
From 1993 to 1995 Newstrack grew to occupy a small office (figure 2). The 
venture opened up another revenue stream: companies joining OFEX would 
‘enjoy the market-making skills of JP Jenkins Ltd and the news distribution 
expertise of Newstrack Limited for an annual cost of £2000 plus VAT.’52 Stock 
markets strengthened and the firm grew. Marketing efforts focused on 
finding private companies with extensive share registers that could benefit 
from the 535(2) service.53 JP Jenkins recruited new traders and moved offices, 
taking a larger space in Goodman’s Yard, London. The bigger space allowed 
for installation of electronic systems, and for the necessary separation 
between trading and information provision services, each on one side of a 
long corridor running down the centre of the building. John commissioned 
an engineer to build a bespoke trading system; but established trading 
practices persisted, and the computers effectively reduplicated his old 
notebooks. The traders were men (see figure 4) who had served their 
apprenticeship as blue-buttons on the LSE floor, often lacking a formal 
education beyond ‘O’levels, but steeped in the practices and etiquette of 
Exchange trading.54
 
 
51 Pamphlet: Reuters Contact, issue 6, October 1993
52 OFEX brochure, July 1995
53 Brown interview
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Figure 2.  ‘The Newstrack team in action’, Source The OFEX Opportunity, 
brochure, 1999.
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Figure 3a,b,c.  Newstrack screens, Source a) The OFEX Facility, brochure, July 
1995; b,c) The OFEX opportunity  brochure, 1999.
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Figure 4. Paul Brown sits in the foreground of the JP Jenkins dealing room. 
Source The OFEX opportunity  brochure, 1999.
Posner suggests that the Reuters-Jenkins venture, while seemingly 
inconsequential, unsettled the LSE and was one of the catalysts which 
subsequently prompted the Exchange to announce that it would transform 
Rule 535(2) into a full-scale market.55 My own interviews corroborate his 
claim. Newstrack did not anticipate such a development, however. As late as 
July 1995 the Newstrack screen, which resembled a teletext screen, printed 
a clear health warning: ‘*Check your price with a registered market-maker 
and the Non-SEAQ noticeboard*’ (Fig 3.a). JP Jenkins had never intended the 
mechanism to be a place for raising funds but, as equity investing started 
to rebound during the early 1990s, entrepreneurial corporate advisors 
began to issue prospectuses for firms arriving on the facility. The LSE was 
uncomfortable about the growth of the over-the-counter markets conducted 
under the 535(2) banner, particularly when they were being used for capital 
raising.56 It had nothing to gain from Jenkins’ growing operations, but much 
to lose in terms of reputation. The LSE was also, as we shall see in the next 
section, under intense political pressure following the closure of the USM; 
these factors led to the birth of AIM, which not only took the place of the 
Regulation, technology, and the birth of OFEX
55 Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets.
56 Corporate advisor 2 interview; Wallis interview
page 42
Philip Roscoe
USM but also rolled the 535(2) trade into a more regulated setting within the 
Exchange’s purview. 
On launching AIM, the Exchange closed Rule 535(2) (by now renamed Rule 
4.2). It encouraged companies to move on to the new market, whether from 
the former USM or 535(2), but an LSE listing was not suitable for all. For 
example, Weetabix was a private company and therefore could not float on 
AIM, but had accumulated a substantial roster of shareholders. Breweries 
and football clubs also predominated, many having unusual and therefore 
ineligible share structures. Other companies found their audit out of date and 
were faced with a costly mid-year audit, or several months’ suspension from 
the market.57 These companies, the story goes, petitioned John Jenkins:
‘“John, you’ve been trading our shares on rule 4.2, can you do 
something?” And John went to the Exchange and said, “Look, 
we’ve got these companies who we currently trade under rule 4.2 
they’re going to be homeless. They don’t fit into AIM. Is it okay if 
we carry on trading these off the exchange?” And the Exchange 
went, “Don’t know why not.” John asked the SFA and they went, 
“Well, we’ve got no rule that says you can’t.”’ 58
As noted above, John Jenkins had no larger ambition than running a 
successful trading business in 535(2) stocks. He was now – following the LSE’s 
changes – likely to find himself out of business and was amenable to the 
suggestion that he set out his own OTC market, trading shares ‘off-exchange’. 
JP Jenkins also faced the closure of its trade reporting mechanism via the 
LSE’s Official List and the Exchange’s market information system, as the 
end of rule 535(2) coincided with the closure of the non-SEAQ board. The 
Jenkins-LSE arrangement concerning the board had always been intended 
as a temporary measure while the Exchange pursued its own process of 
modernisation. In 1995 the LSE introduced a new digital information feed, 
London Market Information Link, and the non-SEAQ noticeboard was 
removed. JP Jenkins lost its public face. In combination with the loss of 
trading business the firm had no option but to start up its own facility. 
‘The non-SEAQ notice board wasn’t very efficient but at least it was 
the focal point for unlimited and unquoted securities that brokers 
57 Market executive 3 interview
58 Market executive 3 interview; also Corporate advisor 1 interview. A similar account is given in the OFEX’s 2004 
AIM offer document
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could go and leave limits and do that sort of stuff on…So on the 
back of the Newstrack thing that we created, the information 
hub in a modern day parlance…we decided that if the Non-SEAQ 
notice board goes we need to have a marker, we need to have 
something out there.’ 59
JP Jenkins opened its OTC facility, named OFEX, on 2 October 1995, the 
first Monday after the Daily Official List ceased to publish closing prices 
(the ‘marks’) for stocks under the old rules. At this point OFEX existed only 
as a badge. It was sometimes described as a trading facility operated by JP 
Jenkins, and it certainly was not a market:
‘The name OFEX is a Registered Trademark of SJ&S Holdings 
Limited and the facilities operated by JP Jenkins Limited in 
conjunction with Newstrack Limited.’ 60
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5. Elite lobbying and the AIM?
The circumstances that provoked the creation of AIM are complicated. 
Lobbying by the small-company sector in defence of UK plc was a major 
factor. Yet the LSE remained a powerful institution, resistant to external 
pressure – though at the time it may have been weakened by the public 
humiliation of having to abandon its high profile settlement system 
project. In replacing the USM, the Exchange was also able to roll up Rule 
535, by then a major worry for an institution that took reputation and 
compliance most seriously; the Jenkins-Newstrack venture appears to 
have been an important factor in the process of launching AIM. The work 
around the new market coincided with a movement in the British regions 
and Scotland to improve the regional participation in the Stock Exchange; 
Michael Lawrence, then head of the LSE, took a keen interest in the regions 
and was fond of remarking that future customers would not be found 
on the streets of the City of London.1 Finally, the successful inception of 
the market in 1995 owed much to the skill, energy and determination of 
a single individual – Theresa Wallis, an executive at the LSE who became 
the first Head of AIM. It is clear, however, that the Exchange’s decision to 
launch a smaller company market was initially reactive, and that as on 
many other occasions, the LSE deployed its ‘second mover advantage’,2 and 
that the new focus on smaller companies remained alien to others. The 
Listing Department especially associated smaller companies with greater 
risk – this, despite a string of high-profile embarrassments concerning large 
quoted companies including Eurotunnel, Maxwell Communications and 
Polly Peck. 
5.1. ‘Firestorm’
Late in 1992 the London Stock Exchange suggested that the USM should 
be closed, a point made ever more strongly throughout 1993. This outcome 
would have left a number of powerful market figures in a difficult position. 
These included Brian Winterflood, the market-maker nicknamed ‘Mr USM’, 
Andrew Beeson, then senior partner of Beeson Gregory, a successful 
small-company stockbroker, and (now Sir) Ronald Cohen, a leading venture 
capitalist. Those unhappy with the LSE’s decision made a noise:
1 Hughes interview
2 Ward interview
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‘Suddenly King Herod had just been appointed to the Board 
of Mothercare, right. You know, the Exchange is out to kill the 
entrepreneur. I mean, the press was just relentless…this firestorm.’ 3
Cohen argued that the closure of the USM would be a particular problem for 
the venture capital community. Left without an exit route for its investments, 
financial contributions to the venture capital sector would shrink, and a 
politically important part of Britain’s smaller company ecology would grind 
to a halt. Winterflood, who was in the process of selling his recently-founded 
Winterflood Securities to Close Brothers for £15 million, campaigned so 
forcibly that he is sometimes held to be the founder of AIM.4 Cohen, Beeson 
and Winterflood formed a ‘ginger group’ (in Winterflood’s words) to lobby 
politicians and the LSE on behalf of UK plc, and by doing so look after their 
own interests. This group became the City Group for Smaller Companies 
(CISCO, later the Quoted Companies Alliance, or QCA), formed in December 
1992. CISCO set about lobbying and raising awareness via the press. CISCO’s 
suggestions were elaborate, as Tim Ward, the current chief executive of QCA, 
explains: 
‘CISCO…got together as the City participants to say, “Hang on a 
minute, we need something in place of the Unlisted Securities 
Market, you ought to re-visit your decision.” I think initially the 
Stock Exchange said, “No we won’t”, so they came up with a plan 
[suggesting] that the Stock Exchange reformulated its offering so 
that it had...something like, a global market, a national market, 
which had obviously national companies on it and what they 
called an enterprise market.’ 5
CISCO argued that there was an underlying demand for a junior market, 
that the Exchange was reacting too hastily to a long and deep recession, 
and that looking towards the mid-1990s, an economic upturn would once 
again create a climate conducive to equity finance and that appropriate 
institutional arrangements to support this should be put in place. Its April 
1993 newsletter contained a long plan for a three tier equity market, the 
lowest tier being an ‘Enterprise Market’. Admission requirements would 
reflect the legal minimum – no trading history or capitalization requirements 
– but the proposal did suggest a minimum stock issuance of £500,000 on the 
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basis that this would encourage bona fide motivations for listing. Another 
proposed innovation was a proposed short trading window, perhaps one 
hour twice daily, to concentrate liquidity. The documents hinted that CISCO 
would be prepared to support a new market beyond the purview of the LSE, 
if necessary.6
The story of market and government pressure on the LSE was pervasive in 
my interviews:
‘I think [there was] a lot of pressure…from HM Treasury and the 
bank of England to say, “Look, we need somewhere for early 
stage pre-listed companies to actually be tradable. You, the Stock 
Exchange cannot wash your hands of this.” They were getting it 
from members and from HMG. That led to the creation of AIM.’ 7
Those managers at the LSE who faced the financial community after the 
closure of the USM remember a deep anger among brokers and investment 
managers in the City and across the regions. There was a concern that a 
uniquely British small-company equity culture would wither away. 
‘There’s always been a culture of small and big companies in the 
UK and if you didn’t have a USM or some dedicated market then 
the chances are that a lot of the infrastructure around it in terms 
of market makers and investors and portfolios and all that kind of 
stuff would have died away. So it was quite important that we did 
set something else up.’ 8
In short, the community saw the Exchange as out of step with the zeitgeist 
of a nation trying hard to recover from a sharp economic downturn: 
‘It was that bad. I got shouted down at conferences…People hate 
bad publicity, including the Government, and there’d be phone 
calls coming in from Treasury, “What are you doing?” So on and so 
forth. And, of course, the listing department had to report to the 
Treasury directly. [The board] came to me and said… “you’ve got 
to find an alternative for the USM.”’ 9
6 Cisco Newsletter, February 1993, p.8; April 1993, p.5-16.
7 Market executive 3 interview
8 Fund manager 1
9 Vardey interview
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By March 1993 Nigel Atkinson, head of the LSE’s Listing Department, had 
begun to give ground.10 CISCO held talks with the LSE, forcing the Exchange to 
extend the USM’s life by several months and set up a working party to consider 
a new market.11 The Exchange opened a consultation and received sixty 
responses from City bodies. It established a practitioners’ committee chaired 
by Ian Macpherson, a Scottish business grandee, and comprising Winterflood, 
Cohen, Patrick Burgess (a lawyer, now chairman of blue chip British property 
firm Intu plc) and others.12 Different parties advocated different positions, 
Cohen preferring a high-growth market modelled on NASDAQ, for instance, 
while the practitioner committee ‘fizzled out’.13 But the LSE enjoyed a powerful 
position and did not cave in to pressure at once.14 It called the response to 
the consultation ‘disappointing’. Despite government support the LSE initially 
rejected the CISCO plan for an enterprise market. In fact, the LSE denied the 
fundamental claim that it was prejudicing the entrepreneurial dynamism of 
the United Kingdom. Atkinson was quoted as saying: 
‘I totally refute suggestions that by recommending the closure 
of the USM the Exchange is somehow stifling entrepreneurs. 
Even those most vociferous in their demands for a new market 
to replace the USM do not dispute the fact that the distinction 
between the USM and the Official List no longer justifies two 
separate regulatory regimes.’ 15
Many in the broking community shared this view, arguing that marketability 
of stock was a function of quality rather than the structure of markets:
I don’t think anybody was really caught out [by the closure of the 
USM]. They transposed to something else. If you couldn’t deal in a 
stock it was because it was shit. Anything with quality survived in 
one guise or another.’ 16
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working party,’  Eric Baird, p.17
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14 Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets.
15 Evening Standard, March 5, 1993, ‘Exchange hits back over USM’, p.33
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We can speculate that the Exchange was at the time unusually vulnerable 
to media attention. In March 1993, the London Stock Exchange had been 
forced to scrap its Taurus paperless settlement system and its reforming chief 
executive Peter Rawlins had resigned. Work on Taurus had begun as early 
as 1981, but the project had been dogged by opposition from banks and 
registrars, who stood to lose work and had to rebuild their own systems to be 
compatible with the new one. The project spanned a decade of revolutionary 
change in the architecture of London’s markets and so never stood on solid 
ground; it was only the LSE’s firm, if mistaken, belief that it should pursue 
the revenues attached to settlement services that sustained the effort.17 
The media did not spare its barbs: Rawlins, reported the Independent, ‘was 
a frustrated thespian whose early search for fame took him as far as an 
appearance on Bruce Forsyth’s Generation Game.’ 18
The Taurus affair cost the LSE £75m and the City as a whole several times 
that amount; it received global news coverage and left the institution 
looking old-fashioned and directionless.19 Michael Lawrence became the 
new chief executive of the LSE late in 1993, recruited from beyond the 
broking community with a mandate to give the struggling institution a new 
direction. In April 1994, he announced a ‘seven-point plan’ mapping out the 
Exchange’s future direction. CISCO reported that ‘the cornerstone of this plan 
was the development and relaunch of the 535.2 “trading facility” as a distinct 
market’.20 Further to this a consultation document published in September 
1994 again positioned the LSE’s proposal as a specific move to develop 
and relaunch Rule 4.2, as well as offering a home to companies unable or 
unwilling to move from the USM to the Official List. 
The decision to launch a new market also coincided with a new interest in 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and the regions on the part of the LSE, and a 
parallel recognition in those places that the financing of entrepreneurial 
businesses might offer a remedy to the economic collapse that followed the 
rapid de-industrialisation of the late 1980s.
‘There was a major enquiry into Scotland’s relatively low level of 
company formation in the early nineties. I think a key strand of 
17 Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, 608-9.
18 The Independent, November 14, 1993, ‘Profile: Enter the man from the Pru; The Stock Exchange’s new chief tells 
William Kay that he’s his own man and it’s time to end the mistakes’, William Kay, Business p8
19 See, e.g. Investors Chronicle, September 3, 1993, ‘Who Needs The Stock Exchange? - The Stock Exchange has 
lost an empire and has not yet found a role. Is it really worth preserving?’, Diane Coyle, p.12
20 Ward and Wallis interviews, CISCO Newsletter, September 1994, p.2. Wallis remembers being physically handed 
the plan as she stepped into her new role.
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that, why is it Scotland has this problem, the access to finance 
issue was raised…There was some sort of advisory or steering 
group that was established in Scotland to look at what Scotland’s 
response might be to the AIM proposal…from the stock exchange 
side, the Chief Exec, Michael Lawrence, who was promoting the 
whole idea of AIM, which was to for the London Stock Exchange to 
re-engage with the regions, I think Michael’s idea was a lot of these 
smaller companies, earlier stage companies are not going to be 
walking about the City of London, you know, they’re going to be in 
the UK regions. This was like a kind of back to the future to I think 
the older days where there were regional exchanges…he was a 
champion of the stock exchange being much more relevant in the 
regions of the UK and Ireland’ 21
There was money in the regions and money is vital to a viable small company 
exchange. Hughes recalls meeting a broker from Northern Ireland with 
‘£1.2 billion of old money’ under management. Despite the depredations 
of the 1980s there was still a regional infrastructure capable of supporting 
the new market: a Birmingham Stock Exchange, brokers in the Channel 
Islands bringing companies and business to 535/4.2, a stock exchange office 
in Glasgow.22 Received wisdom at the Exchange held that local investors 
preferred local businesses:
‘One of the things I heard and learnt when I first came on with the role was… 
investors, when it comes to small companies they’d rather invest close to 
home where they can go and visit the companies and they look them in the 
eye and all that sort of thing.’ 23
The attention to regional networks was constant throughout the whole 
process. Martin Hughes and David Walker were seconded from Scottish 
Enterprise and Scottish Financial Enterprise respectively, along with Damian 
McLaughlin, seconded from Midland Bank. Hughes was based in London 
initially and then in Glasgow, and had responsibility for promoting the 
market in Scotland, Northern Ireland and north-west England. Coverage was 
substantial: 
‘Once we issued the consultation document we then had to present it all 
around the country, every city even up to Inverness. We had a roadshow 
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going round a lot of cities in the UK where we explained the new proposal 
what our thinking of what the market would look like.’ 24
The legal scholar Elliot Posner sees the evolution of AIM in terms of a series 
of competitive responses that allowed the LSE to preserve its monopoly 
position in the UK. He suggests that the LSE acted to preserve its interests on 
two fronts: the threat of a pan-European small-company market, a project 
driven by Cohen and Jos Peeters, a Belgian venture-capitalist with close ties 
to the European Union and JP Jenkins’ joint venture with Reuters to provide 
information on 535.2 stocks (namely Newstrack).25 The launch of EASDAQ 
was delayed until 1996 and, although it was soon regarded as a major threat, 
there was considerable scepticism among interviewees that EASDAQ alone 
had provoked the LSE into an about turn: AIM was intended as a national 
market for all kinds of businesses, and this was driven by the perception that 
the smaller company investor preferred national, even local investments.26 
It does seem the case, however, that JP Jenkins’ Newstrack–Reuters venture 
unsettled the Exchange. Those working within the LSE on the launch of AIM 
remember anxiety about the risks posed by the Jenkins-Newstrack venture:
‘The rule 535.2 facility morphed into an informal unofficial 
market...I remember seeing prospectuses which were public offer 
prospectuses but they said on them “the shares will be traded on 
the Rule 4.2 or Rule 535.2 market”… Something was happening 
by itself…I was advised to use [the narrative that]… the European 
Regulations no longer allow us to be associated in any way with 
an unregulated market… Under the rules if two member firms 
did a deal with each other, then the price at which that was done 
could be recorded in the Daily Official List and it would be viewed 
as the price of that company…But I think John Jenkins was taking 
it all a bit further and making the pricing a bit more visible…it 
was turning into a market which benefited from the London Stock 
Exchange’s name and reputation but we weren’t regulating it.’ 27
These accounts find further support from Stephen Hazell-Smith, a specialist 
smaller company fund manager who launched the Beacon Investment Trust 
to capitalise on the forthcoming AIM opportunity. Like all fund managers 
launching a new scheme, Hazell-Smith conducted a roadshow of potential 
24 Wallis interview
25 Posner, The Origins of Europe’s New Stock Markets.
26 Vardey and Wallis interviews
27 Wallis interview
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investors, and to reassure them of the viability of the forthcoming market he 
used trading figures from the Rule 535 market, provided by John Jenkins. 
‘John’s family had dealt for years in the old what was known as 
the Rule 535 market and we needed data to be able to prove 
to our potential subscribers, to the investment trusts that there 
was activity, interest, call it what you will, in these very small 
companies. And John, bless him, had that data, provided that data 
to us free of charge and we were able to go on the road, Andrew 
and I, and demonstrate that there was potential here.’ 28
In other words, those active in the practitioner community recognised 
the continuity between the 535 market, soon to close, and AIM. Andrew 
Buchanan, Hazell-Smith’s partner at Beacon, felt that the Exchange had made 
a mistake in closing the USM and that the existing 4.2 mechanism offered a 
convenient way forward:
‘[We] put a suggestion to the stock exchange that actually here 
was a group of companies in which there seemed to be some 
perfectly reasonable trading activity but no obvious mechanism. 
And yet the lack of a mechanism didn’t seem to inhibit the 
liquidity in the stock. So, in so many words, what was the problem? 
It seemed to be somewhat short-sighted to us. It was a mistake 
to have shut the USM and they could build on 4.2 to make it a 
reasonable market, a quote-driven market place… To help it on its 
way, Rutherford launched a little investment trust called Beacon in 
August ’94 to invest in effectively the 4.2 matched bargain facility 
and any successor market and that successor market, June ’95, 
becomes AIM.’
It seems the embattled Exchange simply did not have the stomach for a 
prolonged ‘firestorm’ surrounding small companies, and there was a broader 
question too: after so many changes, what was the Exchange to do? The loss 
of the settlement system was a major blow to an institution that had divested 
itself of mutual status and was seeing its regulatory ambit diminished. 
Everyone within the LSE was aware that change was at hand:
‘The days that I was living through in the Exchange were transformational. 
The settlement business had just gone to Crestco and all the old stockbrokers 
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and jobbers used to say that was the glue that held the market together. So 
what was next that was going to go? Well, obviously the regulatory function. 
There was going to be changes in regulation…Then we had the loss of the 
member firms, the mutual status.’ 29
A focus on UK plc, on the raising of risk capital, and on the UK regions offered 
the LSE a new direction and potentially a new lease of life. A new market in 
the form of AIM could supply all of these things and at the same time save 
face following the closure of the USM and deal with the regulatory worries 
that Rule 535/4.2 now presented. The LSE pushed ahead. 
5.2.  Building a market
The Exchange was mindful that the USM’s failure to establish its own market 
position had led to its closure. A central question for any new market, 
therefore, was how to differentiate itself from the Official List. Michael 
Lawrence recognized that a new approach to listing would be vital, and 
that, in the conservative institutional culture of the LSE, this would require 
an entirely new listing team. Lawrence placed Theresa Wallis in charge of a 
working party with a brief to think about listing in a completely new way. 
Wallis had already demonstrated her management – and marketing – skills 
at the Exchange by developing the Eurobond listing activities to match 
the customer-friendly, turnkey service offered by the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange. A pivotal figure in this history, Wallis’ efforts have never been 
fully recognised, though it is clear she displayed a remarkable energy and 
competence in making the market happen. She had been instructed to ‘walk 
through walls,’ said one interviewee, ‘and she did’. Another described her 
as an ‘incredible leader, a team player, politically aware… phenomenal… 
it was a blessing to be working with her.’ Wallis remembers that she was 
‘inspired by the ability to [do] anything that can help the UK economy and 
can help... helping smaller companies grow, helping the UK economy.’ 30 She 
emphasises how much support the working group received from the rest 
of the Exchange; she remembers colleagues with deep expertise in listing 
practices and regulations and the minutiae of running an exchange, while her 
own team fizzed with excitement and a real commitment towards helping 
the British economy. The working group was driven by the twin concerns 
of keeping quality up and making the market accessible, which in practice 
meant keeping costs down. By May 1994 it was clear that
29 Hughes interview
30 Interviews, Wallis interviews
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‘the market had to have three aspects, clear identity, differentiation 
and… appropriate regulation, something like that…whatever new 
market happened, didn’t have a name, the vaguest idea of what it 
would be...it had to be clearly differentiated from the main market, 
have its own identity so that it’s not managed via a part of the 
listing department…People were saying… the reason NASDAQ 
has been successful is that NASDAQ is separate from the New York 
Stock Exchange and it was kind of, ‘Well we can do that inside 
the London Stock Exchange but from a separate team within the 
Exchange.’ 31
At the same time, the new market could make use of the LSE’s expertise, 
infrastructure, and prestige:
‘The Stock Exchange knew how to operate markets, it had got 
the facilities, it had got the people, it had got the resources, 
and it had got the prestige. On the other hand, I think having a 
separate department was absolutely key and from those early 
days of AIM working under Theresa I became convinced that AIM 
could have its separate values, its own separate rules, its own 
separate problems, opportunities and so on and that was Michael 
Lawrence’s vision.’ 32
The resulting market was a peculiar organizational mix of neoliberal 
laissez-faire and old fashioned club. AIM was to operate as a ‘disclosure-
based market’, following the American model, where the emphasis was on 
providing information and allowing choice. Simon Brickles, a barrister by 
training who later became the LSE’s Head of AIM, articulates a clear vision of 
what such a market should be:
‘I always tried throughout my career to maintain the vision that 
Michael had for a small … market based on pure regulations…I 
don’t think [heavy regulation] is the business of a Stock Exchange, 
we should be the high temple of capitalism, we should allow as 
much choice and freedom as compatible with a reasonable level of 
investor protection’ 33
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The listing department acted as quality control for the Official List but this 
model was not deemed appropriate for a smaller market. The new market 
took the success of Rule 4.2 as a model: 
‘[It] seems to be reasonably successful in that the private investors, 
investors who are buying on Rule 4.2 don’t seem to mind – it’s 
very much a caveat market – don’t seem to mind that it’s not 
regulated. They know what they’re going in for. Maybe this is 
going to be the solution, [if ] we build a market around what was 
Rule 535.2 dealing…This new market that was going to be created 
was simply regulating rule 535.2 to a level which we thought was 
commensurate with a) what the market needs, meeting those 
criteria and b) it’s got our badge on it so we can...we feel it’s well 
enough regulated.’ 34
The day-to-day construction of the new market was driven by the 
consultation document. As responses were received they were distributed 
among the small team, reviewed, and discussed at a morning meeting. 
Megan Butler, then a young lawyer at the LSE (now Director of Supervision 
at the FCA) advised the group on developing the Rulebook and regulatory 
compliance. The team had to manage such technical issues, often with the 
support of the community from beyond the Exchange. But most of all, the 
new market had to be talked into being. Hughes describes the process in 
detail, as 
‘Knowledge building, consensus building, to inform an emergent 
model. This was a continuous iterative process. The Exchange was 
very diligent and quite pedantic in the way that they would issue 
their consultation document. They would receive the responses, 
the responses would be considered, we would discuss them 
during our morning review meetings. If there was anything, [if ] 
there was a point of clarification, it was dealt with quite quickly, 
either by a phone-call or by a meeting. There were continuous 
meetings because as well as the consensus building element was 
that you were continuing to raise awareness at the meetings. So 
you’d maybe have things that some of the legal firms during the 
day or at night there would be something on, or you’d be invited 
round for dinner at Clifford Chance, or something. It was all about 
the market, getting to understand it, and that engagement. You 
34 Wallis interview. 
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could tell that the relationship was very close. You could tell that it 
was understood why it was important…there was never anyone 
who was not willing to engage properly, and think about it. Some 
of the legal firms as well, who were quite high end, at very senior 
level, they would have you in and they would talk about things 
and give you real valuable guidance, because I think, as I say, there 
was a recognition and an understanding that this is going to be 
important so we really should make sure it’s right.’ 35
5.3. Privatized regulation
Organized around the key principles of disclosure, accessibility and low 
cost the proposed rules placed the onus on company directors to publish 
full information and keep the market updated with price sensitive news. As 
part of the drive to keep costs down the consultation document suggested 
that sponsorship (the arrangement by which a qualified firm takes formal 
responsibility for supervising the conduct of the listee, compulsory on the 
Official List) would be optional. Firms would need a member firm (a broker) to 
support trading. From an institutional investor’s point of view this compromise 
made sense: investors were sophisticated enough to navigate a caveat emptor 
market, but the natural lack of liquidity in small company stocks would still 
require some kind of intermediary to facilitate institutional trading. This was 
certainly the line taken by Hazell-Smith and Buchanan’s Beacon Trust, but 
as responses to the AIM consultation came in the few voices of institutional 
investors were outnumbered by those who suggested that some kind of 
sponsor would still be necessary, if only to offer reassurance to the investing 
public. A purely ‘caveat market’ was too much for the community to bear. The 
LSE therefore proposed the role of Nominated Advisor, or Nomad, with certain 
guaranteed professional qualifications and experience. Finance scholars 
describe the Nomad system as ‘private sector regulation’ and have debated its 
efficacy;36 it is clear, however, that outsourcing regulation to a third party has 
cost implications for listee firms, the very reason that the working group had 
sought to avoid it in the first place. 
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Nomads were to be policed by reputation alone. Much depended upon the 
‘advanced equity culture’ that had grown up in the market:
‘I think practices had arisen over many years whereby brokers 
would make sure that a good level of due diligence was done 
on companies before they bought them to the market, and due 
diligence of a particular type, which advisors they would use to do 
what particular exercise. And they’d had many years of experience 
doing it so they knew what pitfalls to look for, they knew what 
could go wrong.’ 37
The advisors would have ample opportunity to get to know clients, 
thinking held. Compiling a public offer document over a period of several 
months provides ample opportunity for scrutiny of products, books and 
management. Certain financial events, such as a bankruptcy, would signal 
financial recklessness on the part of a potential listee and would be enough 
to deter many advisors.38 Nomads who willingly brought poor-quality 
goods to market would find themselves struggling to sell future offerings to 
investors and concern for their own commercial prospects would lead them 
to act diligently and scrupulously. 
The team believed that a certain level of experience would be necessary and 
ruled that each Nomad had a four ‘qualified executives’, defined as market 
professionals who had completed three qualifying transactions in the past 
year. Tim Ward, at the time a young accountant seconded from the LSE’s 
Listing Department, was responsible for drafting the eligibility criteria for 
these Nomad firms and overseeing initial applications. In effect, the rules 
guaranteed that each Nomad had sufficient reputational capital at stake to 
make it conscious of the quality of firms that it brought to market. 
‘The Exchange did not want firms which did not have a reputation 
to suddenly pop on this market and build their reputation on 
the back of the market. It was necessary for the firms that were 
nominated advisors to have a reputation that they needed to 
protect and enhance, rather than one to create. So it was not one 
for new boys to come in saying we are going to build our business 
off the back of this….the idea was that there had to be four people 
within any firm who had done relevant transactions, and a certain 
number within the last two years I think it was, so that they were 
37 Wallis interview
38 Norcorss interview
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experienced, qualified and able to do the role that had been set 
out for them by the Exchange.’ 39
Some saw the requirement to have a minimum of four qualified executives as 
a restrictive practice. It placed firms in a very weak position relative to their 
executives, who could leave and thereby strip their employer’s regulatory status: 
‘We eventually became a NOMAD. Not an enjoyable experience…
We got the four QEs…One of our chaps qualified, we took two from 
another firm, and I can’t remember where the fourth one came 
from. But the two that came from [rival firm] also brought another 
person with them and those three…just kept forcing the [salary] 
prices up, and constantly threatening to leave. And of course as 
soon as you lose one you’ve got to go and replace them. This is 
where you get into this bidding auction to try and find QEs.’ 40
Other firms opted to avoid becoming Nomads altogether, and offered 
advisory services contracted through a registered Nomad. 
The Exchange’s vision harnessed the close social networks that persisted in 
the City in the 1990s, many of which stemmed from before the Big Bang. In 
the words of Simon Brickles, it relied upon ‘the tools and instruments of a club’:
‘I think in many ways the essence of AIM, and if you like, the way 
in which it was operated, [owed] more to the clubbable aspect 
of the Exchange, and the black-balling and the fact if you look at 
the sanctions the Stock Exchange had they were not those that 
modern regulators have to impose an unlimited fine. I think there 
was a fining power on issuers but hardly to be used. The censure 
was the thing, a private censure…[and] the public censure, which 
was really only ever used when you were trying to give a signal 
that somebody was a wrong ‘un…These are very much the tools 
and the instruments of a club.’ 41
And, 
‘When you run a stock exchange…you have two rulebooks. One 
is the written rulebook and the other is the unwritten rulebook. 
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Now the unwritten rulebook is when you turn up and say, “Hello, 
I’m [so and so] stockbroker, I’ve got this really interesting company 
and I want bring them on your market”. And you, as the regulator, 
say, “Don’t even think about it. If you turn up, we just won’t let you 
do it, we’ll remove your licence, you’ll stop being an authorised 
broker.”…When it came to AIM, there was a network underneath 
which says, that company, don’t touch it. And so an awful lot of 
this stuff was unwritten, unrecorded, but by and large, one of the 
reasons why AIM survived better than most was because we did 
things like that. Can’t discuss it publicly, deny all knowledge.’ 42
The Nomad structure proved successful, although it is not clear how much 
power the early managers of AIM actually wielded, and there have been 
persistent concerns that the market is not strict enough in dealing with errant 
Nomads. The response to the initial consultation had noted:
‘The performance of nominated advisers will be assessed on an 
annual basis and firms may be censured or removed from the 
register if it is considered that the integrity and reputation of AIM 
may have been impaired as a result of the conduct or judgement 
of a nominated adviser.’
Or, more succinctly:
‘It was always implicit…we would shoot one a year pour encourager 
les autres…I think the Stock Exchange didn’t do that. They were 
too obsessed with the marketing, getting companies on.’ 43
A former senior executive of the LSE remarked to me that he felt that 
managers of AIM became too close to the NOMAD community for the health 
of the market.44 Certainly there was an ongoing conflict between issue 
volume and quality, a tension that only became more difficult in the bull 
market of the late 1990s. 
AIM listed companies also needed to retain a broker whose role it was to 
maintain an orderly market, helping investors to dispose of shares and 
placing new stock in the case of fundraising, to ‘oil the wheels of the stock’ : 45
42 Vardey interview
43 Vardey interview
44 Source, telephone conversation
45 Hoodless interview
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If [an institution] had a line of shares in an AIM company and they 
weren’t marketable, it’s very unlikely they would drop them into 
the market. They would try and find a broker to place them. And 
that was where we as a firm tried to fit in…we had institutions 
asking us to take stock from them. And then they used to get 
very upset because we didn’t offer them a very good price…we 
dissipated those shares over a wide number of shareholders.’ 46
Effective brokering depended upon strong networks and a good reputation, 
‘understanding the business, dealing with honest people, 
doing the due diligence effectively with the help of lawyers and 
accountants, it would be a good network… and then having very 
good distribution through the salesman and good research…In 
1994/95, we started a market bank, along with others, so we acted 
both as an agent and as a principal…Liquidity was the principal 
reason, providing liquidity because institutions want liquidity. 
Also the margin…you tended to have a buyer and a seller and 
something in between and why would you do a put-through…
and…give the job to the market-maker at a small turn? So we took 
it ourselves.’ 47
A central role of the broker is to manage supply and demand of the stock, 
particularly dealing with large purchase and sale orders. A corporate broker 
is expected to understand the secondary market for a given stock, and has to 
expend considerable energy building networks with institutional buyers and 
sellers in order to facilitate these transfers – what Beeson refers to as a ‘put-
through’ in the quote above. Maintaining these networks is an ongoing effort, 
based around a continuous process of marketing for each client company. 
Nevertheless, brokers can find their efforts frustrated by relatively small 
purchases and sales from the retail market:
‘The market price, the price you see on the screen, is generally set 
by the retail investor, the balance of buyers and sellers, all these 
five grands and ten grands and 20 grands worth of stock.…so 
they will interact with our market makers, which will adjust the 
price depending on the supply and demand in the market. The 
institutional investors generally stay out of that. They don’t deal in 
Elite lobbying and the AIM?
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small amounts. But if they want to sell a million pounds worth of 
stock, they will look at the market price, they’ll probably give us 
the stock at the mid-market price. I know I’ve got a seller, I’ve got 
that order, and I can ring up another institutional investor, and if 
he agrees to buy it at that price, we match them. So the million 
pounds worth of stock goes through the market, one’s sold, one’s 
bought. But it doesn’t change the market price. Someone can 
come on and buy ten thousand pounds worth and it will put it up, 
or if they buy or sell, it could put it up or down by five to ten per 
cent.’ 48
Of course, broking could lead to its own difficulties in terms of compliance, 
especially during periods of rapid expansion or contraction when many of 
the salesmen worked on their own account, colloquially known as ‘eat what 
you kill’. These ‘half-commission men’ split their revenues 50-50 with the firm 
through which they operated, and could be difficult to manage:
‘The business got better, there were more people on board, we 
got employed salesmen who were – they could tell a story…they 
were a bit rough and ready …didn’t know what the limit in terms 
of what they could do, what they could say [it was ] a constant 
nightmare keeping track of them. It wasn’t boiler room stuff 
because we were dealing with companies we knew about and we 
had done due diligence on those companies before any selling 
was going on. They just – the whole point about marketing at any 
level and, you know, any IPO we do now, is you have a document 
which had been verified and approved – that is the message – 
you can only talk to what’s in that admission document, draft or 
whatever you want to call it. You can’t say, yes, it’s going to go 
gang bust because of X, Y and Z if that’s not in the document – I 
think those sort of lines get blurred sometimes.’ 49
AIM was launched in June 1995, with the full weight of the LSE behind it. 
On its first day of trading in 1995 10 companies with an aggregate value of 
£82 million joined the market. It offered streamlined listing for companies 
already trading on Rule 4.2 or listed on the USM. It took time for interest and 
confidence to grow. The Beacon Trust, with its relatively small £19m, was the 
only larger investor in the sector – ‘£19m doesn’t sound a lot but it was 17, 18 
48 Norcross interview
49 Corporate advisor 4 interview
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more than anybody else.’ 50 Yet it turned out to be a propitious time to launch 
a new market and AIM began to flourish in the boom of the late 1990s. As 
a privately regulated market it proved an excellent venue for new issues of 
younger, higher risk companies and grew rapidly, especially during the dot-
com bubble.
‘AIM was a slow burner, institutions were not invested initially, 
[just] retail investors, and there were some very odd little 
companies floated. Then gradually a few brokers realised the 
potential of it, so some slightly better companies were floated on 
the market and in 1999 there was a rush, there was certainly a lot 
of technology exposure through the AIM market …All you had to 
do was to have a knitting pattern and put .net and people would 
buy the shares and that worked for three years.’ 51
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6.  1995 to 2000: Dotcom bubble and IPO boom
By the late 1990s OFEX had come to resemble a small-scale capital market. It 
flourished in the dotcom boom and suffered in the bear market that followed. 
The boom years set in train a process of restructuring in pursuit of growth 
and legitimacy, with OFEX gaining regulatory recognition as a ‘prescribed 
market’. It floated on AIM, and then following a disastrous fundraising, slipped 
from the Jenkins family’s control. The next two chapters deal with those 
events. 
 
Entering the late 1990s, the group’s structure remained that established 
prior to 1995. Newstrack Ltd and JP Jenkins Ltd operated as independent 
companies, owned by SJ & S Holdings, which John Jenkins chaired. John 
ran the trading business, and Emma and Jonathan (her younger brother, 
who re-joined the firm in 1997) ran the growing exchange business as joint 
managing directors. Initially, OFEX’s entry requirements were light: a fact 
sheet published in 1996 states that 
‘The facility welcomes both established trading companies or 
start-up enterprises which can meet the entry requirements. These 
requirements include free transfer of shares, compliance with 
Public Offers of Securities requirements if a fund-raiser, provision 
of audited accounts or a detailed business plan if a start-up, 
directors’ declarations and basic company fundamental data.’ 1
Application was straightforward: a Stock Exchange member firm, or a 
member of a recognised professional body such as an accountant, could 
apply on a company’s behalf. It needed to present an application form, 
a questionnaire, and some directors’ declarations, together with a non-
refundable application fee of £250 plus VAT.
The first public offer of securities on the trading mechanism had been Syence 
Skin Care, which started trading in OFEX on 18 October 1995. The firm raised 
£250,000 in a public offer conducted by corporate advisor St James Capital. 
John Jenkins reportedly told John Bridges, the advisor responsible, that he 
‘scared the hell’ out of OFEX’s management, who had never envisaged that 
a company would raise money on the market. Although there had been a 
history of firms issuing offer documents through Rule 4.2 and therefore under 
the LSE’s auspices, under the new arrangement OFEX had suddenly taken 
1 Ofex factsheet, n.d.
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responsibility for its listings and thus inherited the LSE’s concerns about the 
reputational liability carried for companies listed on the market. In regulatory 
terms, the ability of OFEX to act as a primary market (for capital-raising) was 
unclear; it operated as an Alternative Trading System (ATS), a regime designed 
not for new issues but for trading. 2
Despite the claim that all applications were reviewed by an independent 
panel of experts, unpleasant scandals rocked the young market. The most 
infamous was Skynet, a firm which offered satellite-operated tracking devices 
for cars. Having listed at 27p, the stock climbed to 275p, valuing the company 
– despite an absence of sales, or even a viable product – at £30m. Following 
outrage from investors, board resignations, demands from the tax office and 
the landlord, and finally an auditor’s declaration of insolvency, the shares 
were suspended in January 1998 at 4p. The firm’s demise was compounded 
by a rescue plan from OTC fraudster Tom Wilmot himself.3 For this reason JP 
Jenkins moved to tighten standards, and in October 1997 published a code of 
best practice, recruiting David Webb from the LSE’s compliance department 
to supervise new issues. 
Meanwhile, JP Jenkins began to promote OFEX in a more systematic way. It 
supplied price and company data to resellers such as Bloomberg, Reuters, 
ADP, and ICV-TOPIC3. The Financial Times and the London Evening Standard 
carried closing prices of some of the more important shares. Newstrack 
published an ‘OFEX Monthly Review’, containing a summary of news and 
company activity and distributed to the OFEX community every month. 
On the trading floor of Gorgonzola Hall inexperienced jobbers and trainees 
had relied upon a publication known as the ‘Squirt’s Guide’; much to the 
chagrin of some older members of the community, the firm registered the 
name ‘Squirt’s Guide’ as a limited company and used it to produce various 
promotional materials.4 A 1999 brochure titled ‘The OFEX Opportunity’ sang 
the market’s praises and promoted the firm’s national roadshow, which had 
by 1999 developed into a full-scale exhibition at the Business Design Centre, 
in Islington, London. By 1999 a redeveloped website allowed private investors 
to access content that had previously been distributed via Newstrack, such 
as company fundamentals and announcements. In what OFEX described 
as ‘a turning point in the battle to get up-to-the-minute OFEX information 
freely accessible’ the site provided data in real-time and clearly signalled the 
firm’s increasing recognition that its investor base comprised retail investors, 
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3 Cliff Feltham, ‘Skynet echoes warning of dangers on the Ofex’, Daily Mail, January 10, 1998
4 Squirt is a slang term for a young man, or boy
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commenting that ‘the ever increasing demands of the user have not allowed 
the web team time to catch breath’. 5
 
The firm sought to shake off its ‘wild west’ image and to reassure regulators 
by enacting regulation designed to protect investors at a standard 
appropriate to a recognised investment exchange, even though it was 
not one in regulatory terms. The 1995 pamphlet states that ‘the insider 
dealing provisions of the Criminal Justice act 1993 are likely to apply to OFEX’ 
but it was by no means clear that they did.6 In fact JP Jenkins operated a 
trading facility where insider dealing was technically legal yet presented 
huge financial risk to the market maker. The management of OFEX sought 
regulatory protection: executives lobbied the Takeover Panel to ensure that 
OFEX fell within its remit, and the DTI to include the trading facility within the 
scope of the insider dealing regime.7 Being covered by the Takeover Panel 
provided shareholder protection in the case of a bid and was part of a more 
general push towards respectability. The firm established a selection panel 
to screen firms that wished to join the market and emphasised compliance 
structures to the point of seeming ‘paranoid’.8 One member recalls the 
panel comprising about 18 people, and being too big and unwieldy to 
conduct efficient business.9 Such caution was justified as OFEX did receive 
considerable public and regulatory scrutiny, despite strict internal policies 
and John’s repeated assertion that trading was driven by ‘old-school’ values. 
The firm was also judged by the reputation of the advisory community 
around it and the quality of firms listed on the facility:
‘the reputation of OFEX was solid, [but] they had some…advisors 
which I can best class as shake hands and count your fingers. And 
some deals which I’m surprised they felt they should be taking on 
board. Which, of course…didn’t exactly enhance the reputation.’ 10
By the late 1990s, booming markets per technology new issues and 
regulatory concerns led to a repositioning of the commercial offering from 
purely market-making to a broader sweep of market -related services. In 
1998, OFEX ceased to be a name for the trading facility and moved to the 
5 The OFEX Opportunity, p.5
6 The OFEX Facility, July 1995, p.3, emphasis added
7 Jonathan Jenkins and market executive 3, interviews. OFEX may have been unaware of the LSE’s own 
experience after the 1980 criminalization of insider dealing. The change to criminal prosecution greatly 
raised the burden of proof, lowering conviction rates and robbing the Exchange of the means to deal with an 
insidious and damaging practice. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, 600.
8 Emma Jenkins interview
9 French interview
10 French interview
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company Newstrack Ltd. In other words, ‘OFEX’ changed from being a badge 
for a trading operation to a fully-fledged market, its business model based 
on charging listing fees to companies and providing market information. JP 
Jenkins was sole
‘market maker in all OFEX securities and as such, JP Jenkins Ltd 
undertakes to quote a firm two-way price in a given quantity 
of stock for most OFEX securities. For less liquid or illiquid OFEX 
securities JP Jenkins Ltd will quote a basis price and seek to 
match the trade with existing indicated business which has been 
previously noted. JP Jenkins Ltd may elect to change from a 
basis price to a two-way price (or vice versa), depending on the 
prevailing market conditions for the stock in question.’ 11
In other words, JP Jenkins continued to hold a trading monopoly quoting 
prices or matching previously indicated business, depending on levels of 
liquidity. Matching bargains was a direct continuation of JP Jenkins’ original 
trading operation making notes and keeping only indicative ‘basis prices’ 
on the screen. The two-way prices did require the firm to take positions, 
however, and during the final months of 1999 trading volume grew 
exponentially and as it did so the firm’s exposure grew too. For a few months 
the JP Jenkins made extraordinary profits, both from trading revenues and 
from the book value of carried stock. Even John Jenkins, by now chairman of 
the group, found himself back answering the phone:
‘November 1999 was when we used to have to wedge all of the 
doors open. We were taking over 7,000 telephone calls per day 
between four people, I have never seen anything like that in my 
life. People if they wanted to go to the loo had to run up the other 
end of the building that is why all of the doors were wedged open 
so that the boys could get to the loo. All the doors were wedged 
open, it was bizarre.’ 12
A story – clearly something of a myth – circulated that the traders had put a 
bucket in the corner so they did not have to make even those short trips to 
the lavatory.13 The reality may have been less colourful, but the traders were 
certainly busy:
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‘[John would] come around with “Anyone want a drink? I’ll get you 
a drink”… You didn’t go out. When you work up here and you’ve 
been through the times when you’re doing nothing all day, you’re 
quite happy to be trading all day and you can see the P&L as it’s 
coming in or whatever, so you don’t care. But it was literally…it 
didn’t stop, from the time you got in, and we had to leave… In the 
end John used to go at half past four, “Right, we’re leaving”. And 
we used to turn them off. Just turn the phones off and go home. 
Because what are you going to do? You can’t keep doing it. And 
it was… But again, we all did very well out of it, so not going to 
complain about it.’ 14
The boom in orders was unexpected. JP Jenkins had ordered a new 
telephone system to be installed in the run up to the Millennium, when the 
market was likely to be quiet. The new system was overwhelmed by calls from 
brokers and failed; John Jenkins ended up on Bloomberg television offering 
a grovelling apology: ‘it was awful. I mean it was beyond awful… that was a 
nightmare.’ 15
6.1.  The advisory ecosystem and raising funds on OFEX
As a technology-focused bull market gathered speed in the second half of 
the 1990s the ready availability of cash from retail investors encouraged new 
issues and OFEX became a reliable venue for raising money, often for very 
speculative ventures: one interviewee remembers a firm called printpotato.
com, set to revolutionize t-shirt printing via the internet.16 New issues on 
OFEX became seen as a sure-fire way of making money. It was one of the few 
avenues that retail investors had to join the dot.com party at the beginning, 
as opposed to buying already inflated stock in the secondary market.
‘OFEX…allowed the punter to…get into dotcom, which 
[otherwise] the punter could not get into because they were 
institutional placings, even the AIM stocks…you had to get a bit of 
dotcom, and this was really the only way in to a lot of these things. 
Obviously you could buy shares in all of the .coms, but if you 
wanted to get in and take advantage of a big uptick on day one 
then really OFEX was the only way forward.’ 17
14 Brown interview
15 John Jenkins interview
16 Public relations 4, interview 
17 Corporate advisor 1 interview
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The AIM community was also making hay, even in a more institutional 
market. Beacon Trust issued a special dividend as the money flowed in market 
euphoria fired up the ambitions of the meekest firms:
‘I knew people who walked into financial advisers and merchant 
banks and so forth with a business plan and said, “We’d like a 
million quid please to see if we can prove the point,” only to 
discover that two days later they had a fully blown prospectus and 
they were raising at least 25 million.’ 18
Fundraising rapidly became an essential part of the advisory role. Each 
issuing firm would prepare a prospectus, a legally valid document that could 
be distributed widely. Prospectuses were issued under the Public Offer of 
Security Regulations (POSRegs) and found their form as advisors ploughed 
through and imitated the Official List documents:
‘An AIM admission document will look like an ISDX admission 
document, will look like what we used in old POSRegs prospectus, 
before they brought in proper prospectuses. The level of 
information and the format is pretty much the same.’ 19
Offer rules were based upon caveat emptor, so however imaginative the 
offer structure might be – including a sale of founder stock, for example, or 
warrants for early-stage investors that massively diluted other stockholders in 
the case of success – it need only be displayed in the prospectus and buyers 
were expected to discriminate accordingly. On the back page, a tear-off slip 
invited anyone inclined to send in a cheque: 
‘Then you would get the slips back and obviously it is the days 
before scanning and not many people had internet banking and 
so it was all a bit old fashioned and labour intensive, and you 
would get a load of cheques and you would bank them and then 
occasionally you would get somebody calling up saying, “Oh I have 
just sent in a £1,000 cheque for whatever it was, but when are you 
going to cash the cheque?” “I will probably go to the bank later 
today.” “Oh I will not get paid until the end of the month”’ 20
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19 Corporate advisor 2 and 4, interviews
20 Corporate advisor 1, interview
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As quotation suggests, many investors lacked the sophistication needed 
to untangle the issue documents, but the excitement surrounding the new 
technology stocks, combined with a thriving media circus to stoke the 
imagination of the investing public:
‘You’d get Ian [James, a renowned small-company public relations 
man] to put a piece in The Sunday Telegraph and you say that 
… or whoever, were the advisor, and on the Monday morning 
you would get lots of calls, we had already built up a list from the 
previous ones that we had done and people would chuck money 
at these things…’ 21
Public relations drove the media commentary and followed a simple formula, 
described as ‘If I take you [journalists] out and get you pissed a lot you’ll write 
about my company’.22 There was, however, more nuance to this strategy than 
first appeared. The rule was to keep the journalists at lunch until late in the 
afternoon so they had no time to do any research, and, cushioned by a warm 
cloud of foie gras would write the story as it had been passed to them. There 
was a fine line between good natured inebriation and incapacity, so it was the 
task of the host to send the journalist back to the office while they could still 
write. Experience held 4.30pm to be the ideal breaking-up time for lunch.23 
Regional reporters would be entertained at ‘ARCE lunches’ – Association of 
Regional City Editors – each given topped-and-tailed press releases with a 
regional anecdote or focus, and the issues would receive coverage all over 
the UK.24 Journalists, often young and inexperienced writers for the financial 
pages, lived a charmed life. In an interview, one former journalist recalled the 
excitement of the dotcom years. A young man in his first job after university, 
he would find himself speaking to one chief executive on the telephone, his 
mobile ringing, thrown in a drawer, with a stream of callers trying to get him 
on another line. On one occasion he tipped a small firm and saw the shares 
rise 50%, adding £11m to its market cap. ‘At the age of 24’, he said, ‘that was a 
big deal’. 25
The extraordinary demand for stock threatened to overwhelm the small 
advisory firms – sometimes just two or three executives and support staff – 
working on these issues: 
21 Corporate advisor 1 interview
22 Public relations 1, interview
23 Public relations 2, public relations 3, interview
24 Public relations 2, interview
25 Public relations 4, interview
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‘There was one particular day when I personally fielded over 300 
phone calls. I had three telephones…but my receptionist logged 
275 phone calls that she couldn’t put through to me, because I 
was on the phone, so that’s more than 500 phone calls in a day, 
and they were almost always all the same, “Did I get a piece in your 
last float, can you put me down for the next one?” That shows the 
madness of it all, 1999, the madness of it all. I used to come into 
the office on a Sunday to try and keep on top of paperwork. Now, 
there was no way in which we advertised that we were open on 
a Sunday, I used to come in to phones which rang all day long, 
people in the hope of getting somebody on the line that they 
could give money to.’ 26
Many advisory firms made a great deal of money in a short space of time. It 
had become customary to issue warrants (a form of stock option) as delayed 
payment for advisory services, and firms found themselves suddenly sitting 
on enormous paper gains. Like independent record labels, small advisory 
firms only really needed a single success to enjoy a comfortable life hereafter: 
one such, Loeb Aron, found success with its public offer of Applied Robotics, 
a stock that ‘went to the moon and back’, the firm exercising its warrant 
along the way.27 One mid-tier advisory firm, Durlacher – founded by Peter 
Durlacher, scion of the Durlacher broking family mentioned in jobber 
Tommy’s testimony above – saw its book value climb enough for it to qualify 
for the FTSE100. Durlacher later became a shell and was reversed into by 
Panmure Gordon, another broking firm. Individuals, also, found themselves in 
possession of substantial paper fortunes:
‘In January 2000, one of my colleagues came to me and said, “I’ve 
just worked out what your options are worth”…In January 2000, 
my personal options, according to my colleague, were worth 
substantial double figures of millions. I’m glad I didn’t go out and 
spend it, but that was the nonsense of the day, it really was.’ 28
Of course, this was a bubble and bubbles end in disaster. Retail investors, 
once burned, did not hurry back. Many of the companies that raised funds 
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were taking advantage of readily available money and soon went out of 
business, though other more reputable firms suffered too. Hocken recalls the 
change in conditions as like ‘a tap being turned off’, a return to the difficult 
trading of the 1990s when the market had begun. According to Paul Brown, ‘it 
stopped…virtually overnight really.’ As home to some of the more speculative 
ventures, OFEX suffered greatly:
‘Pro rata to its size, OFEX probably had more rubbish listed on it 
during the dotcom boom than either of the other two markets…
So when they all started going bust, OFEX lost more companies, 
and a number of companies went down very, very quickly.’ 29
The profits of 1999 faded into memory. JP Jenkins 
‘did lots of trades, made lots of money and then proceeded to 
give that money back through the January-February-March…the 
small company markets just went down the toilet in that period. 
Positions we had just became totally illiquid, we wrote them down, 
wrote them down, wrote them down and most of that lovely profit 
we made we wrote off.’ 
Despite his best efforts at quality control, John Jenkins remained confounded 
by some of the stocks that were floated on his market. He had taken to the 
airwaves (again via Bloomberg) to warn of the dangers of the bubble and dot.
com stocks. Looking back, he offered an explanation, saddened by the failure 
of some of the better firms he had worked to support:
‘The dodgy ones, they were the ones who folded first, the blokes 
saw that it was going wrong and so they nicked what they could 
out of it and buggered off. The really nice ones went later because 
people had thrown money at them to keep going.’ 
 
29 Corporate advisor 2
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7.  Bear market travails and the end of OFEX
The period from 2000 saw OFEX engage in a slow period of legitimacy-
building. From July 2000 the market was included within the insider dealing 
legislation, and in December 2001 it became a Prescribed Market under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) and therefore covered by 
existing market abuse regulations. In 2002 it secured exemptions from 
stamp duty in line with the privileges available to a Recognised Investment 
Exchange (RIE), although it was not classed as an RIE. These exemptions 
and inclusions were the result of extensive lobbying by the firm and were 
ratified by the House of Lords in 2002.1 The decision to become a Prescribed 
Market followed long discussions with the regulators about what kind of 
creature OFEX really was:
‘There was a glorious conversation when we were talking through 
the whole process. We had the SFA in the room…and two guys 
from the Treasury. And the guy from the Treasury said, “I’m really 
confused. You don’t call yourself a market when you patently 
are a market. Why don’t you call yourself a market?” I just went, 
“You’ve got to ask the SFA because they won’t let us call ourselves 
a market,” and there was just daggers coming [from the other side 
of the table]…The Treasury went, “Well, you know, sorry, it’s got 
feathers, webbed feet and a bill and it goes quack. It’s a market. 
Why don’t we call it a market and we can put it in the market abuse 
regime?”’ 2
The regulators had initially been keen to see OFEX classed as a Recognised 
Investment Exchange (RIE) but the management resisted on the grounds 
that it was unnecessary, expensive and that their operation was distinctively 
different from the big, recognised stock exchanges of world. Paul Brown 
recalls the group’s compliance officer, Peter Freeman, estimating the cost of 
obtaining an RIE to be in the region of £1 million, a huge sum for a relatively 
small enterprise. So the regulators suggested an alternative route and on 1 
December 2001, FSMA’s ‘A-day’, OFEX finally became a market in the eyes of 
the law: 
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1 See Hansard reports at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmstand/f/st020625/
pm/20625s07.htm
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020703/debtext/20703-10.htm
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmstand/deleg4/st020624/20624s01.htm
 [last accessed October 2016]
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‘The Treasury, in exercise of the powers conferred on them by 
section 118 (three) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(a), hereby make the following Order: 4A. There is prescribed, as a 
market to which section 118 of the act applies, the market known 
as OFEX.’ 3
On 4 January 2002, the market was moved into a new vehicle, OFEX plc, 
which absorbed the Newstrack operation. There was now a parent company, 
SJ&S (named after the original family firm) with two subsidiaries, the market 
maker JP Jenkins Ltd and OFEX plc. Jonathan and Emma Jenkins became joint 
managing directors of the latter. No longer operating a trading facility, JP 
Jenkins could target advisory revenues too. John Jenkins and Barry Hocken, 
having witnessed the ‘very comfortable living’ being made by corporate 
advisors bringing firms to market in the late 1990s, established their own 
advisory boutique called Gateway Securities. Advisory and market-making 
operations became physically separated from the market as they moved out 
of the existing offices and into Fenchurch Street.
The FSMA reorganisation brought in other reforms. In January 2002, the 
OFEX Rule Book was published, replacing the existing code of conduct. These 
rules established the regulatory structure of the market and established 
categories of membership, notably broker-dealer, corporate advisor, and 
specialist (effectively a market maker); more importantly, the rules codified 
the professional responsibilities of members in terms of acting in accordance 
with the interests of the market and ultimately the regulatory authorities: 
‘It is the responsibility of each member firm to support OFEX in 
achieving the objectives of the OFEX market and at all times to 
observe these rules both in letter and in spirit and to promote and 
maintain the highest standards of integrity and fair dealing with 
every other member firm and those who use the facilities of the 
OFEX market.’ 4
These rules were drafted to be as familiar as possible, and to this end relied 
heavily upon the existing London Stock Exchange rules, augmented by small 
company relevant experience built up in the business. From March 2002, 
corporate advisors also had to apply for membership before they could bring 
stocks to the market, offering OFEX another means of controlling the quality 
of new issues.
3 Hansard.
4 OFEX Rulebook 1.1:2.4
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From 2000 onwards OFEX faced a dramatic slowdown in the numbers 
of companies listing and in trading volumes. Revenues fell, a situation 
exacerbated by the group’s new structure. The market, which had historically 
acted only as a front-end for more profitable market-making business, 
suddenly had to stand on its own. Revenues could potentially come from 
data sales, listing fees and corporate memberships. The former had been 
an effective source of revenue in the 1990s while the facility was booming, 
but the economics of charging for data are very sensitive to the savings that 
market-makers can gain through better information and therefore depend 
upon admissions and trading volumes. Listing fees depended upon a steady 
stream of admissions, which were difficult to achieve in the bear market of 
the early ‘noughties’. Corporate advisory fees had been waived to encourage 
new advisers to sign up.5 The FSMA-related reorganisation, hugely costly in 
terms of management time, had been driven by the belief that increased 
legitimacy would lead to higher trading volumes and crucially, increased 
institutional participation. The latter was a goal that seemed to edge away, 
whatever the firm did: 
‘I think we chased legitimacy because we thought it would lead to 
more transactions going through, whether it was retail or whether 
it was institutional. But the institutional investors kept telling us 
we weren’t legitimate enough because we weren’t an exchange. 
And at the end of the day, eventually we’re down to… yeah, but 
you’re not the London Stock Exchange. So we could only win that 
battle so much… And I think we genuinely strived for legitimacy, 
because we thought it would help the business case. If we thought 
we could sit for hours, forever and a day making a million pound a 
week and being unregulated I think we would have stayed.’ 6
There was also a personal aspect to the pursuit of legitimacy. John Jenkins 
had never overcome his family reputation for trading dog tracks and sports 
grounds while his peers were trading blue-chip corporations. Even now, 
interviewees were frequently dismissive of OFEX – ‘I liked John but OFEX was 
a dot on the horizon really’, ‘on OFEX you had to trade by appointment,’ and 
so forth. The press was frequently scathing, as were the regulators: ‘If it’s a 
case of ‘buyer beware’ with AIM, it’s a case of ‘buyer beware’ twice over with 
OFEX,’ SFA chief executive Richard Farrant had said in 1996, and despite its 
best efforts the market had struggled to overcome such prejudice.7
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‘[The family] were really, really sensitive to the legitimacy 
questions, [John] was particularly…The headlines that used to 
really hurt were the cowboy market, and all this sort of stuff, 
really, really hurt.…Having been on the market floor as non-
establishment, he wanted to be recognised by the establishment 
as doing something, which is why his OBE was so important to 
him.’ 8
7.1.  The decision to float on AIM
During 2002 just 29 companies joined the market, and OFEX booked a pre-
tax loss of £662,000.9 OFEX’s struggle to attract new issues was exacerbated 
by the fact that the fees available for AIM advisory work greatly exceeded 
those charged by OFEX practitioners and advisors tended to direct potential 
listees accordingly.10
On February 18, 2003 OFEX announced that it would list on AIM and in doing 
so raise up to £2 million at a valuation of £4.5 million. The firm had been led 
to believe that the absence of competing market-makers was a pivotal factor 
in excluding institutions from the market, although John Jenkins was well 
aware of the limited profits available to two, competing market makers:
‘We said, “John, we’d like to come and do business with you 
because we can do corporate finance work and book building 
[i.e. broking work] on OFEX. But we can’t do it unless there are 
two market makers in a security. We can’t do it, and the reason 
why is because we get a shot across our bows from the regulator 
by asking us have we given best execution. So we have two 
competing market makers, and we say yes...” John resisted that and 
the last conversation I recall with him, he said “Well, okay, you can 
become a market maker, but if you do I’m going to stop market-
making in that security”. I said, “No, John, that’s not the question.”’ 
So I don’t think we ever became a market maker on OFEX.’ 11
The rationale for the fund-raising was, therefore, to open up the market by 
moving to a system of competing market-makers, encouraging clients and 
placating the regulators who felt that investors were suffering on account 
8 Jonathan Jenkins interview
9 OFEX plc initial public offer document, p8
10 Market executives, interviews
11 Hoodless interview
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of the single market maker. The listing applied to the OFEX-Newstrack part 
of the business and not JP Jenkins market makers, which remained in John 
Jenkins’ control. OFEX first of all attempted to raise money in a private deal 
with the brokers who used the market, but potential investors demanded 
80% of the business and a move to what would have been in practice a 
member-owned organisation, an arrangement that the family naturally 
declined.12
The decision to float on what many saw as a rival market was contentious. 
Inside the company, it had been the subject of lengthy debate. 
‘We floated on AIM and I remember there being a big discussion… 
Looking back you think, why did we do it…it was rational at the 
time but it jarred. I think we were doing the right thing in terms 
of going to competing market makers and everything else but I 
think it was the beginning of the end as far as we as a family were 
concerned.’ 13
The decision to list on AIM was inappropriate in terms of the size and 
financial needs of the company, and for the operator of a small-company 
market to contract the services of another looked odd. While OFEX may 
have carefully positioned itself so as not to be a competitor to AIM, this 
distinction was lost on observers when the announcement was made. 
In fact, the move was a technical, regulatory decision hinging upon the 
perceived competence of any firm to supervise itself as a listee on the 
market that it ran, while a clearly related company continued to be the sole 
market maker in its stock.14 
‘We got a lot of crap from that and we couldn’t turn round and go, 
“Look, the only reason we did it is because the FSA said we would. 
Actually we think AIM is entirely the wrong place to be, for where 
we are and what we do. We should be on OFEX. We’re a classic 
OFEX company.”’ 15
Ironically, promoters had suggested that OFEX float at the height of the 
boom, but John’s sense of market etiquette precluded such a course:
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‘We’d spoken to [names a respectable broker] at the time, and they 
put such a stupid valuation on us, like a good valuation. But John 
and I sat down one evening after the market had shut and he said 
to me, “Brownie, I can’t justify taking that money”. Because we’d 
had a fantastic year and the PE was like whatever, and they were 
valuing us at like five times earnings or six times earnings. And he 
said, “If we do that, we’re not going to repeat this next year, but 
you know how it goes, we know how it goes, if we do great, we 
can’t guarantee it, but you’re going to get punters in on this stock 
at that level and I can’t sit there in an AGM or whatever and explain 
myself … I just don’t feel it’s right that we should take that sort 
of money.” So we didn’t, but we could’ve taken probably £5m or 
£6m.’ 16
Discussions around multiple market makers and institutional participation 
circled around a much bigger issue, the nature of the firm as a family 
business. John, while a talented trader, had little experience in the regulatory 
minefield of running an investment exchange, and the joint managing 
director status held by Emma and Jonathan sat uncomfortably with investors. 
In April 2003 the offer got away, but only just, with £1.45 million raised rather 
than the expected £2 million. The market moved out of the family group and 
onto AIM as OFEX plc. As part of the deal John Jenkins wrote off roughly £1 
million owed by OFEX to JP Jenkins, with the outstanding balance of the loan 
converted into stock at the end of 2004.17 The offer was in the most part taken 
up by brokers and market-makers with whom OFEX had regular dealings, 
Winterflood Securities becoming an important shareholder at this point.
After the fundraising, the company continued to make progress in its stated 
aims: August 2003 saw Teather & Greenwood join as the first new market-
maker, and in November, Winterflood Securities also agreed to make markets 
in OFEX stocks, subject to the installation of a new quote-driven trading 
system.18 12 July 2004 was ‘impact day’ when the competing market maker 
system went live. OFEX claimed that four firms – Jenkins, Winterflood, Teather 
& Greenwood and Hoodless Brennan – would join as market-makers and that 
each security would benefit from two-way quotes from at least two market 
makers. It’s not clear whether this ever happened in practice: Geoff Hoodless 
believes that his firm never actually became an OFEX market maker.19 
16 Brown interview
17 OFEX offer document note 16, 2003 accounts, Jonathan Jenkins interview
18 Birmingham Post, November 22, 2003, Saturday, ‘ Close Brothers join Ofex’, Business p17
19 OFEX plc 2003 annual results, Hoodless interview
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Figure 5. OFEX’s management celebrate the AIM flotation. Left to right: John 
Jenkins, Peter Freeman, Simon Brickles, John Wedgewood, and 
Jonathan Jenkins.
According to the press, the prospect of institutional investment seemed even 
closer. But for the family, the move to competing market-makers jeopardized 
the only part of the business that had ever been profitable:
‘We thought the upside of having a multi-market maker system 
and the credibility that would bring, would actually bring the 
market up to a standard. And okay, it would hurt JP Jenkins 
Limited, but we thought it was a sacrifice worth making for the 
benefit of the market. And with hindsight, I think all we did was 
drive the businesses to Winterfloods.’ 20
In late November a small but significant event took place: Simon Brickles 
suddenly stepped down from his role as Head of AIM at the London Stock 
Exchange, and was almost immediately recruited by Jonathan Jenkins as a 
consultant to OFEX. Brickles arrival presaged a shift in the firm’s relations with 
the LSE. OFEX had long coexisted with the Exchange, having clearly identified 
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a niche trading companies too small or otherwise unsuited to AIM. It had 
made, said one executive, ‘a very early strategic decision that there is no point 
picking the fight with the biggest gorilla in the room.’ Rumours that OFEX was 
getting ready to take on AIM began to circulate: ‘In November, I said Ofex was 
flexing its muscles to challenge AIM, the Stock Exchange’s junior market. Now 
it is gathering the financial ammunition to strengthen its assault’, said veteran 
pundit Derek Pain, writing in the Independent.21 Journalists suggested 
that the multiple market maker system, combined with the availability of 
institutional funds, made OFEX look an ever more attractive destination, 
especially as EU regulation threatened to drive up the costs of an AIM listing. 
Listed companies did not seem convinced: in 2003 OFEX offered to waive the 
listing fees of companies moving from AIM, and few, if any, took up the offer.22 
Meanwhile, the LSE’s attitude to small company markets had once again 
shifted. For strategic reasons, discussed shortly, the senior management 
of the Exchange had decided to populate AIM with larger companies and 
international companies, a deliberate move away from the market’s regional, 
small-company focus. The Exchange’s management compounded matters 
by rolling out its order book trading through the smaller end of the Official 
List and AIM, greatly eroding profitability. Moreover, the LSE had been forced 
to defend itself against repeated takeover bids and the community was 
justly concerned that a merger of some kind would spell the end for the 
small company markets. Winterflood Securities’ investment now seemed like 
a strategic bet on an alternative trading venue, particularly as AIM’s head 
had moved to OFEX. This political dimension placed further pressure on the 
Jenkins family management, who were perceived, fairly or otherwise, as 
approaching the limits of their competence: 
‘They weren’t exactly out of their depth but they were absolutely 
not in a position, if the industry was going to move from AIM to 
OFEX as it were, if the Deutsche Boerse thing went ahead they 
were not...they couldn’t have done that in a million...they just 
couldn’t, they needed rather deeper help I think.’ 23
Difficult trading conditions had continued through the year, with interim 
results posted in August showing a loss of £273,000. December 2003 saw 
OFEX raise a further £1 million to implement a new computer system. 
21 The Independent (London), January 10, 2004, Saturday, ‘No pain, no gain: I’ve changed my mind about Ofex. I 
may even buy shares’, Derek Pain, Features p5. 
22 The Daily Telegraph, May 02, 2003, Friday, ‘Ofex offers a haven below the horizon’ p.40
23 Hazell-Smith interview
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Among the investors was Luke Johnson, a City personality and businessman 
soon to become chairman of Channel 4, who took 6.3% of the company at 
£340,000 (valuing the whole at £5.4 million). Discussions about Johnson 
joining the board of the company came to nothing. Full year results for 2003 
saw turnover at £1.1 million, an increase driven by the decision to charge 
fees to corporate advisers. Still the company burned through cash, booking 
a full-year loss of roughly half a million pounds, as it continued to work on 
its regulatory status. In February 2004 Simon Brickles became a director of 
OFEX and formed a new, streamlined advisory board, led by Rachel Maguire, 
a former Stock Exchange regulator. The board comprised ‘a couple of good 
accountants, a couple of good lawyers and some fund managers. And these 
[last] were the guys that actually put their hands in their pocket, so let’s listen 
to what they think we should be doing.’ 24
7.2.  The Jenkins family loses control
In the last week of September, 2004, disaster struck. As a quoted company 
OFEX plc was obliged to report its results on a fixed schedule and interims 
were due out in late September. The firm had been struggling financially but 
had put together a substantial fundraising package together with a plan that 
would see it moving towards the status of Recognised Investment Exchange 
and a restructuring of the management team, for the Jenkins family had 
realized that it was time to relinquish control.
‘We were going to raise £5 million, Dad was sort of retiring and 
stepping back, Simon was coming in as CEO, I was stepping back 
into the background a bit, Emma was always in the background 
and we were going to work towards becoming a Recognised 
Investment Exchange…I have the press release for that, I mean 
we were that close. The problem was that you have to release your 
accounts six months after the date, we knew all the way, we ran 
out of time basically and so we knew we had to release, I think 
it was at the end of September, and by mid-September we were 
closing the fundraising deal and we were going to say, “Here are 
the interims, they are a bit shitty, but don’t worry we have just 
raised £5 million and this is the change.” That was the way that we 
were doing it. Then the fundraising fell apart and so we then had 
to come out with, here are our results, they are a bit shitty, and we 
had six weeks [of money left in the bank].’ 25
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The collapse of the fundraising was so sudden that Jonathan Jenkins found 
out at the very moment that he was obliquely announcing its success, clearly 
satisfied that the deal was done:
‘I did a retail investor thing at Bloomberg … I can remember standing on 
the platform on a Monday night [27 September] saying, “Watch this space 
there is some interesting news to come out and I think Ofex is going to go 
from strength to strength”. I said that on the Monday evening, and as I was 
speaking my phone vibrated in my pocket, I then rang, and it was Cyril Theret, 
who was our business development guy, and he was in tears and he told me 
that the cornerstone investor wasn’t in…Suddenly, not only had we lost an 
investor we had lost our cornerstone that we used to lever everybody else in.’
OFEX reported its results on Wednesday 29 September. First half losses had 
almost doubled – to £533,000 – and the number of stocks traded on the 
market had fallen from 170 to 136. Trading volumes had increased, but not 
by enough. One of the market’s stalwarts, cereal manufacturer Weetabix, had 
withdrawn after being taken over. Media reports spread word of the disaster 
quickly, and in some cases with undisguised glee. ‘Shares in OFEX dive as it 
fights imminent collapse’, crowed the Times, ‘OFEX, founded by John Jenkins 
and controlled by his family, said it had only enough money to remain 
solvent for another nine weeks. The announcement precipitated a 54 per cent 
plunge in OFEX’s shares’, adding, ‘It is understood that the revelation of OFEX’s 
dire financial position took the company’s senior management by surprise.’ 
Elsewhere the Times spoke of ‘grim news’ for a firm that ‘did not do itself any 
favours when it decided to list its own shares on AIM’. The more sympathetic 
Independent reported that ‘an emergency fund-raising put together by 
the company’s broker, Numis, collapsed at the last minute, forcing the 
OFEX to admit spiralling losses and a looming cash crunch.’ 26 Like a bank, a 
stock market exists as an act of faith and confidence is crucial. In the highly 
regulated sector of financial services, nasty surprises are also unacceptable. 
For these reasons, the announcement that the company had just enough 
money to survive until the end of November signalled its inevitable demise. 
During the first week of October, 535X, a small company notice-board-cum-
trading-facility (its owner, broker Wills & Co had already been investigated 
by the Serious Fraud Office and was soon to be shut down by the Financial 
26 The Times, September 30, 2004, Thursday, ‘Shares in Ofex dive as it fights imminent collapse’, Peter Klinger, 
Business p. 53; The Times, September 30, 2004, Thursday, ‘AIM’s appeal is Ofex’s problem,’ Patience Wheatcroft, 
Business, p. 45; The Independent, September 30, 2004, Thursday, ‘Spiralling losses spell crisis for OFEX’, Stephen 
Foley, Business p. 46
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Conduct Authority) made an informal approach, with a view to turning OFEX 
into a bulletin board based system. Simon Kiero-Watson, managing director 
of 535X, was quoted as saying:
“The current market system is expensive and unsustainable. A 
bulletin board is much cheaper. We’ve approached Numis [the 
broker] and we’d like to find a deal which will work for JP Jenkins, 
the market and OFEX.” 27
Another approach came from cash shell with the unlikely name of Zyzygy; 
Peter Hoskins, its promoter, offered a lone voice in support of the Jenkins 
family who, he said, had done a ‘tremendous job’. 28 On Friday, 8 October, a 
rescue package was announced comprising more or less the same investors 
but without the cornerstone investor. It also offered OFEX much harsher 
terms. The firm announced that it would raise £3.15m through a placing at 5p 
per share; the Jenkins family were to be diluted from 55% to 12%. Winterflood 
Securities agreed to take a 16.6% holding and Emma and Jonathan Jenkins 
were forced to leave the company, having been excoriated in the press. The 
bid still had to be ratified by shareholders at the end of October, and on 
Friday the 29 October a rival bid was tabled by Shield Investments, a new 
vehicle chaired by Keith Smith of Nabarro Wells. Shield offered stock and 
cash, one share and 6p for each OFEX share up to £645k, conditional on the 
placing not going ahead and the Jenkins remaining at the helm. Mindful 
of their obligations to the market itself, the management of OFEX rejected 
Shield’s offer on the grounds of uncertainty in the source of funds. With 
understandable bitterness Jonathan commented ‘I’m resentful that we’ve 
fought so hard to get this market back on its feet and now I won’t be a part of 
its future.’ 29 The funding went ahead and the market moved out of the hands 
of the family that had launched it. Throughout the second half of the 1990s 
OFEX had occupied a niche providing both funds for small companies and 
start-ups and a trading facility for privately held concerns such as Weetabix. 
When things went well it acted as a ‘stepping stone’ for companies to move 
to AIM; the public offer prospectus of 2003 boasted that 80 companies had 
moved to more senior markets, predominantly AIM, and that since 1995 OFEX 
had raised more than £1 billion in capital for small firms. In 2004, with the 
departure of the Jenkins, this truce would begin to break down. 
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8.  From 2004 to 2010: Markets at war
While OFEX struggled through the post-dot-com slump, AIM began a strong 
process of recovery. Marcus Stuttard, the LSE’s Head of Primary Markets and 
Head of AIM, believes that the diversity of sectors it represented, in part 
inherited from the USM and Rule 4.2, helped to sustain the market during and 
after the bust: 
‘With AIM even during the dotcom boom we were very careful not 
to pitch it as just a technology market and so…we have over 40 
sectors represented there are companies with assets, operation 
and management in over 19 different countries …that broad 
spread is very important and it is one of the reasons that AIM has 
continued to endure and it has the maturity that it has.’ 1
In fact, the LSE executive had chosen not to promote AIM as the venue of 
choice for some of the larger technology issues. In September 1999 the 
Exchange announced that it would create a new index named techMARK, 
billed as the British answer to NASDAQ. The index, launched in November, 
helped draw attention to the many (over 180) technology companies already 
trading on the exchange and provided an attractive ‘venue’ for new arrivals; 
techMARK provided a focus for investment and the possibility of a new 
index without the labour of launching a completely new market. Although 
techMARK arrivals benefitted from a lighter trading history requirement 
in line with privileges according to biotech firms, the listing requirements 
remained relatively stringent. techMARK was a simple and effective 
marketing solution and created a new category around which investor and 
issuer activity could coalesce.2 It was also in part a response to EASDAQ, 
which by the late 1990s was regarded as a serious threat to the Exchange. 
AIM and techMARK were promoted alongside each other as a coherent 
growth and technology offering available to British firms – some of which, 
like Autonomy, had been tempted onto the European offering.3
By its very nature small company investing is the subject of fashions. The dot-
com boom and bust severed the link between the LSE’s growth market and 
smaller businesses in the U.K.’s regions. This separation was also driven by lack 
of customer enthusiasm for a regional offering. In April 2001 the LSE launched 
1 Stuttard interview
2 Ward interview. The LSE’s defence document of 2000 describes ward as the prime architect of techMARK. Also 
Sunday Times, September 19, 1999, ‘Lukewarm welcome for new high flyers’, Kirstie Hamilton
3 Wallis and Ward interviews
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a service paralleling techMARK and directed towards the regions. Named 
LandMARK, this sought to increase awareness about the Exchange’s regional 
constituents, but it was never a great success.4 From the autumn of 2001 the 
LSE’s senior management directed AIM towards a more international market, 
one that became highly focused on overseas resource exploration stocks and 
led to an enormous expansion in numbers. This change of direction provoked 
a movement of executives committed to the small company vision from 
the LSE to OFEX. In time OFEX, renamed PLUS, came to see itself as a direct 
competitor to AIM capable of offering a low-cost, efficient trading venue for 
constituents of the Official List. It culminated in legal action against the LSE 
as PLUS sought the right to trade AIM stocks. Eventually the LSE made certain 
concessions and the community returned to the Exchange, discarding PLUS. 
The current chapter deals with these events.
8.1.  AIM’s change of direction
By the middle of 2001, AIM was claiming to have attracted 800 companies 
and raised £7bn since launch, pointing to a failure rate of a ‘more than 
respectable 3%’. 5 During a period when the City as a whole looked overseas 
for new business, the focus of the market began to move away from a focus 
on the British regions and the entrepreneurial flourishing of UK plc. 
There was an immediate, pragmatic motivation for this change. Throughout 
the autumn of 2000 the LSE had been fighting a hostile takeover bid from the 
Swedish stock market operator OMX. The third and final defence document, 
published on 19 October, sets out the Exchange’s vision for building the 
business: Don Cruickshank, the LSE’s chairman, explicitly promises to develop 
AIM and techMARK as international markets. The document boasts that in 
AIM and techMARK the LSE already has the largest growth and technology 
market in Europe with 688 companies, 40 of which had come from overseas. 
It continues:
‘The London Stock Exchange is now committing to reposition 
techMARK and AIM as international markets by: increasing 
promotional spend significantly to extend the reach and profile 
of these markets, particularly amongst overseas investors across 
Europe; competing for new members and issuers from other 
European jurisdictions; continuing to compete outside Europe for 
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issuers, building on existing successes; providing broader trading 
access to the London market for non-UK brokers’ 6
The document notes that Tim Ward, then the Exchange’s head of marketing 
and company services, would be left in charge of the expansion. Together 
with Simon Brickles, who had replaced Theresa Wallis as Head of AIM in 2001, 
he pursued a vision of internationalisation in order to drive new issues. There 
were, felt some within the organisation, convincing strategic reasons for the 
new direction:
‘It was a management decision to internationalise AIM, and I think 
to some extent for some good reason. It was a very successful 
market in the UK and there are two ways to look at a small cap 
market, I think. One of them would be about geographical 
location…at the end of the day London is an international centre 
of finance, so you have oil and gas expertise which is unrivalled 
anywhere in the world, this is where it is, so why not attract, given 
that the expertise is here? So I think some of the key countries that 
were targeted were Australia and Canada for a simple reason, but 
it did change therefore the nature of AIM, and it became much 
more international.’ 7
Others felt that this new direction had been set after conversations between 
the Chairman and a handful of institutional investors and was not ultimately 
helpful to the direction of the institution.
Immediately on taking over the role, Brickles had set about courting 
overseas listings, visiting Australia to promote the market and enlist 
Australian advisors.8 In May 2002, he formed part of a trade delegation 
to Tel Aviv and a visit to New Zealand followed in 2003.9 The market also 
prospered at the expense of the Official List, with a number of companies 
choosing AIM’s lighter listing requirements to the point where The Times 
cruelly described AIM as a ‘dumping ground for those who cannot cut it 
on the London Stock Exchange’s Official List’.10 The real lure for companies, 
however, was the prospect of raising funds: AIM companies had access to 
6 London Stock Exchange plc, Third Response to OMX’s Offer, October 2000, p.11. https://www.lseg.com/sites/
default/files/.../documents/OMX-third-document-oct00.pdf [Accessed 6 March 2017]
7 Market executive 6
8 Australian Financial Review, August 28, 2001, ‘Taking AIM for listings here but careful about ASX turf’, Andrew 
Main, p.16; Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia), March 14, 2002, ‘Wanted: talent scouts’, Bruce Brammall, p.69.
9 Independent on Sunday, May 12, 2002, ‘London Stock Exchange courts controversy in Israel’, Jason Nisse, p.5; 
Pg. 5The New Zealand Herald, March 23, 2002, ‘London touting Down Under,’ Ellen Read
10 The Times (London), January 3, 2003, ‘Corporate wrecks find home in new firms nursery’, Nick Hasell, p.30
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a community of investors who were actually prepared to part with their 
money. 
The new Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the USA placed heavier reporting and 
responsibility burdens on listed companies and helped to make London a 
more attractive destination for public offers. In London, earlier fears about 
over-heavy EU regulation proved unjustified as Brickles managed to change 
the regulatory status of the market to ‘exchange regulated’.11 The Designated 
Markets Initiative and AIM’s move to opt-out of the EU Prospectus Directive 
allowed the market to continue under the LSE’s supervision and avoid a 
repeat of the cycle that had led to the closure of the USM. This favourable 
regulatory environment helped greatly, as did the arrival of new advisers such 
as the Canadian broker Canaccord.12 Canada, as it happened, was a natural 
market for the LSE:
‘The key task was about promoting London as a venue for listings, 
and I guess Canada became straightaway a very appealing market, 
and that must have been around 2002, something like that, simply 
because there were a number of companies that historically listed 
on the LSE, simply because historically the LSE had financed the 
Canadian railways, so there’s a long history of Canadian issuers on 
the London Stock Exchange’ 13
Overall, the market benefitted from a happy confluence of the upswing 
in the commodities cycle in the first half of the decade, a move to 
internationalisation and therefore exposure to the resource-exploitation 
focused equity culture of the Australian financial community, and the 
willingness of British investors to back speculative exploration ventures. 
These three factors gave rise to a boom in new issues from the mining and oil 
and gas sector. 
‘I went off to Australia for six weeks. I made a point of visiting 
brokers, and all they could talk about was mining. Mining, 
mining, mining. And up to a point I had shunned mining, 
because I always regarded it as being so problematic, why 
get involved? But you couldn’t ignore it. These people started 
talking about the first major bull market in oil prices for a long, 
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long while because China was buying anything…I came back to 
London and I thought well, I ought to have a look at this and see 
if there are opportunities that we can get involved in. And we 
did.’ 14
As Arcot et al. note, 
‘By 2007 AIM was a much more broadly-based market than it had 
been five years earlier. The average size of company had increased 
with an increasing number valued at more than £50 million at the 
time of flotation. It was also attracting a new class of property and 
closed entities, some of which were concerned with exploiting 
investment opportunities in emerging markets such as China, 
India and Vietnam.’ 15
AIM’s internationalization peaked in 2006, with 77 international issues raising 
£2.9bn; during the period from 1995 to 2009 77% of all IPOs on the exchange 
regulated (junior tier) markets of Germany, France, Italy and the UK took 
place on AIM.16 Eventually, however, the interest in international issues and 
commodities came to resemble a bubble, and stories started to circulate: 
the promoter who banked his investors’ money and ‘went straight out and 
bought a boat’ or the Chinese companies that seduced investors ‘who didn’t 
realize that there were ‘three sets of books, one for the market, one for the 
accountant, and one that tells it like it really is’.17
The move to international positioning was mirrored by a change of internal 
management strategy within the LSE, shifting away from the independent-
department approach that had proved so successful in establishing the 
market. This meant, among other things, moving regulatory responsibility 
back towards the listing authorities. Brickles had ‘persuasive and moral 
authority’ but no longer had direct regulatory control over AIM, an absence 
that struck him as problematic when expanding into new and unknown 
markets. By the middle of the decade, AIM had been reabsorbed into the 
organizational structure of the LSE. The Exchange management now sees 
integration as vital to the market’s operation. It is
14 Hoodless interview
15 Arcot, Black, and Owen, “From Local to Global: The Rise of Aim as a Stock Market for Growing Companies: A 
Comprehensive Report Analysing the Growth of Aim,” 17.
16 Khurshed, Kostas, and Saadouni, “Warrants in Underwritten Ipos: The Alternative Investment Market (Aim) 
Experience.”
17 Public relations 1, Public relations 2, interviews
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‘a really important point that AIM is not a separate, discreet or 
somehow backwater part of the London Stock Exchange. It 
is absolutely integral to the material of the group from senior 
management through to our trading services, to our primary 
markets, our comms, our government relations, right the way 
through it is fully integrated into the business… it is an interesting 
example of how the market and how our offering has moved 
on, because I think when AIM was first launched, it was quite 
important to people that there was someone with a separate and 
distinct role as Head of AIM but I think as people have become 
very comfortable that it is an integral part of our offering’ 18
Trading mechanisms were also in flux and the long-running struggle 
between quote-driven and order driven markets was now drifting towards 
the smaller company space. The London Stock Exchange had been aware of 
order-driven markets as a solution to large bid-offer spreads since the late 
1980s. In 1992 it had begun designing a new electronic trading platform – 
Sequence – completed in August 1996 at a cost of £81 million. This platform 
could support either quote-driven (market-maker) or order-driven markets. 
Although an attempt to forcibly introduce an order-driven system in 1995 
led to a members’ rebellion and the sacking of chief executive Michael 
Lawrence, order-driven trading remained inevitable and in October 1997 the 
LSE introduced SETS, at the same time removing rules forcing trade to be 
directed to particular market-makers and the obligation on market-makers to 
quote prices in given stocks.19 Brickles felt that the LSE was moving away from 
his vision for a light-touch small company market and neglecting its core 
constituency: 
‘I also could see that the drift of Stock Exchange thinking was 
increasingly towards order books and I believe very strongly that 
once you get below the FTSE250 or certainly 350 order books just 
don’t work and the market making system, for all of its many, many 
well-documented faults, does… the Stock Exchange was never 
going to long-term deliver on the small-cap focus.’ 20
 
Brickles left the LSE in November 2003, and the role of Head of AIM was taken 
on by Martin Graham, then Director of Markets at the Exchange. Graham 
argued that his taking of the role, albeit in a largely nominal manner while 
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Stuttard looked after the day-to-day running of the market, signalled a 
commitment to the importance of AIM within the LSE; Graham wrote in the 
Financial Times that AIM was ‘the lifeblood of the market’ and of ‘massive 
strategic importance’.21
8.2.  The new contender – PLUS Markets
For those remaining at the refinanced but crippled OFEX, the immediate task 
was to save the business, so Simon Brickles and his team embarked on 
‘a refresh, a rebrand, a rewriting of the rules…a marketing 
campaign to effectively re-launch the markets. We try our best 
to try and hang on to the businesses on the market, because of 
course in the meantime all the Nomads are going crazy trying to 
get all the OFEX companies to move to the AIM market and earn a 
nice juicy fee out of it at the same time. All our income is walking 
out the door because we’re losing so many companies. And in 
the meantime, you know, in 2005, 2006, 2007AIM’s attracting 
500 companies a year, so it’s really boom time. And we are on our 
knees. So we’re trying hard to protect our income.’ 22
Brickles was faced with difficult redundancies, while maintaining the team 
he had imported from the Stock Exchange: Nemone Wynn-Evans and Cyril 
Theret (hired by Jonathan Jenkins) to fill business development roles, and 
Jamie Whitehorn in regulation. Brickles’ reorganisation put paid to the final 
vestiges of the family firm:
‘A whole load of people were being made redundant from 
right across all departments. And effectively it was left with as 
skeleton a staff as it could get away with, to just run the day-to-
day operations. And there were an awful lot of people that had 
been…who’d been there for a long time,… recruited in during 
better market conditions, by 2004, were still there and really 
didn’t have any reason to be…Although it was a PLC by that 
time, there’s no question that it still had the feeling of a family 
business.’ 23
21 Graham personal communication. Arcot, Black, and Owen, “From Local to Global: The Rise of Aim as a Stock 
Market for Growing Companies: A Comprehensive Report Analysing the Growth of Aim,” 16.
22 Market executive 1 interview
23 Market executive 1 interview
page 89
Once costs had been cut, Brickles embarked on the process of building an 
entity that was a stock exchange in legal, regulatory and material terms. The 
rulebook, which had become more onerous than that of AIM, was re-written 
and published in January 2005, and the company set about developing a 
functioning electronic trading platform: 
‘I remember [them] saying to me pretty much on day one when I 
walked in, ‘By the way, there’s no trading platform’. So how are we 
trading stocks? Well there was a very rudimentary connectivity 
mechanism which connected those few market makers involved in 
trading OFEX stocks. But there was certainly no platform.’ 24 
Much of the impetus for this expansion came from market-maker-investors 
such as Winterfloods who were, as Brickles suspected, upset about the 
London Stock Exchange’s decision to extend the coverage of its SETSmm 
electronic system to smaller companies. Brickles says that the new strategy 
simply emerged from the hand he was dealt:
‘I then found myself, if you like, last man standing on the director 
front and far from being, “Yippee... I’m going to make it into 
a market”, I was thinking, “Crikey!”, because in those days the 
regulators were saying, “Well what are you going to do with it?”, 
the investors were saying, “Right what is going to happen with 
it?”, the customers were all saying “We are leaving, we are all off to 
AIM”, everybody who could have a crack was having a crack in the 
press, so I found myself then effectively running the business. We 
could develop it a bit but it was in a problem position, particularly 
given the strength of AIM. Then, I suppose with thinking caps 
[on] and the fact that the Stock Exchange was pushing the order 
books…I thought that we could launch a rival exchange, that it 
would be based on the market-maker system and that it would be 
exclusively [targeted at smaller companies].’ 25
A number of factors gave impetus to the plan. First of all, there was no 
business-as-usual option available. OFEX’s corporate restructuring had made 
it impossible for market-making revenues to subsidise the market, now 
held in an entirely separate legal vehicle.26 OFEX needed a steady stream of 
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 had lost his monopoly on trading at the same time and had been largely outcompeted by Winterflood Securities
page 90
Philip Roscoe
new listings, but by 2004 the stream was barely a trickle. Received wisdom 
held that new listings were dependent upon the availability of capital from 
institutional investors which could only be forthcoming in a market with 
more competitive prices driven by multiple market-makers.27 At the same 
time, the market-makers who had supported the rescue fundraising to 
become major shareholders in OFEX were chafing at the high fees imposed 
by the London Stock Exchange – now a deregulated and revenue-focused 
global corporation – for settlement and transaction. The MiFID regulations, 
expected in 2007, sought to open up competition between markets, but 
there was no possibility of competition unless a vehicle to challenge the LSE 
could be found. Finally, Brickles is widely held to have bought an element of 
personal rivalry into his new role as chief executive of OFEX, now renamed 
PLUS Markets Group. 
Brickles therefore began to expand the market’s offering, assisted by Stephen 
Hazell-Smith who joined as non-executive chairman in January 2005. 
Interim results published in September 2005 announced that the new rules, 
published in January, had reassured investors to the point where ‘a number 
of the key institutional investors in smaller companies have publicly declared 
that they are now prepared to invest in appropriate OFEX securities.’ Turnover 
was up and losses greatly reduced. The company announced a £2.5 million 
fundraising to pay for an expansion in the number of securities traded, 
stating 
‘the company intends to markedly broaden its existing trading 
services to encompass an extended range of securities. The 
enlarged trading service will allow brokers and investors flexibility 
in selecting their execution venue and should focus more attention 
on existing OFEX securities. The company believes that it can 
offer a wider trading service that will be very competitive and will 
provide an efficient platform for brokers, retail service providers 
and market makers.’ 28
In other words, the junior market was to be positioned as a direct competitor 
to LSE’s smaller company markets and AIM. On November 10, 2005, the Times 
reported a private meeting at the offices of mid-tier broker Charles Stanley: 
‘Present at the meeting were representatives from Stanley and dealers such 
as Seymour Pierce, Peel Hunt and Winterflood Securities, which has led the 
opposition to the LSE. Some brokers are upset at the extension of the LSE’s 
27 Jonathan Jenkins interview
28 Interim statement, 6 September 2005, emphasis added
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SETSmm part-electronic trading platform to various small-cap and AIM 
stocks, for which they claim it is unsuitable.’ 29
On 30 November 2005, after a period of intensive work, the PLUS service (as 
it was now called) was launched. It enabled brokers to trade any stock on the 
Official List, ‘everything from Vodafone, down to the smallest FTSE All-Share.’ 30 
It was possible to offer a market in these stocks because the London Stock 
Exchange had lost its monopoly position as competent listing authority 
(giving it effective ownership of the right to trade stocks) that role having 
been passed to the UKLA.31 The new system expanded the potential revenues 
available to PLUS, which up to that point could only charge listing fees:
‘So the PLUS service enabled the PLUS holdings company to 
introduce two new strands of revenue. As it was, we chose not to 
introduce trading fees, but we did charge a membership charge 
for brokers and market makers to trade on the PLUS Service. So 
that was our second strand of revenue. And the third strand of 
revenue was being able to charge for the data relating to that 
trading activity. So the exchange’s sources of revenue went from 
one to three overnight.’ 32
The PLUS rebranding continued to sit alongside the OFEX name until the 
second half of 2006. The regulatory advances achieved by the previous 
management, such as becoming a prescribed market, were linked in statute 
to the OFEX name, and changing the name of the market therefore required 
a formal process of re-registration. The second half of 2006 saw the growth 
of a much more advanced ambition, with PLUS Markets setting out to 
gain the RIE license that the OFEX management had turned down some 
years earlier. This time round, the application would be hugely demanding 
project. 
‘It involved getting a licence but nobody had done it before, you 
see. When I first saw the people at the FSA about becoming a 
stock exchange, and I said, “Well what is involved?”…Apart from 
the London Stock Exchange, the Exchange, there was not really 
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another full exchange, so I asked the FSA, as I think it had just 
become, what would be involved and they said, “About 100 pages, 
blah blah blah,” and I said, “Well what is on those 100 pages?” and 
they said, “We will have to go away and think about it”. And there 
were in fact recognition requirements and so on, there ended up 
being about 7,000 pages, at a cost of over £1 million in legal fees 
and so on, and a hell of a lot of time.’ 33
Becoming a Recognised Investment Exchange conferred numerous 
regulatory advances. The statutory provisions that had been achieved 
piecemeal by OFEX would be replaced by an integrated and comprehensive 
market regime. The RIE had a clearly designed primary market (i.e. capital 
raising) component.34 The PLUS ambition was to achieve regulatory status 
that would allow it to compete not only with AIM, but also with the Official 
List, providing a technologically advanced and financially competitive trading 
venue for fully quoted stocks on absolutely equivalent regulatory terms.35 
This move was made to coincide with MiFID, a European directive designed 
to stimulate competition between stock markets, a market in markets for 
financial services. 
The ambition to achieve the RIE served as the justification for a further 
fundraising, an order of magnitude bigger than previous offers. Announced 
on 13 December 2006, the offer set out to raise £25m at 14 per share. 
According to the offer document, the firm, currently focused ‘on providing 
cost-effective quote and trading services dovetailed to the needs of small 
and mid-cap companies… is seeking to expand into offering services to 
meet the quotation and trading needs of larger companies and the UK 
institutional community.’ The offer document suggests that MiFID, due to 
be implemented from November 2007, would offer ‘an opportunity for 
investment firms to review the current products and services provided to 
them by traditional stock exchanges’.36 The directors, it continued, believed 
that trading on PLUS could reduce transaction costs by eliminating trade 
reporting fees; it was at the time a habitual complaint among brokers and 
market makers that the London Stock Exchange exploited its position to 
charge fees on the reporting of transactions carried out on the exchange. 
Moreover, the directors believed that ‘PLUS markets is the only FSA 
33 Brickles interview
34 It is noteworthy that AIM had stepped ‘down’ to MTF – multilateral trading facility – status, but that it enjoyed 
an unusually privileged status position as part of the LSE. AIM would also have no intention to compete with 
the Official List.
35 Market executive 6 interview
36 Plus Markets Group offer document, 13 December 2006, p5.
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regulated entity that meets the regulatory requirements to offer a market in 
AIM securities’.37
The document elaborated on the proposed services to be offered: electronic 
connectivity with brokers, including a messaging service; the display of 
client limit orders; and extensive trade-reporting services. It also noted the 
intention to broaden trading coverage to include investment trusts and 
other structured vehicles.38 In other words, the newly recognised investment 
exchange would stand as a serious competitor to the LSE, using the RIE 
wrapper and an accompanying trading system to take a share of the LSE’s 
trading activity and eventually go head-to-head with AIM:
[The strategy was] two-fold really. One was to develop the 
market as an RIE and to generate a lot more interest from the 
institutions which is fine. But it’s not just market status that does 
that, you need to have the bigger companies that are going to 
be interesting to the institutions. Then part of the funding was 
also then to develop a sort of state of the art trading system, 
because another strand to the strategy was to become…initially 
an alternative trading platform but a new trading platform for 
AIM.39
In February 2007 the offer, heavily oversubscribed, saw the firm’s net 
assets increase from £2.6m to £24.1m, and valued the company at £43m. 
Alongside the placing two LSE stalwarts – Ian Salter and Giles Vardey 
– joined the board as non-executives, and the company announced its 
intention to move to the Official List. An IT consultant named Brian Taylor 
was recruited as Chief Financial Officer with a brief to order and implement 
a new trading system. In April 2007 he ordered a trading platform from 
Swedish market operator OMX, a supplier of NASDAQ (soon to be taken 
over and become NASDAQ OMX), with a view to getting it up and running 
in six months. 
PLUS’ trading system was central to the whole endeavour of competing 
with the London Stock Exchange. Tradelect, the LSE’s new £40m trading 
system, went live on 18 June 2007; cutting order processing time to 10 
milliseconds, and greatly reducing trading costs.40 PLUS’ efforts show 
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that the process of setting up a new stock exchange had evolved from a 
primarily social to a material and technological project: 
‘When you are launching a Stock Exchange you don’t just have 
technology, you don’t just have a trading platform. All your 
market-makers and brokers have to connect to the platform. 
That platform has to connect to your website and it also has 
to connect to data vendors like Reuters, Bloomberg and so on. 
It has got to connect separately to your surveillance system, 
so that you can monitor it, and it has not got to go down ever, 
virtually. It is a huge spider’s web and if any one of those bits 
of the spider’s web doesn’t connect you cannot launch the 
market.’ 41
July 2007 saw the granting of the RIE license, and the OMX X-Stream platform 
launched in November 2007, just as MiFID came into force. Both took up 
quantities of management time and were finished in time for the November 
deadline: ‘No mean feat. We were running pretty hard’.42
PLUS’ concentration on the material infrastructure perhaps overwhelmed 
the social and discursive labour involved in setting up a new exchange. 
Despite a shared management expertise, PLUS failed to engage in the 
processes that had made the AIM launch a success: prolonged, interactive 
consultation with the investee community. Indeed, many in the smaller 
company community felt that PLUS was no longer seriously committed 
to its original constituency. The market was forced to repeatedly state its 
commitment to companies and advisers, who levelled against PLUS the 
same critique that PLUS itself had been making against the LSE: a steady 
drift upstream towards bigger companies and more lucrative business. 
Members of the advisory panel, chaired by businessman John French, grew 
frustrated with managers who 
‘ignored the real opportunity to enhance the standards of 
companies coming to the junior market, the quality of some of 
the Advisers at that time and introduce acceptance of what PLUS 
could offer to the investment community in terms of small cap and 
developing companies’.43
41 Brickles interview
42 Market executive 1
43 French, personal communication
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French described the task of maintaining a focused market for smaller 
company shares as being like ‘pushing water uphill’ in the face of scant 
interest from institutional investors and the market’s own management. 
Perhaps this feeling ran both ways: PLUS executives found themselves 
frustrated by the unwillingness of the community to take its small cap 
offering seriously.44 
8.3.  Project Tortoise
Any doubts over the market’s direction of travel – from smaller company 
nursery to discount trading and trade reporting venue – would have been 
settled by the Turquoise affair, a significant and ‘traumatic’ distraction for 
management in the autumn of 2007. There had already been rumours of 
ventures that never came to fruition, tempting PLUS to set up off exchange 
‘dark pools’. Like PLUS’ move to compete with the LSE’s small-cap markets, 
Turquoise sprung from the fact that in the mid-2000s ‘people hated the LSE,’ 
then run by Clara Furse, ‘it was…vicious.’ 45 A number of senior UK executives 
of global investment banks came together with the idea of setting up their 
own lightly regulated trading system (an MTF) to take their business away 
from the Exchange. These were
‘big swinging dicks…big players, nothing to do with small 
company investing but big players…[who] got it into their heads, 
probably rightly, that the LSE was taking too much of the pot in 
trading terms “We’re going to set up the alternative, we know 
what we’re doing…we’re masters of the universe, we will create 
an alternative dealing venue. But the problem is that none of 
them had actually run a market, they were all participating in the 
markets but none of them actually run a bloody market and that 
means the regulatory aspects which are not insignificant, all those 
good things and they’re not to be underestimated. And so they 
approached us and said, “How’s about it? This is what we want to 
do, you guys have got the expertise...can we team up?”’ 46
Turquoise was a consortium of seven investment banks including Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank, credit Suisse and Citigroup; by all 
accounts it was an ad hoc grouping of individual bankers representing those 
institutions. Although it had first been mentioned in the press in April 2007, 
From 2004 to 2010: Markets at war
44 French interview; market executive 6, interview
45 Market executive 2
46 Hazell-Smith interview
page 96
Philip Roscoe
and the possibility of a merger with PLUS was mooted by the Daily Mail in 
August, it had not made much progress, earning itself the sobriquet ‘Project 
Tortoise’.47
Brickles recalls that he approached the group to suggest a collaboration, with 
PLUS supplying the trading platform and the management expertise: 
‘[Some of ] the Stock Exchange’s biggest trading firms were 
looking at setting up their own trading entity called Turquoise. 
We went to Turquoise and said, “Well you have all the trading 
that is on the London Stock Exchange in the main market…we 
should be able to get most of the trading in the small cap. We 
have a stock exchange licence and we can do primary markets. 
So if you create this new exchange why would you not float 
companies on it?” If you compete with the monopoly on half of 
its business then it is going to switch its fees in other business. 
We provide a complete new Stock Exchange and so we were 
looking at putting that together. At this point we could have 
been looking at a £1billion business.’ 48
By October, details were leaking out. On 6 October 2007 the Daily Telegraph 
‘revealed’ that PLUS was negotiating the terms of a ‘takeover’ with Turquoise, 
and the Independent announced a ‘merger’. PLUS shares were suspended 
at 28p following the announcement of a ‘non-binding heads-of-terms 
agreement with a third party’.49 It was (and still is) rumoured that 
‘Turquoise made a very generous offer, which would probably 
have got a very large chunk of the shareholders’ money back 
again, a very large chunk, but…personalities got involved.’ 50
But this excitement was misplaced:
‘People were talking about it in terms of a takeover or a merger 
and they were talking about consideration. And the reality was 
47 The Guardian, April 19, 2007 Thursday, ‘London Stock Exchange faces challenges from investment banks and 
AIM rival’, Jill Treanor and Marianne Barriaux, Financial Pages, p.25; Daily Mail, August 7, 2007 Tuesday, ‘Why 
Project Turquoise is feeling blue’, Sam Fleming, p59; The Times (London), October 6, 2007, ‘Project Tortoise’ in 
the running for takeover of Plus Markets, Dominic Walsh. Business, p.53
48 Brickles interview
49 Mail on Sunday, October 7, 2007 Sunday, ‘Turquoise threat to Exchange, Simon Watkins, C1, p5.; The Daily 
Telegraph, October 6, 2007, ‘Plus Markets in talks for reverse takeover of Project Turquoise’, Ben Bland, City, p.33
50 Market executive 2
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that there wasn’t any consideration on the table. The reality was 
that, while the benefits to Turquoise of an RIE licence and a trading 
platform in situ looked pretty obvious…the structure of the 
transaction offered significant delivery risk to PLUS shareholders. 
Because Turquoise was basically a bunch of investment banks with 
a lot of ideas but who themselves actually at that point hadn’t 
delivered anything. It was just an idea. And in seeking to take 
control of what we had at PLUS, there was nothing [left] on the 
table for PLUS shareholders.’ 51
Brickles found the investment bank traders ‘difficult characters’ and Turquoise’ 
lack of a leader made negotiations very difficult. A particular sticking point for 
Brickles was the suggestion that PLUS left the market, locking shareholders 
into an unquoted vehicle with no obvious means of returning their 
investment. The deal was nearly done, but he backed out. 
‘It was just before we were going to announce that they were – I 
called off, I said that the deal could not go ahead because there 
was one term about how long the entity would be listed for that 
I said I could not compromise on…I did not do the deal because I 
thought that it was against my shareholders’ interest. In retrospect 
with the financial crash…I should have just done it, it would 
have made six times the money and everybody would have been 
happy.’ 52
By 19 October talks were over, and Turquoise was reported as looking for a 
deal with Cinnober, a Swedish technology firm.53 Still no progress was made 
and eventually the whole thing was quietly reabsorbed by the London Stock 
Exchange, now run by the shrewd and politically aware Xavier Rolet:
‘They made a big enough noise to worry Rolet who [said], “We can 
see you’re struggling here a bit. Look, what about if we take it off 
your hands? We’ll make sure we don’t do anything nasty on the 
transaction fees, we’ll play your game.” And all breathed a sigh of 
relief because they were getting nowhere with this thing and it 
was starting to look rather embarrassing.’ 54
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8.4.  Head to head with AIM
2008 saw the new exchange making progress with its ambition to tackle the 
LSE. News stories reported that PLUS had captured more than half of private 
investor deals for a particularly turbulent week of trading in January 2008.55 In 
May, PLUS handled ‘virtually all’ of the trade reporting for one new admission 
to AIM, and the following months Mears plc became the first company to 
take up a joint PLUS listing.56 September saw a partnership with the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange and November a proposed partnership with the 
US electronic trading service Direct Edge. The 2007 annual figures showed 
revenues of £3.1 million and a loss of £2.98 million, well within expectations 
in view of the development work the firm had carried out. 
Then came a problem. PLUS’s competitive offering was predicated on the 
ability to trade in Official List Stocks without incurring the LSE’s reporting 
costs. Brickles believed that his market could capture a majority of trading in 
the bottom two thirds of the LSE’s constituents, and on that basis generate 
some £4 million annually in data sales.57 But MiFID did not apply to the 
‘exchange regulated’ AIM, only regulated markets such as the Official List. 
PLUS’s main customers,
‘the likes of Wins, Teathers, the core market makers in the smaller 
company markets, all wanted to be able to trade AIM [stocks] on 
PLUS and they couldn’t. AIM wasn’t caught by MiFID, because the 
regulations didn’t apply. It wasn’t a fully listed market, and MiFID 
only applied to fully listed markets...So what do you think the LSE 
are going to do? Are they going to say, “Hey, yeah, we’re in this 
wonderful deregulated world. Come and have a share of the pie.” 
Well, of course not. So the only way we were going to be able 
to persuade them to…well we did have some goes at trying to 
persuade them to let us trade AIM stocks as well. But they wouldn’t 
do it.’ 58
AIM remained the property of the LSE, while supervision of the Official List 
had been taken over by UKLA. Beyond the scope of the MiFID anti-monopoly 
legislation, the LSE insisted that all trades were reported back through its 
own infrastructure. The LSE lobbied hard. It invoked its long-established 
55 Mail on Sunday, January 27, 2008 ‘Plus takes away trades from LSE’, Simon Watkins, p.73
56 Mail on Sunday, May 18, 2008, ‘A Plus for ‘upstart’ exchange’, Simon Watkins, p.79; Mail on Sunday, June 29, 
2008, ‘A Plus for exchange’, p.77.
57 Brickles personal communication
58 Market executive 1 interview
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reputation to good effect: the FSA made it difficult for PLUS to trade AIM 
stocks, even in cases where it should have been eligible to trade the non-AIM 
side of a dual listed security. 
Brickles suggests that the root of PLUS’ difficulties lay in a change of attitude 
on the part of the government and the regulators. From 2004 to 2006 the 
LSE had been fighting a succession of hostile bids from Deutsche Boerse, 
the Australian Macquarrie Bank and finally NASDAQ. Had any of these 
approaches been successful it is likely that AIM would have suffered and 
perhaps even been closed, and regulators worried about the future of small 
company equity markets in the UK were receptive to alternative solutions. 
Once the threat of takeover had receded, the LSE lobbied to protect its 
position and government support was lacking: PLUS was no longer needed 
as a saviour of the U.K.’s entrepreneurial companies.59 Brickles attempted to 
use EU passporting regulations to report business through the Munich Stock 
Exchange but this scheme met with regulatory disapproval. The only other 
way of being permitted to trade was to seek consent from the companies 
themselves. Here, according to PLUS’ management, vested interests in the 
form of high supervisory fees earned by AIM advisors got in the way:
‘We had to go to every single AIM company and say, “Do you 
want your share to be traded on another market as well as the 
LSE’s market?” And unsurprisingly enough the issuers were very 
suspicious. And they would ring their Nomad and say, “What 
do you think?” And the Nomad said, “Don’t do it”. Why? Because 
they’re running an absolute gravy train of Nomad fees from the 
London Stock Exchange’s AIM market, why on earth would they do 
anything to stop that gravy train from running?...So the only way 
we were going to [earn the] right to persuade the LSE to dual trade 
AIM stocks was to sue them. So we did. So we spent four million 
quid on that legal case.’ 60
Ironically, the source of PLUS’ discomfort was Brickles’ own innovation at the 
LSE, opting into exchange-regulated status and out of European regulated 
market status: 
‘I had been told by the Treasury that I would have the right to 
trade AIM Securities. Ed Balls had written to me twice, I had letters 
from Ed Balls saying, “Yes you will get it.” [But while at the LSE] I 
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had made AIM a non-regulated market under EU Directives so it 
was legally complicated. I set up a doppelganger market, sued the 
LSE and I had just got the right to trade AIM Securities but by that 
point we were going into economic recession... It was agreed at 
the Court that we would have the right to trade AIM Securities but 
it was a bit of a pyrrhic victory because then we were going into 
economic meltdown’ 61
The action, launched in September 2008, was hugely expensive both in terms 
of cash and management time. Market Executive 5 ‘spent days with barristers 
and lawyers’, and it was rumoured that the legal firm dealing with the case 
had to set aside an entire room to store the paperwork. Full year figures for 
2008 showed a loss of £10 million, leaving £15 million cash in the bank. 
The case was settled out of court. Received wisdom holds that the LSE’snewly 
arrived chief executive Xavier Rolet had no wish for a high-profile legal 
action and gave way to PLUS’ demands. The LSE then cut its charges, 
leaving PLUS with no price advantage; those backing PLUS, having waged a 
successful resistance, drifted back to the incumbent exchange. Moreover, as 
interviewees pointed out, the global economy had entered a very difficult 
period. Applications shrank and constituent companies went out of business. 
‘Looking back, during 2008 and by the end of it, it was starting to 
look a bit rocky and at the same time of course a lot of the cash 
had been spent on the trading system. So over the next couple 
of years there was rumours in the market from 2009 onwards 
that PLUS was running out of money. It was the capital adequacy 
requirements rather than the operating costs that were the issue. 
So there were rumours going around for a long time, which of 
course then become self-perpetuating because everyone is 
worried that it is not going to be around for much longer so you 
are not going to punt anything on to the market.’ 62
The regulatory status as RIE, now PLUS’s prime asset, was hugely expensive to 
maintain, roughly ten times the cost of the prescribed market status.63 It was 
fragile, in regulatory terms, subject to cancellation by the FCA if they felt that 
it was not being used properly (or indeed at all). It also made admission to the 
primary market (MTF) more difficult:
61 Brickles interview
62 Market executive 5
63 Market executive 2
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‘Before PLUS become an RIE there were two ways that you could 
get on to the market. One was by producing an admission 
document and the other was…called introduction at that time, 
and you just basically filled in a few forms if you were not raising 
money and you were just having shares admitted to trading, you 
filled in some forms and that was it. That could be done by an 
advisor very quickly they just had to say, “Yes we have had a look 
at this company and it looks fine to us,” and then you were on-
market, which was a much, much cheaper and much faster route 
to market. Once the market became an RIE, that had to go.’ 64
In August 2009 trade reporting commenced in all AIM securities, but it came 
too late for the firm, which by this point was in need of still more capital. New 
issues remained difficult, with advisers deterred by the expectation that the 
fees they could charge for the same work would be substantially lower if 
they listed on PLUS. A PLUS listing, lacking the LSE’s stamp, was hard to sell to 
potential listees. PLUS simply never enjoyed the kudos of the LSE, although 
Brickles remains confident that it would have been recognized in time. 
‘We came, I think very close with PLUS, closer than people know, 
to really wrecking the Stock Exchange business and I think that 
accounts for some of the hostility. Clara, who I had no personal 
animosity towards, had a committee watching everything we 
did on PLUS. They had a committee monitoring us all of the time 
because, of course, people were willing to pay £1.5 billion, £3.5 
billion, £4 billion for the LSE because it was the only show in town. 
But we had got exactly the same licences and liquidity and so on.’ 65
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9.  Decline and fall: the final days of PLUS
PLUS found itself in a difficult position. It had betted heavily on the 
trading and reporting venture, ramping up infrastructure and recruiting 
employees. The expected levels of business had failed to materialize 
and the costs of legal action had drained its coffers. A sudden change 
in market conditions spelled trouble for the primary market as appetite 
for funding risky smaller companies disappeared following the financial 
crisis.1 The company was in bad financial shape. Vardey, who later became 
Chairman of PLUS, suggested that there were fundamental issues with the 
business model. 
‘We got listing fees if a company came on to the PLUS trading 
market, so five grand a year or eight grand a year, whatever it 
was. So… you needed at least three or four hundred companies 
to cover the running costs of the exchange. Well, we never got 
there. And the second fatal flaw of the model was that you had no 
control of the trading system that your market actually operated. 
In other words, you were entirely reliant on market makers, 
particularly Winterflood Securities with a few others as well, to 
make two-way prices, and any profits from secondary trading as 
such went straight into the pockets of the traders and brokers, not 
the exchange.’
In other words, the separation of market-making (trading) revenues from 
market administration revenues (listing fees, memberships and data sales) 
fundamentally undermined the commercial proposition: secondary market 
profits form a crucial part of developing a viable small-company investment 
exchange. 
The second half of 2009 therefore saw another change of direction for PLUS. 
The company now had its licence and systems in place, but was suffering 
from an acute lack of business and cash. A document issued to shareholders 
in September 2009 stated: 
‘Primary markets are currently extremely challenging with a 
dearth of companies coming to the market. Moreover, the delay 
in obtaining the right to trade all AIM securities and the cost of 
the associated litigation requires the Company to strengthen its 
1 Market executives 1 and 6 interview
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balance sheet, increase its regulatory capital and to diversify its 
geographical reach.’
In September 2009 PLUS raised £5m from Kuwaiti group Amara Dhari, a 
loosely affiliated collection of investors representing powerful business 
interests in the Middle East. The deal, at 7.5p per share, valued the company 
at £29.5 million and left Amara Dhari with 17% of the stock. Non-executive 
directors Ian Salter and Giles Vardey stepped down from the board and 
were replaced by two Amara Dhari nominees, Ahmed Ibrahim Al Asfour and 
Hisham S. Al Otaibi, the latter former Minister of Commerce and Industry for 
the State of Kuwait. The stated purpose of this deal was to open up PLUS’ 
market to the Middle East. According to the circular, ‘Amara Dhari and its 
shareholders intend to use their relationships with financial institutions, high 
net-worth individuals, family and international companies headquartered 
in the GCC’ to develop new lines of business, including a Shariah compliant 
trading platform, and introduce businesses from the region onto a London 
exchange.2
The Amara Dhari arrangement constituted a sudden change in strategy and 
was not unanimously supported by the board. It was rumoured that the 
company had turned down a would-be purchaser, a prominent, international 
exchange, to pursue the deal. Several board members were sceptical that 
international business would be delivered, and certainly that it would happen 
on the necessary timescale for a business that was losing money far too 
quickly, overburdened with staff, infrastructure and regulatory costs. The 
new approach created confusion in the market, with observers, customers, 
and market investors unsure why the company had taken money from that 
particular source.3 ’ PLUS’ own shareholders were also wrongfooted by the 
deal and after the announcement several important institutional investors, 
including Cazenove and Scottish Widows, sold their holdings. 
By February 2010 matters had moved on. In a major board reshuffle Cyril 
Theret, hitherto business development director, became chief executive 
while Giles Vardey returned as executive chairman, replacing Stephen Hazell-
Smith. Nemone Wynn Evans, also a business development executive, had 
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warrant, conditional on the successful introduction of new business. The warrant allowed Amara Dhari to 
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3 Market executive 1, interview
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become chief financial officer in September 2008. Simon Brickles moved to 
take the role of vice chairman with focus on Gulf region, leaving Theret, Wynn 
Evans and Vardey as the executive. The firm’s annual results, published on 25 
March 2010, report losses of £8.4m and a cash position of £11m, including 
the proceeds of the September funding, down from £14m at the end of 2009. 
The board commenced a strategic review, seeking to cut costs and reduce 
the company’s cash burn, as well as seeking new revenues. The firm pursued 
two main strategic directions. The first was to develop an offering in market 
services. PLUS gave notice on its expensive but outdated OMX platform and 
began to develop an in-house trading platform and associated services that 
could be sold to others in the market. The second approach was to develop 
a derivatives trading service, an idea that never really had time to come to 
fruition.4
In November 2011, following an acrimonious war of words in the press, 
Amara Dhari succeeded in ousting Vardey from the chairman’s role. The 
Kuwaiti group was said to be frustrated by Vardey’s unwillingness to pursue 
opportunities in the Middle East; Vardey simply did not believe that sufficient 
business existed in a region dominated by family-owned firms to constitute 
an opportunity worth pursuing. The PLUS board was concerned about the 
identity of Amara Dhari syndicate members, but its investigation led only 
to the resignation of a senior board member.5 By this point the group was 
under constant regulatory supervision. Executives were forced to attend 
weekly meetings with the regulator to discuss capital adequacy and plans 
for orderly closure. The executives felt the pressure of the supervision keenly: 
it was made clear that they had responsibilities beyond their immediate 
shareholders, particularly to the regulators and the issuer companies.6 
In December the group announced that it had turned down an offer for 
Plus-DX, its fledgling derivatives exchange, hinting that this offer came from 
the executive until recently in charge of the operation. PLUS claimed that it 
remained committed to launching the service.7 The same month, however, 
PLUS appointed an independent corporate financier to sell the business, 
news that became public in early February. Despite some interest, no buyer 
came forward. On 14 May 2012 PLUS announced its intention to conduct an 
orderly closure in accordance with FSA rules; four days later, on 18 May, it 
4 Market executives 1 and 5. The technology projects were set up in stand-alone companies in order to ease 
regulatory capital requirements.
5 Market executive 6 interview
6 Market executive 6
7 The Daily Telegraph (London), December 30, 2011, ‘Plus Markets Group turns down offer for its derivatives unit’, 
Jamie Dunkley, p.29
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8 A regulatory announcement from PLUS Markets Group, dated 8 June 2011, states ‘Mr Al Asfour, whose family 
hold over 50% of the share capital of AD, has informed the board that they refute the right of Spencer Wilson 
to have committed AD to formally support the additional resolutions proposed at the Company’s forthcoming 
annual general meeting’. A week later it emerged, via an open letter from Amara Dhari, that Spencer Wilson 
had forced Al Asfour to step down from the board of Amara Dhari for supporting the ICAP deal (Source: PR 
Newswire Europe, June 14, 2012, ‘Amara Issues Open Letter to the Board of PLUS Markets Plc’)
announced that the giant inter-broker dealer ICAP would buy the exchange 
for £1, taking a core staff and committing to all associated liabilities. This 
done, the management expected to close down the company and return 
what little cash remained to investors. Discontented shareholders, largely 
in the person of Spencer Wilson, who had seized control of the Amara Dhari 
board in June, reacted with fury to ‘Project Chardonnay’.8 Further acrimony 
broke out in the press, with the Amara Dhari faction objecting to the sale of 
the exchange, and particularly to the payment of nearly £1 million in success 
fees to advisers, and a £423,000 payment to Theret and Wynn-Evans based on 
severance pay and ownership clauses. PLUS executives, for their part, simply 
insisted that they had worked hard to bring about the best deal possible 
both for shareholders and for constituents of the market, whose interests the 
regulator particularly represented. 
Amara Dhari sought to gain the support of heavyweight small-cap investor 
Bruce Rowan, who had accumulated some 15% of the stock when the price 
collapsed, and the media speculated on how he would vote in the coming 
general meeting. On 14 June ICAP increased its offer to £500,000. The 
following day it was announced that the company’s market infrastructure 
business, PLUS Trading Solutions, would be sold to Forum Trading Solutions 
for deferred consideration of £281,251. ‘The rebel shareholders,’ wrote the 
Financial Times, ‘say that the nominal valuation of PLUS-TS is unjustified, 
and argue the deal will benefit the PLUS board’s former colleagues at 
Forum… PLUS valued the platform at £4m when it was seeking investment 
last autumn.’ An acrimonious general meeting of 29 June 2012 saw the sale 
agreed, the directors dispatched from the board, and largely at Rowan’s 
insistence the AIM-listed carcass retained as a shell company.
It seems, in the end, that there was only room for one large-scale small 
company market. PLUS’ ambition grew out of the confluence of a boom in 
international new issuance and a temporary dissatisfaction with the LSE. It 
left 
‘this little vacuum in the middle which I think Simon and the 
original crew thought they could fill, and in a sort of philosophical 
strategic way they were right. But I think the problem was there 
page 106
Philip Roscoe
weren’t either the resources or the ambition frankly to run a full 
exchange…there aren’t enough intermediation fees in the small 
cap area…to feed brokers, exchanges, information providers and 
research firms – there just isn’t enough intermediation fee to do 
that. The biodiversity of the area is just not sustainable.’ 9
Or, as one of the advisors put it,
‘I sold out [of my advisory business] I was very lucky, and I got a 
quarter of a million pounds for my shares…I’ve always said, if I’d 
been an AIM Nomad, I could probably have made two and a half 
million, and I’d been a hedge fund manager, I’d have made twenty 
five million. There just wasn’t the money there.’ 10
 
9 Vardey interview
10 Corporate advisor 5 interview
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10.  Afterword: Changing AIM
Unlike PLUS – now rebranded as NEX Exchange, and establishing its direction 
for a new lease of life – AIM has continued to flourish. The business of a stock 
exchange is supplying infrastructure, and AIM has been successful in part 
because it piggybacks on LSE’s price feeds and trading mechanisms.1 It has 
also greatly benefitted from the reputation and reach of its parent, from 
inception to the present. The launch of AIM constituted a radical change for 
the conservative and risk averse London Stock Exchange, but the decision to 
allow an independent, innovative team to design a bespoke market for smaller 
companies led to an institution that has now entered its third decade. Its 
contribution to the British – and global – economy has been substantial: AIM 
has recently passed the significant milestone of £100 billion raised through 
public offers and in the secondary market. More than 3500 companies have 
passed through the market since it was launched in 1995,2 and the ‘AIM 
model’ has been adopted by growth markets worldwide. AIM has adapted its 
infrastructure to serve a diverse constituency and has managed to cope with 
a wide range of company sizes by providing a menu of trading operations. It 
thereby achieves a careful balance in the politics of market trading, offering 
an electronic order book for larger securities, the market-maker driven SEAQ, 
and a hybrid system. The Exchange has made space for market-makers in the 
smaller-company markets; it has come to recognise
‘the fundamentally important role that market-makers have always 
played and continue to play in making sure that there are always 
prices quoted….[but] towards the larger end where you have got 
much larger and more liquid stocks we want to make sure that 
everyone can participate in the trading of those stocks.’ 3
During the still-short history of AIM two booms in new issues – the dotcom 
boom and the international commodities boom – have resulted in an excess 
of ‘scar tissue’. Despite this, there have been many individual success stories 
on AIM, making it a ‘stock picker’s market’.4 Looking forward, the composition 
of the market is changing, and companies are increasingly
‘regular businesses, not necessarily massive growth markets 
but growing markets, cash flow returns, investing for a future 
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productivity, generating good and growing dividend yields. So the 
nature of AIM I would say has radically changed in the last eight 
years…38 per cent of the AIM market is involved in defensive 
companies.’ 5
Academic research has highlighted the importance of high-growth firms 
(gazelles) with certain characteristics, notably maturity and heterogeneity of 
industrial sector. AIM, in its more mature form, has developed a constituency 
manifesting these characteristics. Research has also drawn attention to the 
importance of physically located entrepreneurial ecosystems, and the AIM 
community itself comprises one such ecosystem, and supports many others 
through the provision of legitimacy, publicity and financial support.6
The tangled story of OFEX/PLUS suggests that there is only room for one full 
scale growth market in the British economy, and that more benefits accrue 
from the concentration of trading activity than from the fragmentation 
required by competition. The London Stock Exchange therefore has a heavy 
responsibility in terms of stewardship of this national resource for the future. 
AIM’s contribution to ‘UK plc’ has been part of its mission statement since the 
beginning and continues to be so:
‘As an exchange, we are very proud of the fact that AIM, just the UK 
companies on AIM are responsible for a £25 billion contribution to 
UK GDP and 730,000 jobs. These are businesses that many of them 
may well have been sold early or wouldn’t have gained the scale or 
the credibility they have gained without AIM and so it is a market 
where we are fundamentally making a difference to the economy 
and to the quality of jobs and employment.’ 7
In view of this commitment, the decision in 2001 to internationalise in pursuit 
of shareholder value seems wrongheaded, and we should applaud AIM’s 
renewed focus on the UK, manifested in such things as its ‘Elite’ training 
programme for SMEs and an ongoing marketing effort in the British regions. 
The history of the UK’s smaller company stock markets also shows an 
ongoing, though cyclical, demand for growth funding and share trading 
5 Williams interview
6 Ross Brown, Suzanne Mawson, and Colin Mason, “Myth-Busting and Entrepreneurship Policy: The Case of 
High Growth Firms,” Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 29, no. 5-6 (2017); Ross Brown and Colin Mason, 
“Looking inside the Spiky Bits: A Critical Review and Conceptualisation of Entrepreneurial Ecosystems,” Small 
Business Economics  (2017).
7 Stuttard interview
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mechanisms (on the part of companies) and investment opportunities 
(on the part of retail investors and institutions). Yet regulation seems, to 
practitioners at least, to be out of step with this demand. Many interviewees 
felt that regulatory oversight verged, at times, on the hostile, and that 
regulatory changes have made it increasingly difficult to secure retail 
investor participation in growth stocks. Regulators pursue the laudable 
aim of protecting individuals from investing loss, but retail investors have 
traditionally been a crucial source of funds for growing businesses, investing 
locally in companies they can see and with which they can interact.8 A 
regulatory tightening of smaller company markets is likely to drive investors 
into informal arrangements or crowd-sourced funding mechanisms which 
lack the disclosure and transparency necessary for any kind of effective 
investing. 
AIM must also deal with the changing nature of social relationships within 
the financial world. Its regulatory structure was based on a currency of 
reputation within a small community. This relied heavily upon links built up 
over many years on the trading floor of the Exchange and a clearly articulated 
understanding of acceptable financial practice. The passage of time has 
eroded these links and the commonly understood norms that accompanied 
them. There was a sense among interviewees that the Nomad structure could 
no longer be expected to wield the influence that it once had done, and 
that it had come to resemble a restrictive practice resulting in high fees and 
excessive turnover of staff within advisory organisations. 
Small company investing is a fashion-driven and volatile occupation, and 
the fortunes of any market are necessarily tied to those fashions. AIM’s 
position within a much larger organisation has helped to insulate it from the 
vicissitudes of investor sentiment, yet at the same time makes it vulnerable 
to internal politics. While I was conducting interviews the small company 
community was worried by the possibility of a merger with Deutsche Boerse. 
The expectation was that incoming management would be unfamiliar with 
equity finance for junior firms and unfriendly to the UK smaller companies 
sector. I heard rumours of another ‘ginger group’ forming to discuss what 
might happen should AIM be closed. Even an institution that is broadly 
supportive of AIM’s endeavour stands to lose much more in reputational 
terms than it can gain from revenue, and many interviews believe that this 
has caused the LSE to run AIM in a conservative manner, drifting away from 
smaller, higher risk fund raisings. Yet it does not seem reasonable to expect a 
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return to the pure caveat market of 1995. We should welcome the maturing 
of AIM as a higher tier in a panoply of funding options for growing companies 
and recognise that quality of supervision may be inextricably linked to fees: 
for example, retaining high quality advisors, a clear signal of quality in the 
market, is an expensive option only available to more developed and larger 
growing companies.
The ongoing enthusiasm of financial intermediaries and their clients 
for earlier-stage sources of funding does imply that AIM should be 
supplemented by a variety of transparent and clearly supervised funding 
mechanisms. Structural factors suggest that a full-scale recognised exchange 
is not an appropriate solution, but other ‘dual-capacity’ arrangements, where 
market-making revenues subsidize market infrastructure, may be viable. 
Clearly, these need to be well regulated, and one would have no wish to go 
back to a 1980s-style over-the-counter market. But the example of JP Jenkins 
and OFEX shows that such ‘markets’ can be beneficial for growing firms; 
OFEX had, by 2003, raised over £1 billion for new businesses, most of which 
would have been far too small to consider a listing on AIM. Technological 
innovations linked to more localised economic activity (for example 
algorithmic micro-exchanges for locally crowd funded start-ups) might also 
offer promising solutions. The London Stock Exchange has been historically 
supportive of noncompeting funding mechanisms, which it views as feeders 
for its own business. Such mechanisms might also help to counterbalance 
two decades of technological and regulatory developments, notably the 
Internet, that have concentrated financial ecologies in bridgehead cities such 
as London.9 This concentration is neither necessarily desirable nor in keeping 
with the political aspirations and responsibilities of a national small company 
market. The perspective of British enterprise – an important political and 
rhetorical motif in this story – demands mechanisms to reinvigorate issuer 
activity in Scotland, Wales and the English regions. Growing infrastructure 
costs and associated economies of scale suggest that ‘white label’ serviced 
offered by large providers may be a more effective solution than de novo 
start-ups.
An important and perhaps unexpected inference we might draw from the 
study is that a stock exchange is talked into being. Although it is a creature of 
regulation, and regulation has played an important role in the development 
of these markets, my account suggests that the two are not connected by a 
direct line of causality. The history of OFEX/PLUS shows that regulation and 
9 GL Clark, “Money Flows Like Mercury: The Geography of Global Finance,” Geografiska Annaler B: Human 
Geography 87B, no. 2 (2005).
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material infrastructure were not, in and of themselves, enough to sustain 
a market; while Rule 535 made the initial venture possible, subsequent 
regulatory innovations and the eventual gaining of the RIE licence did not 
lead to long term success. Both AIM and OFEX came into being as a result of 
a collective conversational effort: the enormous push on the part of Wallis 
and her team to persuade the community that the new market would be 
important and had to be taken seriously, and a similar conversational effort 
on the part of John Jenkins and Paul Brown to revive old networks and unlock 
a flow of demand. More than mere marketing, these discussions talked the 
market into being, and at the same time secured the participation and the 
goodwill of those who would form part of the community. By this account 
the continued success of AIM was due to the ability of the LSE to maintain 
and expand such conversations through difficult times. The eventual 
failure of PLUS, on the other hand, suggests that even the most promising 
conversations are fickle and liable to collapse, a discursive failure exacerbated 
by the management’s focus on the purely technical aspects of running 
a market (although this problem points again to the economies of scale 
available to incumbent exchanges). Stock exchanges, just as much as banks, 
are narrations sustained by the confidence of the community that they serve. 
Most of all, the history shows us that markets are historically and materially 
embedded entities. They take a particular form as a result of historical forces 
and material constraints, including organisational path dependencies, 
regulatory changes, advances (or otherwise) in technological systems and 
market infrastructure, reactions to external stimuli and competitive pressures, 
and the personal projects and interests of individuals. The distinctive 
regulatory shape of AIM is an example of one such path dependency, and 
the launch of OFEX in 1995 another. These market architectures, cultures and 
trading mechanisms give rise to distinctive kinds of ‘ethics of office’ among 
participants. Examples are the code of practice among those apprenticed 
as blue buttons on the floor of the old London Stock Exchange, or the 
project-based frame of reference of classroom-educated MBAs. These value 
systems have shaped the developing markets and clashes between them 
underlie some of the most bitter disputes in my history. Recognising path 
dependencies and the value-systems of participants as the fundamental 
source of institutional form can facilitate discussion of appropriate 
organisational changes as and when necessary. As Michie pointed out 
almost 20 years ago, there is no reason why the task of providing risk capital 
should fall entirely to the LSE. It seems unreasonable to expect the London 
Stock Exchange to be involved in financing of very small enterprises or 
the provision of a market for their shares. But demand will not go away. 
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The recent growth of crowd funding and online platforms for business 
angel investment is likely to create a need for micro-level trading platforms 
going forward as investors seek to realise gains or simply to dispose of their 
holdings. It is likely that some of these needs will be met by matched-bargain 
services of the kind that John Jenkins and Paul Brown first established in 
1992. Indeed, JP Jenkins Ltd, never absorbed into the OFEX vehicle, has found 
its way back to Brown who is reviving it as an exit route for crowd-funded 
businesses. Several other individuals spoke to me in confidence about their 
coming plans for equity trading vehicles. NEX Exchange has repackaged its 
RIE licence as a growth market and main market and may yet challenge the 
LSE’s hegemony. It appears, therefore, that there is both need and scope for 
the development of small-scale, inexpensive mechanisms for the trading of 
smaller company shares and the provision of risk capital, integrated with the 
regional broking (wealth management) and advisory communities in the UK. 
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11. Timeline of relevant events
1 April 1966 S Jenkins & Son established
1970s OTC markets growing under Rule 163.2 and licenced 
dealer regulation
1973 Women admitted to Stock Exchange membership
1979 Wilson Committee criticises LSE. Margaret Thatcher 
becomes Prime Minister
November 1981 Unlisted Securities Market launched
November 1984 British Telecom public offer
27 October 1986 ‘Big Bang’ ends single capacity, opens City to foreign 
competition
January 1987 Third Market launched
19 October 1987 ‘Black Monday’ market crash
1990 Third Market merged with USM
11 February 1991 John Jenkins and Paul Brown establish J P Jenkins Ltd.
December 1992 LSE recommends closure of the USM within two years. 
CISCO established
March 1993 LSE scraps Taurus project and loses settlement function. 
Peter Rawlins resigns as Exchange chief executive
October 1993 Newstrack launched as joint venture between Reuters 
and JP Jenkins 
7 September 1994 LSE proposal to create AIM circulated, consultation 
begins
June 1995 AIM launched
29 September 1995 LSE’s Daily Official List ceases to publish 535 prices. LSE 
closes non-SEAQ board
2 October 1995 OFEX launched as ‘trading facility’
October 1997 LSE introduces SETS order book trading system. OFEX 
publishes code of practice
September 1999 LSE launches techMARK index. Dotcom mania 
approaches climax
August 2000 Sweden’s OMX makes hostile bid for LSE. Defence 
document promises rapid internationalization of AIM 
and techMark
1 December 2001 OFEX becomes prescribed market under FSMA
January 2002 OFEX rule book published
February 2003 OFEX floats on AIM
September 2004 Jenkins family loses control of OFEX. Simon Brickles 
takes over as CEO
November 2005  PLUS Service launched
Timeline of relevant events
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December 2006 PLUS raises £25m to launch RIE
18 June 2007 Tradelect, LSE’s £40m trading system, launched
July 2007 PLUS gains RIE
November 2007 MiFID comes into force. LSE blocks trading in AIM stocks
September 2008 PLUS launches legal action against LSE. Lehman 
Brothers collapses 15 September  
August 2009 PLUS commences trading in AIM securities
September 2009 PLUS raises £5m from Amara Dhari
14 May 2012 PLUS announces intention to conduct orderly closure
29 June 2012 ICAP purchase ratified at EGM
June 2015 AIM celebrates 20th anniversary
January 2017 AIM reaches ‘£100bn funds raised’ milestone 
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12. Appendix i: Interviewees
Interviews were conducted during the period December 2015 to May 2017. 
* denotes multiple interviews. 
Name/Pseudonym Role
Andrew Beeson Founder Beeson Gregory, broker, Chairman of 
Schroders
Andrew Buchanan Fund manager
Barry Hocken OFEX executive, Newstrack founder, small company 
financier
Brian Winterflood* Founder, Winterflood Securities, marketmaker
Corporate advisor 1* Small company financier
Corporate advisor 2* Small company financier
Corporate advisor 4* Small company financier
Corporate advisor 5 Small company financier
Emma Jenkins Former MD of OFEX, daughter of John Jenkins
Fund manager 1 Fund Manager
Geoff Hoodless* Founder Hoodless Brennan, broker
Gervais Williams Fund manager
Giles Vardey* LSE Director of Market Development, Chairman of 
PLUS
John Jenkins Founder, JP Jenkins, founder OFEX, former chairman 
of OFEX
Jonathan Jenkins* Former MD of OFEX, son of John Jenkins
John French Company promoter
Marcus Stuttard* Current Head of AIM and UK Primary Markets at the 
LSE
Market executive 1* Market executive
Market executive 2 Market executive
Market executive 3 Market executive
Market executive 4 Market executive
Market executive 5 Market executive
Market executive 6* Market executive
Market maker 1 Market maker
Market maker 2 Market maker
Martin Hughes Market executive
Paul Brown Cofounder JP Jenkins Ltd
Phil Nathan Director of broking, Charles Stanley
Promoter 2 Company promoter
Public relations 1 Former journalist, Public relations
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Public relations 2 Public relations
Public relations 3 Public relations
Public relations 4 Former journalist, Public relations
Simon Brickles Former Head of AIM, former CEO of OFEX
Stephen Hazell-Smith* Fund manager, former Chairman of PLUS
Stephen Norcross* Director of broking, Finncap
Theresa Wallis* Former Head of AIM
Tim Ward* Former member of AIM launch team, CEO of QCA
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